NARUS STA 6400
Hello, and welcome to the NARUS STA 6400!
This is where to find more information on NARUS STA 6400. STA stands for "semantic traffic analyzer".
The NARUS STA 6400 integrates with an optical-laser interception device which AT&T and the NSA use to access the telephone.
Allegation: Clandestince, Domestic Intelligence Gathering Outside FISA To Support War Crimes
The NARUS fiber optic splicing appears to capture information used to abuse civilian-prisoners of war in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Apparent use of illgally captured information; war crimes implications.
The fiber optic interception capabilities have been linked with the US Army, DoD budgets, and various firms located on the Atlantic coast. US Army Central Command has also been affirmatively linked with the various contractors which integrate with the NARUS STA 6400 system. [ Details here ]
The fiber optic-integration firm goes by two names, and is located in Miami, Flordia: Terremark or TERRENAP. Abraxas, Narus, and Verizon jointly sponsored a conference in Hawaii. [ Details ]
Boeing, as discussed here appears to act as an integrating contractor linking (a) the allegedly illegal intelligence gathering systems; with (b) the allegedly illegal rendition and prisoner abuse efforts.
AT&T Involvement With Building Phone Billing Database
Court refused to dismiss complaint against AT&T over billing issue. Members of Congress have been secretly briefed on illegal NSA activity and AT&T involvement in database, but have refused to investigate, raising 5 USC 3331 liabilities for Members of Congress. [ See page 27-28 of 40 ] Recall: NARUS has a billing-capability linked to Isreali firms and appears to be the means by which AT&T provided billing data to the NSA. Ref Ref Ref Ref
Litigation: State Secrets Fails, Other Avenues, NSLs Unconstitutional
State Utility Commissions actively targeting phone and billing companies [ Oregon: Click ]
Further undermining AT&T and White House's contention for "state secrets," 2nd District Court of Appeals struck down National Security Letters (NSL) as unconstitutional, affirming the lower court judgments against the government [See: 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 317 F. Supp. 2d 488]. [ORCON prohibits classifying activities to hide criminal conduct Click]
JROC: NSA's CMPO Acquisition Documents Defy White House, Hayden Assertions
Despite NSA refusal to cooperate, JROC and SEC documents show President and Hayden knew they were violating law. [JROC Manual in re NSA/Intelligence; Sample JROC comment resolution: Click Click.
Sample, indirect evidence: Cryptographic Modernization Program Office coordiantes documents through J7 Ref Sample PPT briefing slides, office coordination dates, POC: Cryptographic Modernization Program Office (CMPO; j7, jtfcb) CLick ]
Links to NARUS STA 6400: Schematics, trouble shooting, cross referenced with Klein's maintenance procedures in affidavit
Pictures of the STA, wiring diagram, and the 1999 conference/planning agendas [Click Links to HTML Screen Shots ]
Public transcription [PDF to text] conversion completed, posted Click
Summary discussion of the revealed schematics. [Overview, context Click ]
Funding Click
NARUS and ISS [ Click ]
NARUS STA 6400 includes Lucent's OC48 Other OC; see para 22, page 5/8; DDM 2000 Schematics
Multiple Fiber Optic Cables Para 21; page 5/8 [ Sample Troubleshooting procedures (OC3) for these actions, para 20-28] Port Standard: DoDI 8851.1 Satellite Integration OC 12 Guidance Conference
Room contents/use: Redacted text visible on the AT&T counsel documents.
Legal options rejected [Click ]
This Blog Content in the News
Some of you have noticed this content has been blocked, or not available except in outdated cache. Read here how this content, and other sites related to the NARUS STA 6400, have been blocked. [ Does the American NSA use NARUS STA-like systems to target/block web content, as NARUS apparently does for the Chinese: Click ]
Introduction to NARUS STA 6400 Links Below
You will find below some interesting links about the NARUS STA 6400: How it works, some illustrations, how it fits into the satellite data transmission, and some ideas on what you can do.
Note: This is not official information from NARUS or AT&T. This information is based on leaks from NARUS and AT&T, data mining done on the NARUS and AT&T systems, and other sources.
About NARUS STA 6400 Affidavit [ To read it: [ Click Mark Klein, April 6, 2006 ]
Technical [ For some answers: Visit Here ]
Legal Liabilities
Warrants and the US Constitution
Technical Changes
Legal Options
Civilian Liability for War Crimes
Defendants
Loss of Legislative Immunity
Rendition To The Hague
Reciprocity, Laws of War, Just War Theory, Levee En Masse
UN Intervention and Loss of US Sovereignty
Options to what America Offers
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NARUS linked with Telecom Billing [ Ref ]
White House is linked to a firm which has direct managerial control of law enforcement accounting for both the billing and the warrantless surveillance activities, and appears to be well connected to the secret/arguably unconstitutional national security letters [NSLs].
[ Phone Record Caselaw ]
Verizon and Bell South publicly denied they were cooperating with the NSA. Yet, there is a link between [1] NARUS, AT&T, the NSA; [2] the data transfers from the private corporations to the NSA; and [3] the billing companies. NARUS is the mechanism that assists these companies to construct the billing systems.
Amdocs, and Israeli firm works with NARUS and Bell South to provide billing services [ Click ]; NARUS also works with AT&T to perform this internet billing function. [ Click ]
This gives the telecoms a way to publicly deny that they are supporting the NSA, while using intermediaries connected to NARUS and Amdocs. Ref
NARUS linked with NSA SETA contractors
SAIC, Amdocs and the NSA appear on this SEC Edgar Document [Click suggesting that SAIC is another organizing or SETA -like integrator that is orchestrating the integration of the STA-like systems, billing data, into the NSA efforts. [To explore the connection between NARUS, SAIC, Amdocs, and the NSA: Click ]
Further, given the SAIC's known involvement in DoD messaging in Iraq [read="propaganda"], it seems likely that there is a cross flow of information from the NARUS/AT&T billing data, through NSA back into the SAIC pipeline, then out for public consumption, allegedly in violation of the Smith Act. We judge this is a confirmed link between the US Special Forces, Central Command HQ in Florida, the domestic surveillance program, and the alleged use of NSA intercept data for domestic messaging.
Budget Documents: Linking Telemcoms to NSA
You can also see through these DoD budget documents, how well entrenched AT&T is within DoD, not just the NSA. [ Descriptive Summaries showing AT&T link with NSA, DoD, or JTTF Click ] Any of these contracts could be used by NSA or SecDef to pay for the domestic data mining program.
Also, here are the public versions of the descriptive summaries mentioning classified DoD programs, NSA, and AT&T. [ Click ] You'll note that there are numerous references to encryption standards and other acronyms creating a gold mine of potential avenues which NSA could use to illegally spend funds on illegal things which violate not only the US Constitution but also FISA.
The Descriptive Summaries are documents largely constructed by DoD personnel at the System Program Office [SPO] with significant support by SETA contractors and other non-government personnel, south of the Pentagon in Virginia. Most Members of Congress never read the descriptive summaries, and leave it up to the Staffers to "work with" DoD and the Intelligence Community. Funds related to black programs or illegal things are constantly moving around, hidden, and then will float into another mysterious location.
The money may or may not be for DoD, but will flow into a "DoD-related" function, appear perhaps in Commerce or DoJ, then actually get expended by an NSA contractor overseas. Yes, it's designed to be confusing to prevent you from finding out how the President is violating the Constitution, who is involved, and their link between unlawful conduct and the clearly promulgated statutes. [Making sense of the DC funding -- how they hide money Click ]
The problem for the White House, NSA, AT&T, NARUS, and other contractors involved is that the "immunity" they're relying on under the 05 May 2006 Presidential "waiver" is not a lawful assertion of Presidential power. [ More ]
NARUS and the link to the telecoms: What this means
Based on this link (between NARUS and the billing services permitting the telecoms to deny direct support of the NSA's criminal activity), it appears the following is (apparently) true:
It remains to be understood what NARUS has been paid directly or indirectly for the very narrow NSA-support activity.
Connecting the Dots
Let's review what you may wish to examine more closely below in the links below, as it relates to the above link between NARUS and the apparent NSA-billing-support. Below you will find links related to the following important information:
The NARUS STA 6400 is also one of the tools the NSA and President use to do data mining and social network analysis [SNA].
It remains to be understood how Wall Street disciplines those who have allegedly violated the law.
Yes, even Presidential waivers can be illegal, and no reasonable contractor should have relied on something that violated a clearly established right. Rather, some government agents and contractors appear to have lost all credible qualified immunity and may be lawfully indicted for violating the law.
There are only five [5] NARUS STA 6400 systems mentioned in the affidavit, assuming one system for each of the five cities. However, total US information data throughput in 1998 would require at least eighteen [18] other systems for a total of a minimum of twenty-three [23]. This does not include data growth rate increases between 1998 and 2006. Issues: Where are the other systems, what types of systems are they using, and who knows about them? |
Data mining: The basics [ NSA's Social Network Analysis uses many databases: Click ] Recall: "no active Qaeda networks inside the United States planning attacks" So, who and what are they really monitoring with the 100% data mining program? ] Click ] 1999 paper on mining web content, referencing NARUS [Click ] FBIS becomes Open Source Center [OSC], monitors blogs/integrates with law enforcement, military and commercial databases [ Click ] Technical: Highly recommended discussion on the technical details, Cross posted
There are summaries about the NARUS system from the contractor’s site.A drawing and illustration [ Witness Statement ] The drawing can be confusing, and may not be helpful, but if you want to impress your friends, you can link to it. Integration: How NARUS STA 6400 likely integrates with other data-mining systems, AT&T satellites, and NSA ground stations [ System: 1997 DCGS ] [ Personnel: Click [ Illustration, inexact: Illustration ]] Funding: NSA wiretap costs [ EPIC: click; EPIC contacts: [ Click ] Note 1Note 4NSA Integration with JTTF: IPDR; NSA and IPDR ILETS LEITS These intersect with DHS through the NSA Advisory Board: [ Click ] [ Back to Referrer 1 Back to Referrer 4 ] Data Standards: IEEE Standard 802.3 in re lasers Voice: Possible to take the optical speech data and have real time speech recognition that converts the audio/speech into text/transcripts [ Click ] Statute: 10 USC 2366: Before Sept 2001, what reviews were done on the NARUS STA 6400 [ CLick ] See 10 USC 2366 in re NSA: [Click ] Note 6Subpoenas: Gold Mine: Potential AT&T/NARUS litigation subpoena target list -- STA industry POCs, Phone lists, assignments [ Click ] Back to Referrer 6] Litigation: EFF v AT&T [Frequently asked questions/answers [ Click ] Litigation against Verizon [ Click ] ACLU v US Govt in re NSA [ Click ] CCR v. Bush, NSA, and US Intelligence community [ Click ] Technical Security Buzz: [ Click ] [ DoD Directive: Things the DoD fails to do ] Sample files, likely well-organized using a NARUS STA-like system: [ Click ] Speculation on how DoJ-NSA data mining programs can be used to censor information on the internet [ Click ] Speculation on what the NARUS STA 6400-like systems should tell us about 9-11 [ Click ] Other news related to the illegal, domestic NSA activities [ Click] Contest: Which documents will the NARUS STA 6400 help declassify? [ Click ] Satire Competition: How to create IT that violates the Constitution? [ CLick ]
Sample searches:
[ Feedster: Click ]
[ Blog Search Engine: Click Click ]
[Note 5 ]
NARUS discussed in 1999 with Oracle the concept of Semantic Traffic Analysis, two years before Sept 2001 [Press release: 17-Dec-99 Click] This was four years after the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act; it appears NSA contractors were brought into the nexus to not only support this bill, but immediately move to develop IT systems that would support the law enforcement. It remains to be understood what happened between 1994 and Sept 2001. [ Back to Referrer 5 ]
Given the 1994 legislation, it is not likely that the federal government would:
Rather, it appears there are other NARUS STA-like systems in place, which were tested and well integrated with the NSA after the 1994 legislation.
NARUS interest item: Domestic application of technology
To see how NARUS STA-like system appears to have been used to direct JTTF in Nebraska, read this account [click ] The NSA provides investigative leads to JTTF and local law enforcement; it appears using NARUS STA, NSA is able to ensure that local law enforcement intelligence have information that permits them to circumvent the warrant requirements. They use the information to violate the rights of Americans, intimidate others, and harass political opposition.
It remains to be understood what events between 1999 and 2004 prompted NARUS personnel to interface with Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Information Systems Command, Raytheon, and the DoD acquisition community in Ft. Belvoir, VA. You will find consistent exchange of information throughout the DoD acquisition community directing personnel to common websites known within the NSA contractor community. The interface is not limited to a single service or continent, but covers multiple commands and geographic regions around the globe.
NARUS principal officers include: Greg Olsan and David L. Robertson [CPA; University of California at Berkeley (MBA)], and reports itself as, "privately held and fully funded, backed by JP Morgan Partners, Mayfield, NeoCarta, Intel, Presidio Venture Partners, Sumisho Electronics and Walden Ventures." [ Ref ]
The issue: How much money are American firms paid to support violations of the Constitution? But the legal issues are not isolated to Americans. It appears the Royal Canadian Mounted Police is looking into the matter, reviewing to what extent NARUS and the NSA may have illegally intercepted Canadian communications in and out of the United States.
You'd think that an agency like the NSA that uses Fourier transforms to retrieve optically stored digital information could use this laser technology to read the Constitution and FISA: "We shall be free from unreasonable searches; otherwise, get a warrant." But not these idiots.
NARUS STA 6400 needs to be looked at in terms of one of the many tools used in concert to violate the law. NARUS STA 6400 collects the information; other tools will analyze the information. The key is to know which other systems, personnel, technology, and information pipelines transferred, processed, and had access to the fruits of the NARUS STA 6400.
It's important to understand how NARUS STA -- as one of the data mining-support tools -- fits in with the Presidential programs. The system is illegally used. Congress refuses to act. They have the power of a subpoena. There are clear rules. The Constitution is clear. Yet, Congress refuses to protect the Constitution.
One of the curious areas NARUS appears to show some interest is the "Scaleable Monitoring Platform for the Internet", a common interest shared with NSA contractors including Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, and here is a 2004 e-mail mentioning the Netherlands Conference, and "Operation Support Systems" presented by Stas Khirman. [ Click ].
NARUS has openly disclosed many of its capabilities at the World Intellectual Property Organization, in Switzerland [ Details ]
There are many firms interested in the NARUS revelations:
Claranet UK
Comcast
Dolphin Search
E5 Systems
Inteliant
Logix Communications
Sun Microsystems, a partner of NARUS
Time Warner Telecom: For demonstration, we share a copy of a sample download from NSA to TW [time, personnel, IP, data reviewed, file inspected] and can verify this data is retained outside NSA control, here [ CLick ] Here are a sample of the interactions between [ TW Telecom and NSA, and the well established association with OSIS, a cloaking mechanism coordinated with MITRE. It is possible to penetrate the OSIS cloaking system; determine the vehicle VIN number of the NSA and DoD contractor personnel; the type of car they purchased; and the cash/wire transfers for maintenance then their bank account numbers. The US Attorney's office and Certified Fraud Examiners are well aware of this capability.] The General Counsel's office and the staff attorneys at Time Warner Telecom know about NARUS STA 2600, and should be able to provide an explanation for their concern. We can confirm GCHQ has intercepts of the message traffic in and out of the TW General Counsel's office related to NARUS STA 6400. Here are the IP numbers for Time Warner Telecom which can be used to trace the data once it was downloaded from NSA into the telecom community [ Click ]
Titan
[ UUNet ]
What's curious is to explore the common names on the boards of directors in the domestic surveillance area. For example, Unisys and NARUS have many overlaps. If we consider the 1994 legislation, and the program management efforts it's not likely the boards of directors pre 2001 were in the dark about what systems existed, had been deployed, or how they are used.
It is our view they members of the boards of directors in these companies fully know the extent to which pre Sept 2001 data was available, not relied on; and to what extent the pre Iran WMD invasion plans were premised on information know to be at odds with facts. Bluntly, are they being paid alot of money to keep quiet about [a] what the President was fully warned about prior to Sept 2001; or [b] where the information is retained; or [c] why this information is not available for fact finding in re Iraq WMD and what was really known about Sept 2001 events? It would be a real shame during an impeachment investigation to find out that members of the boards of directors had not been cooperative with the Fitzgerald Grand jury during his discovery requests, or when Congress reviews the war crimes in Iraq. When someone has information and they fail to cooperate on a matter of a war crime, they may very well be considered a co-conspirator. DoJ and NSA employees have already sought private counsel. How many of the members on the Boards of directors have reviewed the DL&O insurance in re war crimes liability?
Recall the internet was originally a DARPA project. DoD has various message communication systems. One of them is outlined here: Click. The Flag Officer in Charge of this acquisition works in an office called a "Program Executive Officer" or PEO. Goodwin will have to be called to discuss how the DoD systems integrate with NARUS and the rest of the SIPR Net. Lockheed Martin was recently awarded a $740M contract to manage the Defense Messaging System, managed from Hanscom Air Force at the Base Electronic System Center’s Operations and Sustainment Systems Group.
NARUS STA-like systems helps monitor the public's reaction to black propaganda; and messages are then crafted to manipulate the public. The problem they have is that they are not as comfortable with the predictive models: They were developed using one set of data; and the population has changed.
NARUS STA-like systems assist both DoD combatant commanders and American civilian leaders. NSA provides investigative leads from the illegal monitoring to local law enforcement. This is used to direct law enforcement to "stumble upon" evidence. This is how they get around the warrant requirements. The local prosecutors will have to explain why they have so much information, but local law enforcement has not been busy. They have been using NARUS to convict people. This is a violation of the Constitution.
At the same time, given the existence of NARUS STA-like systems, the White House cannot explain why there is no evidence about the attacks on the RNC offices before the 2004 election. It appears that using NARUS STA-like systems, the national leadership and law enforcement knew that the RNC attacked their own offices in pre-selected states.
You can get a sense of the loopholes in the statutes by reading the discussion by the numbered pages. The FY06 Senate Intelligence Bill provides you an idea of the wiggle room DoJ, NSA, and the White House have been using to violate the law, and illegally gather information. Here are the ranges of abuses committed by this White House using NARUS STA-like systems. [ Click ] Here is a guide to the other illegal NSA programs.
The violation is clear. Title 50 is what DoD and the White House have violated. Here is the problem the President has: He has the legal responsibility under 50 USC 413 to notify Congress about the use of NARUS STA within the AT&T system. He didn't do that. The Joint Staff also has a problem: They have violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or "UCMJ" Article 92. This prohibits conduct that violates the law.
NARUS interest item: Timelines
There are problems with the timelines. The six diagrams at this link show how the NARUS STA system capabilities -- as they were available, tested, and proven -- is at odds with the White House statements over the AUMF and the FISA; and also how the NARUS STA capabilities show us there had to have been message traffic between the telephone company General Counsels, DoD, NSA, and DoJ over the legal liability issues. They knew there were problems.
But the contractors cannot claim immunity. They have a bigger problem. DoJ has fatally asserted in question 21 to the House Judiciary that NARUS STA-like systems support illegal DoD combat operations. This means that US contractors are actively supporting the use of illegal military force and power against American civilians. This is a war crime. Civilian contractors may be tried for war crimes. All the assurances DoD, NSA, DoJ, and the White House staff gave to the phone companies -- over issues of immunity and liability -- are worthless.
The contractors are not as smart as you think. Their problem is they believe their own propaganda, and have a hard time separating reality from fantasy. They are delusional. They support your leaders. They are war criminals.
The information at this blog will be updated to provide you with additional useful information about the NSA capabilities. If you link back here, or tell your friends about this, you'll find other interesting information for your visitors.
This blog entry originally covered the material, and contains questions for the House Judiciary Committee.
The issue with the NARUS STA-like systems is two fold:
Give the existence of the NARUS STA system as AT&T and NSA were using it, we have to ask when it was developed, and put into full use. This means many people inside the NSA's Integrated Product Teams and Program Management Office know full well how this system was tested before Sept 2001.
Given the system existed in the wake of Sept 2001, the US would have known what was or was not true about Iraq. Yet, how do we explain what happened in 2003 -- the invasion of Iraq, and the leaking of bogus information. This means the Fitzgerald Grand Jury, US District Court in DC, and American people have been lied to.
Curiously, Wired is covering the NARUS in 2006, but in 2004 dismissed the system. Isn't the curious: What changed? [ See Item 3 ]
The NSA-AT&T's use of NARUS STA isn't simply a problem for American citizens. It now compels us to ask what we've really been told about 9-11, why the NSA did or didn't know about it, and what timelines we've been asked to believe.
The more you look at the NARUS STA-like system, the more you'll wonder why the President claims he was surprised about the UAE port deal. NARUS STA shows us that the NSA fully knew what was being discussed. Combined with the fabrications over the phony-2002 LA building attacks, and the misstatements over Iraq WMD, there's no telling how many other timelines have to be reconsidered. It is our view that Bush and Cheney know they've mislead the Fitzgerald Grand Jury.
Clinton was impeached for lying to a jury. The RNC needs to explain why jury tampering is "OK" for their President. Also, if this nation invaded Iraq to -- as the RNC would have you believe -- "bring law and order to Iraq," why isn't that standard applicable to the United States over the illegal use of the NARUS system in violation of FISA?
Given the existence of NARUS STA-like systems; the 1994 legislation calling for IT support of law enforcement; and the systems were well tested and in use before Sept 2001, we have to ask what kind of data mining was done, and how the 52 FAA warnings prior to Sept 2001 fit into this. Specifically, given the NSA knew that they needed to develop this system -- we have to look at the broader communications before Sept 2001 which the NSA knew full well: The planning, who was really involved, and what kind of communication went into the training for 9-11.
As another example, specific personnel inside the telecom industry have been linked with both NSA and Lebanon. The issue: If NSA had bonafide information related to the Mehlis assassination -- which it does not -- the US would be able to present this information. A similar "lack of information" not only existed -- and was known inside the intelligence community -- in re Iraq, but also with Iran.
NSA and the telecoms have a problem: The NARUS STA-like systems "should" be able to provide the information; the issue is the information the White House and Joint Staff "need" does not exist. This is well known to the DoJ Staff attorneys, and behind the NSA revelations to the New York Times. Bluntly, they know they have engaged in war crimes not just overseas but against American civilians.
These military operations violate US treaty obligations, and Congress fully knows the significance in terms of Article V of the US Constitution. Using methods and planning structures outside NSA intercept capability, American citizens have already begun work on drafting a New Constitution, outside Article V. There is nothing the White House or the NSA can do to stop this effort, as outlined here.
Here's the table of contents for this blog: The NSA archive is there, and shows you what we were discussing in 2004 on the issue; also there are some ideas on a New Constitution so that this type of abuse of power does not occur.
There are state level impeachment efforts under way -- these will force the Congress to vote -- up or down -- well before the November 2006 election on where they stand on the rule of law. It doesn't matter that the Congress may vote it down; rather, it's simply a reminder to Congress that they can't bury it in committee.
The NSA may have some very powerful tools, but they are unable to figure out how we are able to communicate, and get this high ranking.
Thanks for stopping by. Your interest shows we have reason for hope and optimism in America: People are willing to find out what they can do to protect their rights and prevent the abuse of power.
There are many others like you who are working behind the scenes. Here is the plan which has surprised the NSA and Joint Staff -- they are now reacting to this: [ Click ]
Good luck in protecting the Constitution. If you're wondering who I am, I'm well known to you and am the author of this quote: click.
They wished this.
Other links:
Real possibility NARUS-like systems are well integrated with local governments across the country, well known, and went unreported after Sept 2001: [ Other links: Click Contact: VZ Nuri theory-edge • cutting edge in algorithmics/mathematics ]
Subj: NARUS ISP in re EFF v. AT&T litigation For purposes of discovery and supporting the ongoing litigation against AT&T and the National Security Agency over alleged violations of the law, we offer the following for the court:
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2 [Back to Referrer] Funding The issue is: How much money would have been transferred to NARUS -- even in a diversion -- to get NARUS to take the fall? The larger issue is: Where is the money going other than NARUS, and how complicated are the funding flows in and out of Canada to these to-be-determined locations and NSA support systems. Even if NARUS is a diversion, we do know at least one person at NARUS is breathing. Funds have been linked from AT&T, NSA/DoD, and NARUS through this financial institution: Provident Credit Union. Could this be where the NSA sends the money for the NARUS personnel? NARUS, AT&T, and the NSA payroll systems have been penetrated without NSA detection, and we can confirm the contract flow of money linking all contractors back to the NSA. The information is also available in the backup files with GCHQ, and they can direct you to personnel inside DoJ who are currently working in an undercover capacity for the Department of Justice. There you will find details of the employee names at NARUS, and the funds that are transferred between the various DoD-NSA contracts, AT&T, and finally into the personnel payroll accounts. It remains to be understood which specific contracts assigned to NSA are or are not in support of the President's illegal programs. In turn, once you review the files at the DFAS office in Columbus, you will find the actual weapons systems through which the funding is transferred; and other NSA payroll information where these contracts are assigned. This will then link you to the other equipment -- outside AT&T and NARUS control -- that is also deployed around the country in other communities in support of illegal NSA domestic surveillance. Keep in mind we are not saying that Provident has or has not done anything illegal. The issue is: Where else is the money going besides NARUS. It appears the Canadian Mounties may be reviewing the DFAS funds transfers through Regina, Alberta then to other locations in the United States. [ Click ]. As a curious comparison, it will be interesting to see how the DFAS funding flows through the NSA into the following institutions, which as of 2000 had provided $57M of funding: [ Click ] Intel Communications Fund, NARUS lease at 500 Logue Av linked to LV Colliers for 17,250 feet, this confirms the total square footage was under 50K feet. This appears to be assigned to Steve Condrey with Colliers International. Let's consider whether the floor-space-assigned is sufficient to do what we're asked to believe: That this facility is the sole location to develop the NARUS STA 6400; and that there are no other locations. First, we know that the facility is 17,250 square feet; a comparative location is in Florida 21067-square-foot lease at 8857 N. 56th St. The question we have to consider is: Is it reasonable that the facility in California can actually hold the number of NARUS employees were' asked to believe are there; or must the worked that they're doing -- in support of AT&T and then the NSA -- actually occur somewhere else? NARUS as of Jan 2006 was reported to have about 100 employees or 172 square feet per employee. If figure 5 is to be believed, then we would assume at least offsite copy contract. But it's more reasonable, given the consulting nature of NARUS to define it more of a service contract, and that it has about 3 copiers in the 17,250 square feet for the 100 employees. We can then cross check this figure against figure 4 which says that there are 43 copiers per 1M square feet or 10-3, which confirms that the NARUS facility use is less related to square feet and size, but with it's relationship, intellectual property, and business type. This means it remains to be understood who overseas helped create the software for the NARUS STA 6400, and which other contractors worked with NARUS. Even if NARUS has deployed all the systems, we know of only 5 cities. But NSA cannot possibly cover this. It remains to be understood which specific contractors worked with AT&T and NARUS to physically fabricate, move, and install the systems. In other words, there's a production plant where they make this -- outside the NARUS facility -- and there's insufficient floor space at the NARUS facility to support all the NSA's IT data mining efforts. There's a bigger fish out there at another location other than AT&T and this NARUS facility. Another way to look at this is the energy consumption for the facility and the 100 employees. Let's suppose for the sake of argument that the overhead costs applied to the NSA contracts is 50%, meaning the energy consumption, material, and non-labor costs adds up to the 50%. Let's also suppose what we've read is true -- that the price of these 100 employees is above average. So, let's guess: That each employee gets paid $100,000 per year, and on top of that they have $50,000 in overhead per employee, or $0.15M per employee, or $15M/year. The issue is what is the approximate energy cost -- which we would have to have to support that type of operation, that budget, and that type of industry. Consider the above funding flows: $57M. See the problem? A gross estimate of their labor costs is $15M/year. SO between 1998 and 2000 -- at the time of this funding -- they had only burned throw $30M dollars; so why an additional chunk of money on top of the funding that is coming from the AT&T and the other clients? The facility is too small for production, and the energy use couldn't be that high. It appears they've got too much money going into the facility that's too small. This suggests that NARUS is a front for a larger activity, and the real work is somewhere else, again supporting the belief that there's something else going on somewhere else, not just at NARUS. Let's consider the iPowerWeb facility that's 17,000 square feet, essentially the same size, but with twice the number of employees, and 200. Let's think about NARUS and the 2x the space it has other than iPowerWeb -- that means that rather than having everyone stacked into cubicles, answering phones as they likely have at iPowerWeb, they have everyone stacked into two cubicles. Let's take best case, and assume that all the 120 Phoenix employees at iPowerWeb are doing their job in the 17,000 foot facility, and the other 40 are somewhere else. This doesn't help, it makes it worse. It means that the 120 Phoenix employees are roughly in the same size as 100 at NARUS. This means the effective space per employee at NARUS drops from 2 desks to 1.2 desks per person, making it less likely that there's any production facility; then raising more questions: Where is this money really going, and how can the NSA and White House be supported by people who are almost crowded in like customer service reps. See the problem? Even with best case and adjusting the figures, nothing adds up. There's still not enough space to do consulting work, have presentation, and have conference tables, then spread out -- and on top of that fabricate the NSA/AT&T products. It remains to be understood why the NSA is only discussing a small facility, while the actual effort required to sustain the other operations -- other than the five cities listed -- would have to be much larger. [ 1997 baseline 1994 opto electronics ] |
Comparison: Total US Information vs. NSA Data Mining Capacity Summary: 1. Publicly discussed systems are far less than the total data mining requirements 2. There are at least 23 systems in place; only 5 of them have been disclosed. 3. The NARUS STA 6400-like systems are part of a larger NSA acquisition effort, fully in development and deployment well before Sept 2001. 4. White House and Joint Staff statements on FISA are designed to dissuade other NSA employees and contractors from disclosing other evidence related to illegal activity. Discussion The other thing to consider is the sheer volume of electronic data that we are asked to believe go through X-locations. Again, we've been given some idea of what the NARUS STA 6400 can do. The issue is: Does the actual electronic transfer -- under a system that reviews everything -- is there still too much stuff going through the pipeline, and requires additional NARUS-like STA systems to be installed. That's the key question: What is a comfortable level that the NSA would have going through the systems, and still maintain secrecy. At first blush, it doesn't appear as though the current 5 cities -- as of 2002 -- are below the threshold; nor does it look like the rest of the country could be handled. Yes, it's alot of data capability in the NARUS STA 6400; the issue is how much data in other locations was also getting reviewed; and how does the total data throughput of the Entire US compare with what we are led to believe only occurred at the five AT&T sites. Again, it appears as though the actual data flows across the entire area of interest for the NSA in the US in all data formats would far exceed what could be managed and processed by the very stellar NARUS systems. Let's think in simple terms. Suppose we look at the NARUS STA-like systems as being a simple box; and the information is like a single pipe going through NARUS STA. The question to be asked is: What was the maximum capacity of the total US data -- that we would expect to have been sampled using these NSA monitoring systems -- and then compare this bandwidth capacity with what was available in other countries. The issue is that we have no real idea of the actual data volume that at any given point in time is going through the system. Rather, all we know for sure is the bandwidth utilization, and how it does or does not compare with countries like Japan that are moving to expand their bandwidth. At the same time we also know that companies are working with the Federal Government to work on bandwidth and priority in the internet; this suggests that there's a problem with the capacity and also means that to estimate the total data -- unless someone else has a good number -- we have to look at the total bandwidth in known locations, and then see if we can back-calculate the total data for that specific location. AT this point, the White House could pick any number and say, "This is what is the actual. . ." but who's really doing to know? Thus, the next step is to compare the most credible data load on the entire US System, and see how this most likely data load would or would not be handled; then guess as to the likely number of other locations -- not just these five -- that would reasonably be expected to exist in order to adequately mange the full spectrum of NSA interest areas. Keep in mind we're not talking about data that is bought and sold; we're talking about a stream of information from all sources to all locations. That not simple a file of names; it's everything. DHS also has an SCO which has to interface with this system. Here are some comparative programs: [ Click ] The problem is we're dealing with these links finished products, ideally they are at the end of the analysis, so much smaller than a total level. This would set a lower bound for the total data and is not really useful. Rather, what we're talking about is a single snapshot of this information census data, but for all data as a group, not as separate categories. That's alot! Think in terms of what they knew just after Sept 2001 when the proposal was getting put together for AT&T and the current NARUS STA 6400 Image -- see the problem: The data hubs of high traffic don't match what we've been told about the AT&T support for the NSA. Also, there are many other hubs other than the internet such as this. This means there's something else. Factors: Total information-data load vs. NARUS STA 6400 Capacity Goal: A. How many STA 6400's are needed to process all the information in the United States? B. Given it looks like there are only 5 STA 6400's in place, what percentage of the US data is not getting covered? C. By inference, how many other systems must exist is NSA wants to cover all data? For sake of simplicity, we'll simply look at the data as it is in 1998-2002, and not attempt to make any conversions to 2006. Total Phone 0.028742284 Terabytes/sec REf
DARPA solicitation data: Consider their assumptions on total data/information to be reviewed, accessed, managed, and screened These links are to Poindexter's old stomping grounds: [FAS ] [Transational data ] [ Proposer information ] [ Firts ] [ Second ] [Third ] Then we have to consider the sheer maintenance support requirements. Not simply to physically repair and maintain the system, but do so in a manner that did not attract attention across the country. We're not buying the "it was just through five cities"-argument. Rather, there are many others involved in the maintenance, support, and upgrades. Recall, FISA has been changed several times; this would have to require some sort of tweaking in the deployed systems. Also, given the acquisition of at least 23 systems -- most likely many more -- we're talking a major acquisition effort involving multiple years of planning, testing, development, fabrication, and then deployment. We can speculate that the testing and development peaked in 1998, and this is when the monitoring systems were first installed; it remains to be understood how many of the total 23 were already in place prior to Sept 2001; and how many additional systems were added later between Sept 2001 and now. We judge the deployment schedule was well spaced out, and not something that occurred quickly; rather it ramped up, and reached a peak rate in 1999, then tapered off. It is likely the forecasted data throughputs were well forecasted, and there have been no surprises in terms of inadequate monitoring and interception centers relative to actual data monitoring requirements. Let's presume that there is at least one other non-AT&T sub contractor -- other than NARUS -- that is doing this. The issue is: How are the multiple systems then integrated into a common system for data analysis. Also, as part of the overall data mining concept we have to speculate on how the data is -- after it is collected -- transferred to its final location. We judge the easiest method would be by satellite. This means that there would have to be an additional integration effort between the original land interception system, and the space-based. Clearly, a simple approach would be over landline, but this would simply create another set of data that could get intercepted. Perhaps the NSA is encrypting data and sending it along the secure DoD networks. It remains to be understood what it means -- in terms of legal issues -- if civilian data were illegally captured, then sent along DoD secure lines to the analysis centers. What most likely happened is in the early 1990s the concept took off, and was behind the 1994 legislation calling for IT support to law enforcement. In other words, the entire NSA monitoring system -- as it is currently being illegally used -- was designed before Sept 2001. At best the acquisition effort started in parallel with the aircraft modification program. In turn, the current system isn't something that simply mines information. There are then sub-sections where the finished products are then analyzed, reviewed, and put into something that resembles information. The issue is -- where are these data analysis centers, how many people are working at them, and do they realize that they're taking data illegally obtained and then analyzing it? Again, there are many people involved in this, at multiple locations through the country. In our judgment, the NSA is using NARUS as a red herring. Yes, there's something going on at NARUS, but there's something bigger going on somewhere else, in multiple locations, and it appears the employees may have no clue about each other. In our judgment the sole objective of the White House and DoJ public statements is to dissuade employees from thinking, "Gosh, did I do something that wasn't right?" Again, the entire siren song from DoJ and the White House has been repetitive: "We did nothing wrong." They don't believe what they're saying; rather, they're trying to delay NSA contractors from putting two and two together and coming forward before the November 2006 election. Thus, going back to the AT&T general counsel, we judge that sole objective of that "request for suppression" is at odds with what they've fatally admitted: That there's something going on at NARUS; but the real goal is to distract attention from the other facilities, the other components, and the larger NSA effort for this specific activity. This does not mention the other technical support required for the broader integration and analysis functions developed after 1994. |
Summary: Information is not credible, appears to be designed to act as a red herring. Another look: The incredible NARUS statement This is a breakdown of a recent NARUS VP statement. The goal of this is to show that there appears to be some misinformation going around about what NARUS is or is not doing. It remains to be understood whether the VP for marketing is in the dark, and the NARUS CEO is not keeping all personnel informed; or whether there is a deliberate effort to downplay the NARUS involvement for the purpose of attracting attention to NARUS. The short version is: regardless how you interpret the NARUS VP comments -- whether they are or are not related to the official CEO position -- one thing is clear: NARUS STA 6400 is only one small fraction of the entire NSA data mining effort. The real issue is how the NSA, AT&T, NARUS, and other contractors like Raytheon and Lockheed Martin have integrated their commercial satellite and ground stations to unlawfully support illegal violations of the law; and to what extent they were doing so well before Sept 2001. Here are the details on the problematic NARUS VP Statement NARUS has asserted a “hands off” approach to AT&T, implying that he had/has no idea what AT&T is doing: ”Once our customers buy our product, it's relatively opaque to us” -- Steve Bannerman, NARUS vice president of marketing
For purposes of simplicity we assume that the Vice President for Marketing is speaking for the NARUS CEO and NARUS; thus we generalize his comments as being the position of the NARUS CEO. NARUS CEO has not distanced himself from these comments; thus we conclude that even though the NARUS Vice President for marketing is the source of the comments, that this is the position of the NARUS CEO. To re-iterate: In all comments below we explicitly define the above comments as being from the NARUS CEO, a position of the NARUS CEO, and a well supported position of the NARUS CEO. Clearly, the issue is: Because the NARUS CEO has not explicitly stated this – and delegated this statement to the VP for Marketing, is there a reasonable basis to ask to what extent the NARUS CEO is keeping staff in the dark about actual communications and other NARUS support for AT&T and NSA. We leave this for another day. Rather the goal of this discussion is to evaluate the merits of this assertion – that NARUS is in the dark about what AT&T is doing. We conclude, on the basis of the discussion below that NARUS well interfaces with AT&T and NSA on the full data mining programs, and well supports the NSA in the AT&T data transmission via satellite to NSA supported ground stations. We summarize with a discussion of what other systems are involved, the broader data mining program, the types of systems included in the overall capture, and the types of contractor activities required to fully support the full NSA data mining program. In short, the NARUS STA 6400 system only captures at most a small portion of the overall NSA data mining. We judge NSA, AT&T and NARUS fully know the broader interface issues between the telephone company, AT&T satellites, and the other NSA-contactor-supported ground stations and analysis centers. Let’s begin with a discussion of the NARUS statement. This assertion – that NARUS is not familiar with what AT&T is doing -- does not appear credible for several reasons If someone were to contact AT&T – a listed client of NARUS – they would have to ask about the NARUS reputation. Suppose the AT&T community was asked, “How supportive is NARUS?” If the NARUS CEO is to be believed – that NARUS has “no idea” what AT&T does – then AT&T would have to say, “Well, we buy their products, but when we have a question about how we can modify it, NARUS isn’t there.” But AT&T isn’t saying that. Rather, AT&T appears to say the opposite, to such an extent that NARUS is willing to continue to refer potential clients to AT&T staying, “We do such a great job, we’re willing to let you talk to our client – they’ll tell you great things.” If the NARUS CEO statements are true – that he has no idea what AT&T is doing – then AT&T would have to respond in a manner that undermines NARUS’ reason for mentioning AT&T. This is too convoluted. Rather, it’s more credible to believe the opposite: That NARUS and AT&T well interface, and that NARUS lists AT&T because AT&T will tell other potential clients that NARUS is fully responsive to all requests for assistance. This defies what the NARUS CEO would have us believe. If you go down the list of conferences and other meetings NARUS attends and is well represented at, you’ll find that the clients are from law enforcement, national security, and people in the intelligence community. This is not news. The issue is – if AT&T and NARUS are not interfacing – then NARUS’ attendance at these conferences would constitute a direct communication between NARUS to AT&T clients. Yet, this is not the case. As stated, NARUS and AT&T still favorably comment on each other. Despite the 1990’s conferences and direct contact NARUS has had with AT&T clients, AT&T and NARUS are still on good terms. This means that NARUS – despite attending the conferences and interfacing directly with AT&T clients – is still on favorable terms with AT&T, appropriately steers business to AT&T, and does not attempt to compete. Rather, the only way that AT&T and NARUS would both have favorable comments about each other, and at the same time not compete is that they have some sort of ongoing technical interchange and have agreed on what NSA requirements and how to serve the client. This is merely good customer service. If the NARUS CEO is to be believed, then he would have us believe that NARUS is not a good service agent; and we would have to believe that millions of dollars continue to into NARUS despite poor results. Again, if this were the case, then it would mean that money is simply going into NARUS for them to do nothing. This defies reason: the investors would have to see some tangible result. A company like NARUS with a finite floor space must generate returns. Whether those returns are or are not favorable is a different matter. Rather, if NARUS CEO is to be believed – that they have no idea what AT&T is doing – then this would raise questions as to the suitability of NARUS as a customer service company. Either the NARUS CEO is telling the truth – and NARUS is a poor customer service company; and this raises questions about the auditing practices of the companies who provide funds; Or NARUS CEO is not being candid, and does not want to reveal the scope of the interface with AT&T and other NSA contractors that fully rely on NARUS to support their NSA-related support projects. If NARUS CEO is being candid, then he would have us believe that there is absolutely no interface between the software system and the final end user. This is not credible. The very reason that NARUS hired former NSA personnel was to do the opposite: Ensure that the working products are consistent with the ultimate user requirements: The NSA. Whether the intermediate contractor is AT&T or someone else is irrelevant. The mere fact that NARUS has hired former NSA personnel clearly indicates that NARUS is concerned how its products are used, and wants to ensure its products do interface to solve NSA problems. If NARUS CEO statements are to be believed, he would have us believe that he has no interest or communication with an intermediate-level NSA contractors [AT&T], but goes out of his way to ensure that the system he makes interfaces with the final user: NSA. How is this “final interface” going to be achieved unless NARUS is involved with the intermediate contractor effort? Again, this defies reason. If you review the various DoD sites, you’ll see that NARUS is well known, and that the NARUS systems and websites are well understood. NARUS is a recognized name. They have a recognized product. They are something which the information technology community well know. If the NARUS CEO is to be believed – that he has no knowledge of the AT&T product, or what AT&T is doing – then this raises questions as to whether NARUS is really being a good supplier. But the NARUS reputation shows us that it is well qualified to be an excellent supplier, trusted, and someone that works well with the NSA community. Thus, any claim by the NARUS CEO that he doesn’t know or is not familiar is not consistent with his otherwise sterling reputation as being actively involved, fully supportive, responsive, and willing to assist to solve NSA issues. If NARUS and AT&T were not working in concert, then we would have to conclude that NARUS was going behind AT&Ts back and talking directly to AT&T customers. Yet, NARUS still lists AT&T as a client, indicating that AT&T is satisfies with the agreements and discussions NARUS has with law enforcement, and does not consider this an adverse competitor. In order for AT&T to use the NARUS system, AT&T would not simply plug the system into the wall, and use it. Rather, AT&T would have to know the limitations and parameters of the NARUS system then modify them or leverage them to address the other issues. It’s not reasonable to think that AT&T independently back engineered NARUS system, determining its operational capabilities, and then built off the AT&T-derived information. Rather, AT&T and NARUS would have to exchange information on what the NARUS technical details were; and AT&T and NARUS would likely have discussed in general terms what they hoped to accomplish, how to modify or use the NARUS system for this objective, and then ensure that the use did or did not conform to the licensing agreement. To suggest the opposite: That AT&T and NARUS had no communication is not likely, AT&T would not first buy a product, then interpedently re-accomplish a study on what the NARUS system does or does not do. If this is the case, then this would be grounds to review whether AT&T is effectively using capital and other government funds. If we take NARUS CEO at his word, then this forms the basis for DoD to expand an investigation into alleged AT&T waste of government resources: Not simply to allegedly commit violations of the law, but to inefficiently use open resources that would simplify the interface and solution, regardless its illegality. Either the NARUS CEO is telling the truth, and AT&T is wasting money; or NARUS CEO is not being truthful, raising questions – as with Libby – what NARUS really hopes to protect. Let’s take the NARUS CEO comment at face value – that he has no idea what the AT&T system does, or what the AT&T engineers are doing. In order for AT&T to do what it is doing – what we’re not sure, but we can speculate – AT&T would have to take an existing product, and do something with it. This means that the final product or support system would be something this is easily duplicated by simply installing the NARUS system. But if this were the case, why would the NSA go to AT&T, then buy a product, then install it? NSA could do that itself – they lied about the FISA requirements, made up information to justify ignoring FISA – why not make up a new story to “justify” installing the system without either AT&T or NARUS knowing? Rather, what’s more likely is that AT&T is doing something specific with the NARUS product, and doing something that neither NARUS or the NSA or other contractors can easily do. The “other thing” could very well be the way that AT&T packages the data, and delivers it to the NSA. This implies that there are non-AT&T assets which AT&T has to interface with after AT&T captures the data. This implies that the AT&T and NSA have agreed to use the AT&T satellites to deliver the data to NSA-controlled assets used for analysis, archiving, and prioritization. Bluntly, it is absurd to believe that the NSA would interface with AT&T, but that NARUS would not interface with AT&T. Rather, the issue becomes to what extent AT&T is involved in other NSA activities related to the data mining: This means that AT&T has to do two things: But the issue then becomes once AT&T does this, we have to take a step back and say, “Is AT&T doing something so novel that it would create a new business model and product that is something other customers would want, or is the technical solution so specific to NSA that no other client would want the product.” This is where we get into the make versus buy decision. If AT&T is doing something radically different – that the NARUS STA 6400 cannot fully support – then AT&T isn’t doing something that simply builds off or tweaks the NARUS system. Rather, it would have to be doing something extraordinary, making the NARUS STA system merely a minor component. Yet, AT&T engineers tell us that the NARUS STA is the system, and that all AT&T has done is merely ensured that the NARUS STA interfaced with the telephone system to address NSA objectives. The issue is: If we are to believe that the NARUS STA 6400 – and the NARUS CEO have no idea what AT&T are doing – then we would have to conclude that AT&T is doing something that is novel, and warranted patent protection. Thus, if the NARUS CEO statement is to believed, then we have to ask where is the AT&T patent for this radically new product; and how is the AT&T using this new technology in new locations, above and beyond what NSA or the NARUS CEO are aware. It may be true that AT&T is doing something new and not telling NARUS. The issue then becomes: Is AT&T doing other things that fill in the 80% gap between what the current NARUS STA 6400 systems do, and the other 80% of the US information systems; and how the AT&T approach is being applied in other countries like Canada, where the data analysis may be occurring. We can only speculate. We don’t have all the information. The issue is that there are two problems: In order for there to be a data mining program, you have to capture all the data. Using only the five NARUS STA 6400 systems, there is insufficient technical capacity to data mine all the information. We judge there are other systems in place to support the data mining program; We judge the AT&T and NARUS STA 6400 system is at most one-fifth [1/5] of the total intercept capability. There are other systems which comprise at least 80% of the other intercept capability. We judge the data mining program is 100% capture for the following reasons The only way this information could be captured is if there is a data mining program. If they were engaged in bonafide surveillance – without a warrant – then there would be a reason for the US to direct attention. It is another matter whether that reason was bonafide, related to political intimidation, or simply an effort to retaliate for petit offenses. The way around the warrant requirement is to use the NSA-captured data to direct law enforcement to ‘stumble upon” other evidence, which is admissible. At the 6 Feb 2006 meeting before the Senate Judiciary, Gonzalez did not dispute that there were other programs. We judge that these other programs are not really “other” – rather, they’ve simply arbitrarily defined “other programs’ as things that specific contractors are not told about. Review The NARUS CEO assertion that he is not familiar with the AT&T use of the NARUS STA 6400 is not credible. There are too many interface issues. Rather, in order to support the full data mining program, AT&T and NARUS would have to interface with other contractors to ensure that the captured data was then packaged and delivered to the ground stations where NSA would provide it to other customers. It remains to be understood which other NSA contractors like Raytheon and Lockheed Martin designed the ground station system to receive and process data from systems other than AT&T and the NARUS STA 6400. The current capacity of the AT&T NARUS STA 6400 systems captures at most only 20% of the data that was known in 1999. Since then, the volumes have increased, meaning that there is a significant chunk of data which the publicly known AT&T and NARUS STA 6400 systems do not capture. It remains to be understood which systems – above and beyond the AT&T and NARUS STA 6400 – capture the remaining data in the NSA data mining program. |
Also for purposes of discovery and litigation, we believe we have found one of the many private e-mail systems which NARUS and ISP are using to communicate. Here is a sample e-mail which includes NARUS and ISP in the communications. Here is a portion of the header from one of the emails. Note it includes the e-mail and IP number and an address. The information is behind a firewall and requires a password to read the entire contents: anderson_vance@hotmail.com Colleen Anderson 801 DALLAS ST SAUK ...anderson_vance@hotmail.com Colleen Anderson 801 DALLAS ST SAUK CITY WI 53583 209.83.13.89 5/18/2005 7:12 arobins1@amfam.com Allen Robinson 13703 S STEWART URL of this e-mail, and a link to the fire walled system: www.pmaftp.com/havens/Omni/50k_File12_052005.txt Here is how to find this e-mail: [ Click ] As confirmation this is a valid URL, look at the other sites containing the above URL [ Click ] Here is a copy-and-paste of these three links: waterside estates dr horton - ojoo.comWe were looking for pages containing the term waterside estates dr horton, 144 pages were found. Search Took 7.0413 Seconds ... |
Note 3: Summary: Note the many interactions with law enforcement; there is a reasonable basis to expand discovery into the JTTF files for purposes of the NSA litigation. Also, for purposes of litigation and discovery, there are well known conferences in the IT and telephone industry. The attendees from industry are well known. It will be interesting to see: Here is a sample conference: To see the links between NARUS and law enforcement consider this link Click. At the links you'll see well established organizations like the FBI, JTTF, various local law enforcements, and Booz Allen, winner of the big contracts in Iraq. Here are the various IP codes showing common interests between NARUS and various DoD installations worldwide: [ Click ] It is our view based on a cursory review of the public information, there is probable cause to expand civil litigation discovery into the JTTF, FBI, and DoD information systems to determine: It is our view the primary objective of this alleged conspiracy was merely to generate contracts and appropriate funds for unlawful purposes; and despite the clear laws prohibiting this unlawful use many personnel inside NSA, DoJ, DoD, and the White House -- along with countless corporate officers and IT workers -- well know the scope of the illegal activity is much wider. [Back to Referrer 3] |
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