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Wednesday, February 22, 2006

How to review the hidden NSA programs

This is a guide. It is not intended to "the answer." It is merely a place to start. This will show you how to review the hidden NSA programs.

The approach is simple, and easy to understand. After you are done reviewing the material, be sure to let others know what you find.

[ For your convenience, there is an NSA Hearing Archive; Click here to read other content in the NSA Hearing Archive.]

What I'll do is show you where to look, how to review the information, and what you can do. I'm sure you'll see it's fairly simple to understand.

Then I'll show you some examples of how this is done, and show you some finished reports that you can write yourself.

Then I'll walk you through some simple steps and examples of how you can do this on your own. You'll be impressed with how quickly you'll be able to do this on your own, and you'll have other ideas on how this can be done.

* * *

Executive Summary

The methodology outlined below can be summarized in the following reports.

Summary findings:

  • NSA's modernization and spiral acquisition efforts are inconsistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulations; prior to 9-11, NSA programs used unlawful capabilities inconsistent with FISA [ Click ].

  • POTUS is independently confirmed to have violated the law by failing to notify Congress of unlawful activities [ Click ].

  • DoD Statute review confirms SecDef has violated the law: [ Click ].


  • The President, Joint Staff, National Security Council, DoJ, NSA, CIA, civilian contractors and others in and out of the US Government have conspired to violate the laws of the United States; and

  • There is no effective oversight of the Executive Branch, DoJ, DoD, or NSA by the Inspector General, NSA Independent Oversight Board, or Congress.


    Discussion on Options: [Click ]

    If Congress fails to respond, the States are prepared to compel the Congress to investigate: [ Click ]

    The deadline for Congress to initiate impeachment proceedings/order an investigation is 1 March 2006. If there is no action, the States are poised. Choose wisely

  • * * *

    Let's get into the guide. This Guide will help you see how to examine public information to find out what is or is not going on inside the NSA.

    Part One: Where to start

    Step 1 Let's start here: [ Click ]

    Step 2: Then type in: "National Security Agency" "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act"; you can also type in this second search string, "Department of Justice" "Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act"

    Step 3: Start reading.

    Step 4: Ask these types of questions:
    A. If this is the standard, how do we explain what we have?

    B. If this is possible, why wasn’t it done?

    C. If this is the standard, how do we explain the other conduct?

    Let's review some examples

    Here are some sample reports of how this works, and what you can learn.

    Notice how simple it is to contrast the standards with what we publicly know: Click.

    Here is a sample line of questions based on a simple review of public information. [ Click ] Notice all we're doing is comparing what we know, to what we have been told.

    It's fairly simple, anyone can do it.

    Let's work through some examples together

    I'll show you some sample questions, and then we'll walk through how to review these types of issues using the open information.

    Again, you'll see how easily this can be done.

    1. Who isn't doing their job?

    2. Where are the audit checklists?

    3. Why does the Inspector General not doing this?

    4. How has this been reported to the Congressional Committees?

    For now, and demonstration purposes here are two general areas we want to look at in the US Code. one is the US Department of Justice. The Second is the Department of Defense.

    Let's start with the DoJ, and focus on something interesting with the FISA and IG responsibilities. Again, this isn't magic, it's all there for you to read.

    The issue is when we compare [a] the standards with [b] what we know, there is a problem. Let me show you an example.

    Part A

    First, let's start with what we know: something is going on, but Congress is playing stupid. Also, the President keeps talking about these programs.

    I. Step 1: Hit this link, Click

    II. Step 2: Look for this quote:
    (D) a certification that
    the Inspector General has had full
    and direct access to all
    information relevant to the
    performance of his functions;

    This tells us something interesting things:

    1. The Inspector General [IG] has the power to review things

    2. When the IG has to certify something -- this means there has to be a document of that certification

    3. The IG has to attempt to do something

    4. If the IG cannot do what they hope to find, they have to notice whether they have been given full access to the information or not.

    Part B

    Let's do the same thing, but with a different clause.

    I. Hit this link: [Click ]

    II. Look for this clause:
    (d) Semiannual reports;
    immediate reports of serious or
    flagrant problems; reports of
    functional problems; reports to
    Congress on urgent concerns

    (1) The Inspector General
    shall, not later than January 31
    and July 31 of each year, prepare
    and submit to the Director of
    Central Intelligence a classified
    semiannual report summarizing the

    activities of the Office
    during the immediately preceding
    six-month periods ending December 31 (of
    the preceding year) and June 30,

    What do we know

    This is important. It tells us the IG has to file a report. It also tells us this report is periodic. And it tells the IG what they're supposed to put in that report.

    This is the basis to request this information -- and/or ask why those in Congress who have clearance to review this report have not read the report; or they didn't receive the report.

    Again, it doesn't matter what their reason it -- the point is that we can simply point to the standard and ask, "What is going on?" That's it.

    Part C

    The next step is to follow the logical step. We have to look at what is going on in Congress.

    I. Hit this link:

    II. Look for this clause:
    (3) The Director may
    prohibit the Inspector General from
    initiating, carrying out, or
    completing any audit, inspection,
    or investigation, or from issuing
    any subpoena, after the Inspector
    General has decided to
    initiate, carry out, or complete
    such audit, inspection, or investigation
    or to issue such subpoena, if the
    Director determines that such
    prohibition is necessary to protect
    vital national security
    interests of the United States.

    The question becomes: Was it reasonable to assert that these programs which violate the law should "not be reviewed" because of [a] national security; or was the actual intent of the "do not review order" -- if that exists -- related to a simple goal of preventing Congress from finding out about the FISA violations?

    Given that violations of the law are not "in the interests of national security" but crimes, then the issue becomes: Who should have probed further, but failed to or was dissuaded?

    Again, the point of this clause is to show you what might be going on:

  • A. What is the reason that this activity is occurring, but nobody in Congress knows about it;

  • B. Is there are requirement to do or not do something that someone hasn't complied with

    The issue at this point isn't what is actually going on with the NSA: But was there a memo from the DCI to the IG to say, "Do not review this"? There should be, otherwise the IG has to explain why -- despite this mess -- he apparently couldn't figure out that there were massive programs in violation of the law.

    Again, the point is that the problem rests with either the IG or the DCI. One of them has to convince us they should be trusted. They can do that by letting Congress review a memo.

    However, if this has already been done -- as what appears likely -- the issue becomes, what prevented Congress from ordering a broader review in 2002?

    Again, the issue for the IG, Congress, and DCI to explain is: Why was this conduct occurring, who knew about it, and why weren't the reports provided to Congress.

    We do know that in 2002 the DCI and Joint Staff received through the investigators in Guantanamo information about abuse. That was four years ago. What's happened since then, and where has the IG been for the last for years? IT doesn't look good for the Joint Staff, IG, Congress, or the DCI.

    Part D

    Here's where we can get answers to these questions. There is another clause that is also very interesting.

    I. Click this link: Click

    II. This is a combination. Look for two clauses, and we'll talk about both of them:
    Clause 1
    (4) If the Director
    exercises any power under
    paragraph (3), he
    shall submit an appropriately
    classified statement of the reasons
    for the exercise of such power
    within seven days to the
    intelligence committees.

    . . . .

    Clause 2: DCI message to IG

    The Director shall advise the
    Inspector General at the time such

    report is submitted, and, to the
    extent consistent with the protection

    of intelligence sources and
    methods, provide the Inspector General
    with a copy of any such report.

    The point of these two clauses is simple: It tells us where Congress should have looked, and there should be a Congressional note asking to review this information. Again, just because this is classified doesn't matter. We're simply relying on the public standards, and inquiring into what should have been done.

    These two clauses tell us several things: There is a sender and a receiver of this message. There are four options, all of them within the scope of understanding. Things will have to be consistent with one of these. People who are lying will not be consistent with what actually happened. The truth can be understood.

    Let's break these clauses down into two halves: Sender and Receiver.

    First Half: Sender

    A. The clauses tells us the conversation was documented

    There is a classified message from DCI detailing the reasons why the IG was refused permission to investigate the issues; [Either the message exists, or it does not. There is not other option. IF the message exists, then there are documents showing when it was created, who reviewed it, and what they did or didn't say in response; if the message does not exist, then there is a question: Why is there no message, and who can we find who read the message that "no longer exists"?]

    B. Alternatively, if there was no documentation, there is a violation

    If the Intelligence Committee has no record of the message, this is a separate/subsequent violation. [This expands the scope of the conspiracy to others, who will either cooperate, or be found in violation.]

    Second half: Receiver

    C. The clauses tell us the other half of the story: Someone received the document

    The IG has a copy of this message [And this should be available for review, along with the access list of who reviewed it, and memoranda they created/distributed to document their concerns;

    D. Alternatively, if there is no receipt, then this is a violation

    If there is no copy then this is a subsequent violation. [This expands the liability to other parties.]

    The issue isn't whether someone is or isn’t cooperating. The issue is how long do they want to go before they make another violation. They have one option, but to admit reality, they have to admit subsequent violations. So, they're in a trap.

    The key is simple: NO matter what happens, there has to be either:

    A. Compliance with the rules; or

    B. Deviation from the rules.

    Those are the only two options. Something has to be documented: Either the order not to review; or the declination to review; or the comments about what was going on.

    Part E

    But there's more. Once DCI and the IG disagree on a matter, and the IG wants to peruse something, they have an obligation to report to the Committee.

    Let's review the clauses.

    I. Hit this link: Click

    II. Look for this clause:
    In such cases, the Inspector
    General may submit such comments
    to the intelligence committees that
    he considers appropriate.

    This tell us several things: The IG can submit information to Congress.

    It raises a number of questions, all which will help see who is or is not doing their job, cooperating, or following the rules. The reason for asking these questions is to inquire into what happened, what can be proven, and who is or is not doing what they promised to do.

    Here are some sample questions which need answers:

    A. What comments, if any, did IG attach to the classified message from DCI to the intelligence Committee; if there is no message, why not; if there is a message, what action did the intelligence committee take, if any?

    B. Was there a reason for the IG in not commenting; how could the IG "not comment" on something that was not consistent with statute?

    C. What was the reason for including the remarks that were included; but not including the other concerns we are led to believe may have existed at the time; what is the basis to exclude comments, is this exclusions consistent or it out of the ordinary?

    D. Was there something the DCI said, communicated, or implied would happen if these IG concerns were or were not communicated in the format, manner, and order that was
    finally submitted or not submitted; was this speculative future result clear, or was it merely assented to without discussion; what should the IG have done?

    Part F

    Let's consider some more details.

    I. Hit this link: [ Click ]

    I. Look for this clause:

    (5) In accordance with
    section 535 of title 28, the

    General shall report to the
    Attorney General any information,

    allegation, or complaint
    received by the Inspector General

    to violations of Federal
    criminal law that involve a
    program or

    operation of the Agency,
    consistent with such guidelines as
    may be

    issued by the Attorney General
    pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of

    such section. A copy of all
    such reports shall be furnished to
    the Director.

    This tells us there is a communication flow between the IG and the Director. This is a given. The issue is whether there is a reasonable story on why documents are or are not provided; and whether the communications are or are not consistent with what we know: There are illegal programs.

    The issue is simple:

    A. Were there roadblocks between the AG and DCI; or were these just imaginary;

    B. Was there something that prevented the IG and/or DCI from providing information to the AG?

    It remains to be understood whether these communication roadblocks between the DIC and AG were real, imagined, implied, believed, or something else.

    Part G

    Next we have to consider the standards the IG uses to review. They use something Government Accounting Standards, or GAGAS. This means, "Generally Accepted Government Accounting Standards," and others call it "Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards." They're not the same, but sometimes people mix them up.

    I. Hit this link: [ Click ]

    II. Look for this clause:
    (4) in the execution of his
    responsibilities, to comply with
    generally accepted
    government auditing standards.

    This tells us several things:

    A. The IG knows how the audits are supposed to be done

    B. There are reasonable standards that the IG has to comply with

    C. These standards are well known throughout the government

    D. It is not a surprise for the IG to use these procedures

    E. it is not out of the ordinary for the IG to follow these rules

    Why does this matter? Because in order for someone to be hired, nominated, and appointed to the IG positions they have to have a track record of being able to follow procedures in management, law, auditing, or some other field.

    The issue falls back on Congress: If the IG's aren't able to do their job -- despite their appointment -- why hasn't Congress started an investigation into the IG?

    Part H

    Now we start to bring the above together. You'll see how this fits.

    I. Hit this link: [ Click ]

    II. Look for this clause about communicating urgent concerns:
    (d) Semiannual reports;
    immediate reports of serious or
    flagrant problems; reports of
    functional problems; reports to
    Congress on urgent concerns

    This tells us a few things: There is a process which Congress understands and is not surprised by when the IG submits an urgent concern. There are several questions:

    A. Was there something in the way that prevented DoJ IG from reporting urgent concerns about what was going on?

    B. Where are these reports, concerns?

    C. Who reviewed them, and what were their comments, if any?

    D. How can the IG explain this many problems in the DoJ and NSA, but they don't seem to be able to explain [1] Why Congress can't seem to find any message or comment about these concerns; and/or [2] There is no apparent Congressional order to work with the IG to expand the scope of the audit?

    Again, the issue here isn't to pin them down -- the point is that no matter what they do, they're showing that there were broad scale violations of the law, they failed to do their jobs per GAGAS, and a reasonable IG would have known and reported this information to Congress. The issue is simple: Either:

    A. Congress knows about eh problem and has done nothing; OR

    B> The IG's are not reliable and cannot be trusted to compare clear standards with reality, and fails to keep the Committee aware of problems and urgent matters.

    There are no other options.

    Part I

    It gets worse. There is a 7-=day reporting requirement on matters that are very clearly laid out. In other words, the IG doesn't have to guess, "Is this urgent," but the guide tells them in detail what types of things they need to report.

    I. Hit this link

    II. Look for this clause
    (3) In the event that -

    (A) the Inspector General
    is unable to resolve any

    with the Director affecting
    the execution of the Inspector

    General’s duties or

    (B) an investigation,
    inspection, or audit carried out
    by the

    Inspector General should
    focus on any current or former

    official who -

    (i) holds or held a
    position in the Agency that is
    subject to

    appointment by the
    President, by and with the advice
    (!1) and

    consent of the Senate,
    including such a position held on

    acting basis; or

    (ii) holds or held the
    position in the Agency, including

    a position held on an
    acting basis, of -

    (I) Executive Director;

    (II) Deputy Director
    for Operations;

    (III) Deputy Director
    for Intelligence;

    (IV) Deputy Director
    for Administration; or

    (V) Deputy Director
    for Science and Technology;

    (C) a matter requires a
    report by the Inspector General to

    Department of Justice on
    possible criminal conduct by a

    or former Agency official
    described or referred to in

    subparagraph (B);

    (D) the Inspector General
    receives notice from the Department

    of Justice declining or
    approving prosecution of possible

    criminal conduct of any of
    the officials described in

    subparagraph (B); or

    (E) the Inspector General,
    after exhausting all possible

    alternatives, is unable to
    obtain significant documentary

    information in the course of
    an investigation, inspection, or


    the Inspector General shall
    immediately notify and submit a

    on such matter to the
    intelligence committees.

    III. Look for this second clause
    (2) The Inspector General
    shall report immediately to the

    Director whenever he becomes
    aware of particularly serious or

    flagrant problems, abuses, or
    deficiencies relating to the

    administration of programs or
    operations. The Director shall

    transmit such report to the
    intelligence committees within

    calendar days, together with
    any comments he considers

    Here's the point: Not only do we know the Congress has a duty to review, but when there are this many problems that were known in 2004, the problem is why wasn't the IG brought into the picture?

    Again, the point is that the NSA has violated the law; and the Congress has shown it cannot adequately check the President's power.

    There is no other explanation.

    Part J

    Here's the kicker. This is the rule that gives the Ranking Member on the Intelligence Committee -- Senator Rockefeller -- the power to have ordered an IG investigation. IN other words, the fact that he's in the DNC or a minority party member is irrelevant. That's non-sense.

    I. Hit this link [ Click ]

    II. Look for this clause:
    [ That the RNC controls the
    committee is irrelevant]
    [ Where’s the DNC request for
    audit that was not done?]

    (4) Pursuant to Title V of
    the National Security Act of 1947

    U.S.C. 413 et seq.], the
    Director shall submit to the

    committees any report or
    findings and recommendations of an

    inspection, investigation, or
    audit conducted by the office which

    has been requested by the
    Chairman or Ranking Minority
    Member of

    either committee.


    This is just an example. The problem is this is across the board in all the guides and regulations, but horizontally across all the departments, and vertically within the departments; and across both branches -- the Legislature and Executive.

    In other words, this is a huge problem with internal reviews, audits, and personnel in both branches not doing their jobs.

    It doesn't matter why. The point is this is a huge problem, and neither Party has demonstrated they can effectively follow clear rules.

    This is information voters need to discuss and debate: What is to be done to adequately bound this problem, and compel both branches to do their jobs.

    Neither branch, nor party appears to be willing despite their oath to do so.

    Part Two: Statutes

    You can also do the same with the Statutes

    The neat thing about the above is that you can pick and choose where you want to start, and ask questions. No matter what the NSA and COngress do, they're going to trip themselves up.

    We can also do the same thing with SECDEF, the NSC, and the Joint Staff.

    To illustrate this, I'm going to use statutes, and show you how to trip them up on the NSA issues. Remember, their problem is they are not in alignment with the statutes. That's what makes this funny: They can't do anything to change reality, excpet give you non-sense.

    Here's a sample report: Comparing public knowledge to the statutes, to find a new problem: [ Click ]

    Start here: [ Click ]

    This is title 10, it relates to the DoD. Click around on these links for a couple of seconds, and get used to what's in there. Don't worry about the content, just get an idea of how they are organized.

    Home Base for SecDef

    We're going to do things a little differently than we did with the copy and paste above. This time, we're going to jump around to the links. The key is to move fast, and see there are many reuqirements, but SEC Def didn't do his job.

    OK, let's jump into the OSD Section where Sec Def is: Click. We'll call this "home base."

    Your job is to keep up with what I'm talking about. I'm not going to link to each item, but I'm going to jump back and forth between these statutes.

    135 is the responsibility of Sec Def to keep Congress informed.

    137 is the role SecDef plays in intelligence, and his link to the NSA.

    141 is the DoD IG role in reviewing things

    138b5 is the DoD legislative liaison role, they act as the interface between DoD and the Congress.

    Here are the statutes covering NSA: Click

    421b1 is the key one: No money can be used for things Congress denies -- which is what Congress said in FISA: this is how you are supposed to follow the rules; and if you don't do that, it's not lawful.

    426 is the one that documents the meetings. There should be agendas discussing the NSA activity. This group is the ISR.

    Here's the problem: 435 says the conduct can only be for lawful purposes.

    OK, stop. Remember from above -- way above -- and also on this page -- there's the issue of legality. The procedures can only be lawful. That's important to realize. There's two separate mentions that there can only be legal activities; and the conduct which the IG has to look into has to detect this illegality.

    So the question becomes; How could all this be occurring, and there be clear rules of what to do, but nobody detected anything; yet there were clear rules against it?

    The answer is simple: Alot of people know.

    Here is 437 -- that means Congress has to know what is going on. Read part B.

    See how this works? Not only is there a requirement to follow the law, but there's a requirement SEC DEF certify to Congress that things are OK.

    No we know otherwise: The DoD-NSA activities violated the law. So there are two options: Either,

    A. SEC DEF lied and didn't disclose to Congress, and violated the law; OR

    B. Congress knew and did nothing.

    Given what we know about he President and the NSA activities -- he say's they're lawful, it's more likely that SEC DEF didn't keep Congress up to date.

    So the issue isn't whether Congress is or isn't given "enough information" or whether the White House does or does not agree to "keep Congress involved." The issue is why despite the SEC DEF failure to comply with the statute, isn't the Congress ordering an investigation?

    That's the big mystery: Why is Congress not willing to enforce the law? The voters can understand.

    229 c 2 B also is clear: SEC DEF has to report the differences between what the Congress told him to do; and how he actually spent the money. Again, SEC DEF has a problem -- money was used for unlawful purposes, but he didn't tell Congress about the differences between [a] what Congress told him -- spend on legal programs; and [b] where the money went -- illegal programs. Either,

    SEC DEF violated the law on the delta-reporting per 2298 c 2 B; and/OR

    Congress knows about the problem and has done nothing to impose sanctions for violations of the law.

    193d2 tells us SECDEF fully coordinated with NSA's Hayden on these programs; and 192c2 shows us SECDEF reviews the NSA budget.

    Part Three: Combine the Guide and Statutes

    Digging into DoD, SecDef and NSA with this combination

    Let's do what we did above with the Guide, and post some text for you to see. YOu'll see that we can figure out what the NSA is violating and what SEC Def hasn't done.

    I. Click: Click

    II. Look for this clause:
    (11) Prescribing, within its
    field of authorized operations,

    security regulations covering
    operating practices, including the

    transmission, handling and
    distribution of signals
    intelligence and

    communications security
    material within and among the

    under control of the Director
    of the NSA, and exercising the

    necessary supervisory control
    to ensure compliance with the


    Issues: This clause tells us that the Reviews about activities must be
    consistent with authorized
    operations -- only authorized operations can be part of the governance process.

    Question: How do they explain activities, planning related to unlawful activities? They can't.

    The President also has a prompt reporting requirement on illegal activities and corrective action: [ Click ] He didn't do that.

    This means that the performance awards are a problem. [ Click ]

    We have to ask: How were "illegal domestic activities" incorporated into the
    performance plans, bonuses, and assessments that "things were really efficient"?

    Problem with Procurement

    we already know that the 9-11 is irrelevant: NSA already had the capability to do this illegal activity. There was no time to modify the hardware. Rather, this capability already existed prior to 9-11; and was already used prior to 9-11.

    Here's the problem: [ Click ] The procurement/acquisition/"process to buy stuff from contractors" is messed up.

    Look at this clause:
    "(f) Applicability of
    Existing Law. - Nothing in this

    shall be construed to exempt
    any program of the Department of

    Defense from the application
    of any provision of chapter 144 of

    title 10, United States Code,
    section 139, 181, 2366, 2399, or

    of such title, or any
    requirement under Department of

    Directive 5000.1, Department
    of Defense Instruction 5000.2, or

    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff Instruction 3170.01B in

    accordance with the terms of
    such provision or requirement.

    Note: 10 USC 2366 includes a waiver for wartime; but this is irrelevant given the NARUS STA 6400-like systems were designed before Sept 2001. [ CLick ]

    This tells us that the process is Supposed to comply with Federal laws -- and only make things that are lawful.

    But here's the problem: We know the activity violates FISA. That means they made something that wasn't legal; and it was allowed to keep operating -- gathering information without a FISA warrant -- despite a requirement that the monitoring stop after X-hours.

    In other words, FISA wasn't adequately incorporated into the design, or the systems requirements list which NSA program managers issued. This is well known inside NSA and the telephone companies.

    There is something called "spiral" acquisition which you can read more about here. [ Click ] There are special procurement regulations which the Joint Staff knows about, and these fit with the NSA. This fits into the what the NSA calls the modernization program [ Click ] -- this means we know that NSA and NSC are aware of technology inside the US that they cannot decrypt, and there are ongoing efforts to acquire, decrypt, analyze and develop counter measures for.

    One small problem: The modernization efforts aren't simply about breaking into new things; they're also about doing things without getting caught. And this is why the NSA managers are talking to lawyers in New York and why the telephone companies are having a problem, panicking to their friends on the Joint Staff. Their problem is they have no clue who can access their ongoing illegal activities.

    Here's the surprise. All this NSA-monitoring is ongoing, and the NSA cannot stop it. This is why Q2 goes after their own NSA people so harshly: The NSA Q2 is the internal security. They do polygraphs. They also know that there are people inside NSA who know how to use the equipment which NSA cannot decipher. That's what's been going on, and how NSA has been set up. NSA cannot detect how the information about their illegal activities is flowing outside the building. Here's a hint: Orange.

    Here's what's been going on. Remember those SedDef meetings with the Joint Staff with agendas, well DCI is the one who directs the monitoring.

    I. Hit this slink: [ Click ]

    II. Look for this phrase:
    (3) Collection of signals
    intelligence information for

    foreign intelligence purposes
    in accordance with guidance from

    Director of Central
    It appears DCI has been told a whopper of a story why certain people are or are not being monitored. Small problem, they never verified that the monitoring was or was not consistent with FISA; rather, they just did it. Big mistake.

    Political Appointees

    here's where the President has a problem. There's something called the IOB. This is the body that works with the NSA IG, and they review -- or are supposed to -- problems with fraud and illegal activity.

    I. Click this link: Click

    II. Look for this clause:
    Sec. 2.2. The IOB shall:

    (a) prepare for the
    President reports of intelligence

    activities that the IOB
    believes may be unlawful or
    contrary to

    Executive order or
    Presidential directive;

    (b) forward to the
    Attorney General reports received

    intelligence activities that
    the IOB believes may be unlawful or

    contrary to Executive order
    or Presidential directive;

    (c) review the internal
    guidelines of each agency within

    Intelligence Community that
    concern the lawfulness of

    intelligence activities;

    (d) review the practices
    and procedures of the Inspectors

    General and General Counsel
    of the Intelligence Community for

    discovering and reporting
    intelligence activities that may be

    unlawful or contrary to
    Executive order or Presidential

    directive; and

    (e) conduct such
    investigations as the IOB deems
    necessary to

    carry out its functions
    under this order.

    The question is:

    A. Was the IOB reviewing illegal activities?

    B. Why not?

    C. Did they communicate with the IG?

    Recall what we learned above from the DoJ IG -- there's an IG reporting requirement to Congress. This obviously broke down.

    Here's the problem:
    Inspectors General and General

    Counsel of the Intelligence
    Community, to the extent permitted

    law, shall report to the IOB,
    at least on a quarterly basis and

    from time to time as necessary
    or appropriate, concerning

    intelligence activities that
    they have reason to believe may be

    unlawful or contrary to
    Executive order or Presidential


    A. The Guidelines confer responsibility on NSA IG to consult with IOB; it does not appear the IOB-IG discussions were based on anything real

    B. Where are the meeting minutes of these discussions;

    C. How could all this illegal activity be occurring inside NSA< but the IOB, NSA IG, and others who made presentations at these briefings for the IG-NSA had no clue what was going on?

    The answer is simple: They're playing stupid. The lack of timely cooperation -- and failure to timely review the issues after they knew the NYT was reviewing the matter raises reasonable doubts about their ability to do their jobs.

    The next President needs to fire the NSA IG and the entire IOB, and start with a new crew that can read. This crew has failed.


    IOB has to review these matters. Like the IG, they have to take action when they have a reason to believe that the activity is unlawful.

    Also, the Presidential directives -- as we learn from Youngstown -- cannot violate the law; rather the President has to assent to the rule of law. This is not a power, but a ministerial act. This means the FISA is a direction to the Executive -- which the President must comply with because it is a ministerial requirement, not something he can ignore because he has "power". There i no implied power in the Constitution -- it's either there, or it's reserved to the states in the 10th Amendment.

    This means specific FISA language trumps the very generalized -- and arguably unconstitutional -- AUMF.

    372 is the clear provision that Congress has the power to regulate the NSA -- NSA is a facility, and this is consistent with Article 1 Section 8.


    All I've done is show you how by looking at the standards, its easy to see that something isn't working. what we know is that the laws clearly prohibited the activities, and many people -- including in the IG and IOB -- know about eh problems.

    It doesn't matter why they didn't. The fact is that this activity -- that should have been detected and reported as illegal -- continued. The issue is this Congress because of the unfavorable weather is not interested in ensuring the Executive follows the laws.

    This guide is here to show you that the laws are understandable, they can be easily reviewed, and everything that we publicly know tells us one thing: The entire NSA acquisition process is designed to create products that support unlawful programs; and Congress and the IG process have ineffectively overseen this continuing illegal activity.

    The problem the telephone companies, the NSA employees, and SETA contactors have is that not only do the voters know, but all you message traffic has been secured in an offsite location outside your control.

    Congratulations, you have been set up and there is nothing you can do to stop the voters from digesting what they now know:

    A. NSA and Joint Staff leadership are in violation of the law, and have unlawfully supported illegal acquisition programs;

    B. The internal auditing and Congressional oversight process has message traffic indicating that reviews and audits should be shut down, but they should have been expanded;

    C. DoD SEC DEF has violated the law by failing to report the differences between what Congress authorized, and what was actually going on

    D. The President violated the statutes by failing to timely inform Congress of the illegal activities that he knew about, and he has failed to provide any corrective action.

    E. All NSA contracts related to unlawful activity are not enforceable; and all telephone companies which have unlawfully supported these illegal activities have non basis to ask for any reimbursement. They knew well the FISA requirements, and ignored them.

    Part Four: Writing up your conclusions

    The next part is to share your results.

    Here's a sample report of findings: [Click ]

    Here s a sample line of evidence, and how this compares with the Standards: [ Click ]


    Here's how you can apply the skills you're learning right now to the blogosphere: [ Click ]

    What we just did

    Notice we haven’t done anything mysterious. All we’ve done is compare the standards to what we know. The public information and the standards are like two railroad tracks. They move together. Sometimes there are where they should be, other times they are not. That’s all you have to know.

    The right answer is always the standard. The easy part is to see how far the public information is from the standard.

    Also, think of the standards as being like music scores: The sheets of music that tell you what notes to play. That is what you’re supposed to do. The problem is when the notes are played, recorded, rebroadcast, or spoken about differently.

    For example, if we take a sheet of music, that is what is known – but when someone talks about how someone else is playing – that is like a public commentator talking about someone playing the music. The problem is when the person playing the music cannot read music; and the person who is talking about the music player is paid to promote the musician, not ensure the music is enjoyable.

    That’s what’s going on in the country right now.


    That's it. You can see it's fairly simple. All you have to do is look at what is available and then think about it.

    You don't have to have access to "classified" information. You can figure out things using open material.

    Your job is simple:

  • 1. Look at what you are being told;

  • 2. Compare what you are hearing with the statutes and guides;

  • 3. Ask yourself what is reasonable;

  • 4. Record your questions and comments for others to review.

  • You'll notice that it's not all that hard. And the surprising thing is you'll have other ideas on how to do this.

    Share this with your friends. Let them know: There's a way that this can be done, and it's very simple to understand.

    After you are done reviewing the material, be sure to let others know what you find.