That's right. The same idiots who said, "We did nothing" about specific information prior to 9-11, are still doing the same.
Yet, this time, it's worse. They're not only "doing nothing," they're actually rebuffing specific threat information.
Why? Because they have too much information coming in; and not enough analysts to pick through the pile. Don't even talk to me about translation problems. How many months backlogged are you?
Specific threat information against specific targets and individuals was rebuffed.
Let's take a look back at the 9-11 commission "major finding" ... something to do with a "lack of imagination." Here's the "imagination": Someone out there [wherever you want] has specific information that JTTF is rebuffing.
Problem JTTF has is that they're using the administrative oversight responsibilities of "other angencies" as the basis to defer personnel, informants, and witnesses.
Bluntly, the core intelligence information within the primary contact is getting ignored, and JTTF is sending the "person who comes forward" on a wild goose chase.
Last time I checked, we had 3,000 dead people in NYC, and a "war on terror."
When specific statements are made in re targets and personnel, it would be reasonable to presume that JTTF [regardless the primary "administrative" body that has "jurisdiction"] would be interested in the intelligence information, inter alia
- Target name, location, and identifying information;
- Specific indentifying information of the individuals making the statements, representations, calls to action;
- Means of obtaining information to substantiate/corroborate the alleged statements;
- Where the evidence is physically located;
- Identify other agencies requiring notification to ensure a comprehensive asset protection plan is in place; and
- Other information that would facilitate resource, asset, or individual protection to include adjusting patterns, changing security/schedules.
None of the above was done, collected, or gleaned. Rather, the public was directed to "other agencies" which had no authority to physically protect the target. This delay and diversion is not acceptable, and an inappropriate delay in both notification and adjustment [if needed] in security actions.
JTTF can't argue "it's a new world" while at the same time both rebuffing intelligence, and failing to take action on specific information that would other wise be "evidence".
Translation: JTTF is trying to have it both ways. They want to say "they're too busy" and "we have higher priorities"; yet, at the same time, when they bungle, they claim "We're still used to the prosecution-level of evidence" world.
That's a bunch of hogwash. Because when given specific information that would facilitate prosecution, they also do nothing.
It's all well and good to argue "this is a new war." The problem a civilian population has is when it reasonably
expects law enforcement and security information to take actionable intelligence, but the security services not only fail to take the information, but send the public on a wild goose chase.
The reason the public is willing to come forward is that they have specific information; it is credible; and the information is given on the condition that the information be acted upon; and that there be no consequences for the public when engaging in a "civic duty."
Clearly, we have the opposite: Information is rebuffed; intelligence not gleaned; no action taken by security services; and direction given to expose the public to the exact opposite
outcome and conditions desired.
There is no telling how many people sitting on actionable intelligence have thrown up their hands saying, "I give up."
These types of problems [rebuffing information; Alice in Wonderland stupidity] is the same type of non-sense we had prior to 9-11.
Except this time, despite
9-11, they still rebuff information, and induce people to take action that will further expose them to conditions that prompted them to initially contact the agencies.
It makes no sense to shout "tell us what you see-hear," but then do nothing to ensure that report generates appropriate action; it's not up to the public-citizen to make sure that JTTF "does the right thing." This should be automatic.
Know that if you are sitting on actionable intelligence, do not be fooled into thinking "they want to know."
Apparently, the barriers to entry are higher; and if you desire to maintain confidentiality you will be given non-sense to strip away the protections you might otherwise desire by keeping your identity non-disclosed.
How many individuals sitting on important information continue, despite the "new era" to be given the run around?
A credible security system is only effective when it demonstrates that it will take action based on specific information. When that system rebuffs information, it has little credibility.
It is more disturbing when more effort goes into silencing those who dare challenge JTTF for their failure to take the information. We learned prior to 9-11 that the smallest bit of information can mean alot.
Today, the same "failure of imagination" continues. We have yet to understand the scope of the barriers to information. The problem of "having a hard time getting information into the system" continues despite Congressional statutes.
A free citizenry will only continue to support a system when that system continues to demonstrate it remains effective. One is less likely to come forward when the barriers to entry are high.
We haven't even touched on the "whether the mechanisms to address the situation" [assuming the intelligence is taken] actually work.
God help America. It's still in a coma despite
If I have to tell you "what do I want" at this point, we're in real trouble...so here goes:
1. Personnel within JTTF need to be briefed on the importance of gathering actionable intelligence, and thank the public and informants for providing this information.
2. When informants approach JTTF with specific threat information against a specific target and/or individual, that information be gleaned for intelligence information.
3. JTTF should make the notifications of the identified individual so that threat management unit [TMU] personnel in the associated municipalities/jurisdictions can privately take action to protect assets, individuals, and resources.
4. When specific information against a specific target, location, or individual is obtained, JTTF should not "pawn off" the informant to another agency that has a lower-level interest in this type of threat information.
5. The informants should not be directed to "do the work" of making "higher reporting" to "other agencies." JTTF should not rely on the public or "those in the know" to do the work.
6. Individuals choosing to provide information on a "non-identify" or "confidential" or "do not identify the source" should have that desire respected.
7. In those situations where personnel have come forward on condition of anonymity, JTTF needs to take this into consideration when providing other "direction". If the individuals do not wish to be identified, then it makes no sense to direct them to "other agencies" where identification is a requirement as a starting position or before any action will be taken.
8. Congressional oversight needs to contact DoJ OPR for letters to identify the number of complaints; and then compare this with a statistical analysis of the "actual number of complaints that are rebuffed" [using missing data algorithms] in order to assess the type of intelligence being rebuffed, and the scope-severity of the threats being ignored.
Read more . . .