President's Executive Orders to Illegally Transfer Funds To Attack Iran
RefDevelopments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Australia relate to NATO enlargement efforts; and the planned transfer of funds outside Congressional intent to support attacks on Iran.
The most important information appears to be at the end. Taken in a new light, and when contrasted with the other article. Something unusual emerges.
There are a couple of things about this quote which deserve comment:
Asadullah Wafa, the governor of Musa Qala’s province, Helmand, was at the NATO airbase at Kandahar discussing the situation with NATO commanders. He said that he was not aware that the Taliban had begun making arrests but that the government and NATO were poised to act. “We have a comprehensive plan to resolve the issue of Musa Qala, and it will be solved very soon,” he said by telephone.
Let's go through this quote step by step. You'll quickly see there is something incorrect, invalid, or a problem.
1. Asadullah Wafa is talking by telephone, not in person. We have no information whether there was a translator involved.
2. Asadullah Wafa stated there was a "comprehensive plan"; and that he was with the NATO commanders at the NATO airbase. We're not being asked to believe this is a US based, but a NATO base.
3. Asadullah Wafa said he was discussing the situation with the NATO commanders, but not aware of the Taliban arrests.
___ If he wasn't "aware" of the arrests, what "situation" was he discussing?
___ How can Asadullah Wafa say there is a "comprehensive plan" to resolve a "situation" which isn't factoring in the unfolding situation?
___ Given his lack of knowledge of the Taliban arrests, how can Asadullah Wafa say that anyone is poised to act -- against whom, to do what, and for what purpose?
4. Asadullah Wafa says the situation will be resolved "soon".
___ How can anyone say that a situation -- which is unfolding, but not part of the discussion -- be subject to any timely resolution?
The Goal of the meeting was to to assess what should be done to defeat the Taliban, and regain Afghan civilian support for NATO goals.
The information presented does not make sense. The question is why would Asadullah Wafa perceive the need to emphatically assert there was planning, and would be a resolution, but he's openly admitted he's not aware of the factor which should have been part of the meeting and contingency plan.
It appears the Asadullah Wafa meeting with NATO was related to factors which Asadullah Wafa has not openly discussed. It's more likely that the Taliban have done something that is outside Asadullah Wafa-NATO discussion; the plan underway is not factoring this development; and asserting that this will be "resolved" soon is meaningless.
The problem for NATO isn't the Taliban attack; but the demonstration that NATO is powerless to defend the attacks, stop them, or control the area. The Taliban goal is to provoke NATO to over-respond, and encourage Afghans to see the NATO troops as being ineffectual, powerless, and unmanageable.
The locals are most likely to shift their support away from NATO:
1. If NATO does not respond, there will be a loss of support;
2. If NATO does respond, it will more likely than not be viewed as excessive, but with plenty of Taliban reminders that the NATO plan didn't succeed.
The arrests started last week, after the first attacks three weeks ago. Either
A. Asadullah Wafa is lying and pretending not to know something; or
B. Asadullah Wafa is out of touch and there is a communications problem.
If teh Taliban have advanced to making unchallenged arrests, but there is no NATO leadership or plan, popular support will tilt away from NATO. Bombing doesn't work to end intimidation; it only destroyes private homes of civilians who grow tried with the lack of progress.
The nature of the "Taliban" effort may have been misconstrued and exxagerated. Something prompted the NATO meeting: Whether that reason was real or illusory remains uncertain. The quotes may have been fabricated to incite action and NATO response, just as was done in Federal Court.
It's more likely that he's not conforming something that hasn't been directly asked. Rather than admit he knows something, the safe route -- given the inaction -- is to pretend he doesn't know the problem. However, this deception is not likely: A governor known for lying would inspire the Taliban's supporters.
___ What was Asadullah Wafa discussing with NATO, above and beyond what the Taliban were or were not doing recently by way of arrests?
___ What US Presidential orders has been issued and is in effect to take advantage of this smokescreen?
___ How are the Pakistani-US President discussions related to the Vice President discussions with the Australians?
UK troops are not leaving Iraq to return home, but are being transitioned. The President is known to have a funding issue.
The question is how much money is the US funneling through Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to do exactly what the Congress has rejected: An attack on Iran.
The Iranians support anti-AlQueda efforts; the US does not like getting its nose rubbed in the ground, especially by relative lightly equipped Hezbollah against Israel; or insurgents in Iraq. Never mind the Vice President is providing arms to fund the insurgency and AlQueda.
___ Which special forces units, under Executive Order, will be funneled through Pakistan, into this "big mess of Pakistan and Afghanistan" and magically appear with evidence of "nasty things" from Iran?
Notice the confusion of Iraq and Afghanistan -- there are multiple outside players who have an interest in both peace and instability. On any given day the US is both for and against peace depending on the arguments the Americans buy into.
NATO has a plan to expand its combat unit coverage outside the Afghanistan theater and include South East Asia under its umbrella.
There's something new above and beyond the satellite ground station in Australia.
The weather is warming up in the northern Hemisphere; and Australia, in the southern hemisphere, is starting to slide into autumn. The US anticipates combat operations to increase in Afghanistan, and the Taliban are expecting reinforcements.
Insurgents know if they abuse power, the civilian population will turn against them. The Taliban do not care about this, and are arresting people, and making military gains. It's unclear why the US cannot do what the Taliban refuse to do: Provide security, avoid needless arrests, and create a governance system which works -- the things that, on their own, would undermine support for the Taliban.
The American accusations and plans shed light on the classified Execuive Ordes. Anything the US accuses of Iran -- deception, illegal activity, or refusal to coopeate -- is how the US views American power: What American, alone, can do and all other nations cannot.
Just as the US cannot implement a credible confrontation with Iran, the US cannot afford the risks of a confrontation with China or Russia. The US military action would most likely be through third parties. Overt interceptions of lawful shipments of Russian and Chinese goods to Iran would be an act of war.
The Taliban view their position as being beyond the tipping point. Even if they abuse civilians, they view the net support they have for their combat to far outweigh any setbacks linked with undermining civilian support.
The US emphasis on Pakistan is designed to distract attention from the US action. US leadership will be focusing on what Pakistan's government does or doesn't do; there will be less attention on what the US is independently doing inside Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The US prisoners at Guantanamo have become a legal problem. The Vice President appears to be going to Australia to secure a secondary detention center in a remote location, establish some sort of military authority to conduct training exercises, and secure Australian air and port facilities to expand and support NATO operations in South East Asia, possibly to defend the Oil-rich Islands.
Any new facilities the US creates in Australia will be ones the Iranians will have less information. Saudi Arabia, Dubai, and Kuwait are natural launching points, but are too close to support reserves and backup activities should the conflict with Iran widen.
The President's secret executive orders:
 Establish a formal objective to thwart Chinese military advances in Africa, but do not adequately review the economic development issues of the Africans. Militarily, the approach is flawed; economically, the plan is deficient.
 Assists Iranian opposition groups, including AlQueda leaders, who are willing to oppose Iran. The terms of the arrangement with AlQueda include promises of power sharing; and US selective refusal to attack personnel when AlQueda attacks targets the US would like to undermine: Venezuela, Iran, Cuba, Hezbollah, and Syria;
 Illegally channels funds from the current appropriations for Pakistan and the Iraqi reconstruction to train Iranian opposition forces located in Australia, who will be cycled through Pakistan;
 Involves Georgian troops loyal to Anti-Russian forces, who are ready to selectively retaliate against Russian troops depending on the scope of Russian support for Iranian attacks on the United States
 Develops, and if needed, implements a contingency plan to resolve shipping of Chinese missiles through the Indian Ocean, and with the assistance of the Australians to monitor, thwart, and if needed seize Chinese military shipments going to Iran.
The Presidential executive order has the following objectives:
A. To find evidence suggesting the original AUMFs for either Afghanistan or Iraq can be broadly expanded to include new things the UN Security Council has approved;
B. Track Chinese arms shipments into Iran;
C. Secure weapons shipments from Turkey and Iraq into Georgia to support anti-Russian sentiment, and create the impression the US military might provide military assistance if Georgian oil supplies were shut down. As needed create various distractions in the black see and Turkish shipping lanes, and blames these events on the Russians.
D. Intercept without detection Russian and Chinese military equipment bound for Iran, verify the ELINT signatures and include various software and guidance control systems which are not detectable, but can be remotely controlled by satellites not directly connected with the United States.
E. Coordinate with the Iraqi and Pakistani opposition forces to stir up trouble on the borders with Iran, hoping to create enough confusion while the US waits for the Iranians to respond.
1. Iranian opposition forces do not have enough support. Once the US and NATO attack, the US will have lost the moral high ground and lose what support the Iranian leadership may have.
2. Iran already has the equipment it needs. Any effort by the US to track new systems from Russia or China would be meaningless as long as the combat is short. As with Israel's engagement with Hezbollah, the US cannot be sure of all technology being employed; or how it will perform.
3. Iranian military forces are rested, not stretched, have a home field advantage.
4. When the US supports AlQueda to attack Iran, Iran, when defending itself, has the moral high ground in opposing both AlQueda and the United States.
5. There are insufficient US special forces available. The personnel being recalled are well into their 40s, and not trained to move through three terrains -- Australian, Pakistani-Afghan, into Iran.
6. There's inadequate consideration given to sustain the NATO special forces units inside Iran once they are detected, or require sustained combat operations to engage the Iranian army and air force.
7. Saudi Arabia has not adequately planned for Iranian counter strikes, despite the success of Hezbollah against Israel.
8. US combat against Iran is illegal, not related to any imminent threat, and Iran may lawfully justify its military action in Iraq and worldwide under the principle of imminent threat, humanitarian assistance, and lawful resistance to illegal warfare.
9. Cheney's private intelligence network has been compromised, and is under non-NSA surveillance.
10. US interception of Russian or Chinese goods would be an illegal act of war, further compounding the legal argument attempting to link the 9-11 and Iraqi AUMFs to Iran, then Russia and China.
The US will be successful in tracking Chinese and Russian arms shipments to Iran. However, this information will be less useful as a legal argument, but may carry some favor with the American public. Evidence of Russian and Chinese support to Iran has not strengthened the American President's hand.
Cuban and Venezuelan ground and air forces are not expected to aggressively challenge US aircraft.
There will be resignations on the Joint Staff, prompting Congressional review.
The funds transfers outside Congressional authority will be reviewed in a cursory manner, despite their disclosure in December 2006.
American special forces are not in sufficient quantities to support an uprising in Iran.
The intelligence needed to identify Iranian military targets is poor; and the United Stats does not have sufficient intelligence to lawfully justify any military action against Iran.
The strength of the Iranian opposition forces in Iran have been overstated; and the US President unreasonably expects different results than in Iraq.
There is no evidence the Iranians are doing anything wrong or illegal.
The Iranians, with Chinese and Russian assurances, will not be provoked into attacking the United States troops unless the United States invades first, or violates Iranian sovereignty.
Iran has the means and world support to lawfully reciprocate against the United States for any damage done to any Iranian facilities, buildings, or infrastructure.
The training for Iranian opposition in Australia will prove, as was the US training for the Iraqis, meaningless and more of a morale booster; at worst, the training will be more of a hassle for Americans to manage than a credible force.
Australia will be asked to join an enlarged NATO; but China will not prove itself to be something NATO allies are willing to commit troops to oppose. There are NATO plans to create forward basis in Australia to support NATO efforts in South Asia.