Florida Atty Indirectly Suggests Investigation of Law School Dean
A Florida Attorney, posting a response to a Law School Dean editorial, has implicitly suggested that an attorney may be complicit with war crimes and might possibly be investigated for their failure to prevent war crimes.
The Alabama State Bar has a clear statement of lawyer responsibilities. There appears to be a well-grounded concern that deserves serious discussion and debate, if not investigation.
Some American lawyers may be on the wrong side of the law, and prosecuted for failing to prevent war crimes.
After the nonsense from Senator Graham, the more I learn about the Military JAGs, the less impressed I am. See comment of FL Atty Nicholas Miller Jackson in response to Jeffrey Addicott author, "The Military Commissions Act: Congress Commits to the War on Terror." Ref:
[P]assage of this bill is evidence of Congress’ ratification of an ongoing conspiracy to violate the War Crimes Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Details: Indictment; Archive
Thank you, Nicholas Miller Jackson, for speaking out. Please encourage your peers to do the same. Perhaps you could encourage all Law School deans to comment on the original editorial -- this might assist law school students in deciding which legal "experts" they might want to avoid like John Yoo.
The former JAG retired before Sept 2001. We can only wonder how often he was consulted to review alleged unlawful military-related legal opinions condoning illegal abuse. Peter got it right. What's Addicott's excuse?
It's one thing for Congress to realize it has failed to effectively manage the House. Stunning when the legal community five years later openly discusses what has happened: The American legal community and Members of Congress have jointly assented to illegal violations of international and domestic law. Finally.
The American Bar Association has a problem: The military's legal experts -- Judge Advocate Generals -- working in both Congress and the Executive Branch have a problem comprehending Geneva. This is a leadership problem within the ABA.
This public statement by Jeffrey Addicott seems to be sufficient basis to conclude that the Army JAGs have a major legal problem: One of their alumni has put into writing -- evidence -- an alleged conspiracy not to enforce Geneva.
What You Can Do
If you want to contact his State Disciplinary Board, he's licensed in Alabama
Grounds for attorney discipline could include failing to ensure the oath and Supreme Law are enforced: "The Military Commissions Act of 2006 is in-your-face unconstitutional and any lawyer worth his or her oath is obligated to condemn it." -- Nicholas Miller Jackson, J.D., LL.M., Florida Bar Member No. 167983
It appears a legal expert has raised a reasonable basis to question whether Addicott may or may not have the competence to continue as Dean, much less continue practicing law: Standard.
Let's stop editorializing, and start some investigations. The House has woken up on Hastert; let's get the Alabama Disciplinary Board looking at Addicott:
- Which Constitution did you take an oath?
- What's the legal basis to suggest that violating the Constitution and Geneva is lawful?
- Why should we believe you are fit to practice law, educate others, or protect the Constitution?
- What did Addicott fail to do that he should have done?
- How much input to the Military Commissions Bill did Addicott have, especially language to pay for legal defenses of those who might be prosecuted before The Hague?
- Is there some relationship between the Dean and the JAGs or DoD that has not been disclosed? [ Standard ]
Nicholas Miller Jackson has it right. Jeffrey Addicott, in my personal opinion, sounds like a shill, giving excuses for war crimes. Failing to prevent war crimes could be construed to be a war crime.
Based on belief and this editorial, in my personal view Jeffrey Addicott, although he retired from in 2000, could be complicit with the alleged war criminals in the Congress and US Military: For allegedly
- Giving illegal advice to others;
- Drafting illegal memoranda, legal opinions, and editorials; and
- Failing to ensure the laws of war were effectively enforced through other memoranda, as he has the requirement to do through his oath under the State of Alabama Attorney Bar.
We'll have to see what the war crimes prosecutor says.
It is a problem when the legal education system, however far removed it might be from Washington, celebrates alleged war crimes by Members of Congress and the President of the Untied States.
I'm not impressed with the American legal community. It's no wonder the Taliban are on the rebound -- there are apparently defective legal counsel inside DoD who are encouraging others to ignore the Geneva conventions.
The Nazis didn't rise to power on their own. Lawyers were complicit. What do the JAGs like Addicott know, or should they know, about the alleged Genocide committed by American troops against Iraqis? One of the war crimes the Nazis were indicted for was failing to ensure stability. 600,000 dead Iraqis, in my view, is Genocide.
Addicott, congratulations, you're on the list of the alleged war criminals who failed to do what they had the legal obligation to do: Ensure there were no violations of Geneva.
I remain unconvinced that you have done everything within your power to ensure that you have asserted your oath of office as a sworn officer of the court to uphold the Constitution, Supreme Law, and all Treaties including Geneva.
Thank you for putting in writing what some might view as a confession of your alleged complicity and failure to act or remove yourself from the alleged illegal activity. As a reminder, lawyers were complicit with war crimes and lawfully executed. If indicted, may you have a fair trial and be similarly adjudicated, if appropriate.
Comments About Original Addicott Editorial
This could be important evidence. This may support of an immediate investigation by the Alabama Bar into Addicott's conduct while allegedly serving as a legal advisor and educator.
This information is provided here for the German war crimes prosecutor; and is as an exhibit for the ongoing war crimes investigation.
Ref All Alabama attorneys have an obligation to fully cooperate with the German war crimes prosecutor.
Ref Alleged Attorney Misconduct: "fitness as a lawyer"; (g) "any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law"
Ref All Attorneys reading this information have an obligation to review 8.3
(a) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule 8.4 shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.
The editorial and public information may help to understand to what extent if any he has allegedly, inter alia:
(a) Been complicit with war crimes planning;
(b) Failed to prevent war crimes;
(c) Illegally drafted illegal memoranda and policy while serving as an independent consultant to any Judge Advocate Generals working for the Department of Defense; or
(d) Counseled any member of the legal profession not to enforce Geneva, ignore war crimes, or fail to take action to ensure that the attorney rules or professional conduct are enforced.
Added Comments are in italics
With the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Congress has firmly committed itself to the view that the nation is illegally at war and that the legislative branch of government has a significant unlawful role to play in a variety of legal issues associated with the “enemy combatants” – both legal and illegal - that seek to do great physical harm to the United States and its allies. This is no excuse to endorse war crimes.
While the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provided an advanced signal that Congress was at last willing to get involved in a limited manner in some of the thorny illegal aspects of the War on Terror, the MCA represents a major Congressional shift in scope. In short, the MCA is a resounding statutory broadside that impacts forcefully and with great unlawful effect across the entire legal landscape.
Above all, the MCA has certainly washed away all doubt regarding Congress’ willingness to characterize the War on Terror as a real unlawful global war against real enemies who desire to murder and terrorize.
Accordingly, Congress has demonstrated that it is more than willing to employ the unconstitutional full weight of the rule of law pertaining to armed conflict against our enemies. Prompted by the Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, an energized Congress understood that they could no longer remain on the sidelines in the War on Terror. Congress established the creation of illegal military commissions, affirming quite unsatisfactorily that the MCA is wholly inconsistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions – the military commissions so established constitute a “regularly constituted court,” affording all the necessary “judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”
Not only does the MCA provide crystal clear guidance in the context of the establishment and operation of military commissions to try “any alien unlawful enemy combatant” (al-Qa’eda and al-Qa’eda-styled Islamic terrorists) it provides irrelevant concrete statutory definitions concerning a wide variety of terms that have been previously hotly debated.
The MCA also clearly unlawfully places a large illegal “seal of approval” on many of the initiatives taken by the Bush Administration in the War on Terror. For instance, the MCA defines “unlawful enemy combatants” in unlawful precise language while recognizing in the same breath the lawful functioning of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal for enemy combatant determination set up by the Department of Defense in response to the 2004 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ruling:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.
The MCA also illegally, retroactively lists in detail the criminal offenses that fall within the jurisdiction of the military commission, in an unlawful interference with ongoing litigation.
Apart from the nonexistent traditional list of war crimes the MCA appropriately includes “conspiracy” and “providing material support for terrorism,” drawing definitional language from the Material Support provisions at Section 2339A for the later offense.
In addition, illegally reaffirming the unlawful assertion of fact that the United States is in a state of unlawful hostilities, the MCA addresses the matter of illegally streamlining the process for dealing with the large number of petitions filed by lawyers on behalf enemy combatants in the federal court system by illegally denying the writ of habeas corpus.
Again, if one illegally recognizes the government’s irrelevant premise that the nation is at war and the laws of war apply, then the MCA
In the sphere of authorizing trial by military commission, the Congress unwisely allows for the military commission to operate outside
The MCA holds that “[e]vidence shall be admissible if the military judge determines that the evidence would have probative value to a reasonable person” and “[e]vidence shall not be excluded from trial by military commission on the grounds that the evidence was not seized pursuant to a search warrant or other authorization.”
While the MCA incorrectly fails to excludes all statements obtained by use of
Such statements may not be admissible under strict guidelines depending on when they were obtained. Statements obtained before the enactment of Detainee Treatment Act are illegal “in which the degree of coercion is disputed may be admitted only if the military judge finds that (1) the totality of the circumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value; and (2) the interests of justice would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.”
Statements obtained after enactment of Detainee Treatment Act in which the degree of coercion amounts to abuse and is illegal is disputed may be admitted only if the military judge finds that in addition to (1) and (2) above, “(3) the interrogation methods used to obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.” The Geneva Conventions prohibit all abuse and inhumane treatment; it is irrelevant how one defines torture. [ See explanation, which includes a diagram and chart for students to ask questions. Application]
Ironically, some intelligent members of the legal profession view the common sense evidentiary provisions in the MCA as a violation of Common Article 3’s requirement that the accused be afforded all the necessary “guarantees … recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”
Such
Even the International Criminal Court allows hearsay. Indeed, there are exceptions to Hearsay, which American courts permit; but it is not lawful to rely on abuse to get evidence or circumvent the hearsay rules.
In fact, earlier calls by some (uniformed judge advocates who should have known better) that a military commission should include the same due process standards that American soldiers enjoy at a military courts martial under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice were unwisely disregarded by Congress. Geneva requires what the JAGs said was required.
Obviously, these “relaxed” provisions in the MCA are necessary due to the exigencies of war – witnesses and victims may be dead, investigators are not able to get to the crime scene, etc. We may also have innocent civilians -- how about that!
As various legal challenges to all of portions of the MCA make their way through the lower courts, e.g., the MCA illegally revokes all U.S. court’s jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions by alien enemy combatants in U.S. custody, it is highly doubtful that the Supreme Court will strike down very much of the MCA as unconstitutional. If permitted, all nine (9) Supreme Court Justices could be prosecuted for war crimes
Indeed, in time of war the Court has traditionally been most reluctant to intervene in matters of national security, particularly when the executive and legislative branches have joined together in such a seamless illegal fashion. When the Courts fail to act or prevent violations of Geneva, they can be also prosecuted for war crimes.
In summary, Congress has sat on the sidelines in the War on Terror for far too long. While rational people understand that the unique threat of al-Qa’eda-styled terrorism can only be addressed by employing the laws established for armed conflict, it is equally true that said laws of war need to be updated to encompass the new paradigm. This is irrelevant. The laws of war do not permit retroactive approvals of abuse.
For over five years, Congress has simply watched as the executive branch, with occasional mandates from the judicial branch, illegally crafted and unlawfully implemented an emerging rule of law. It is extremely unsupportive of the rule of law and
Original Editorial
The Military Commissions Act: Congress Commits to the War on Terror
JURIST Contributing Editor Jeffrey Addicott of St. Mary's University School of Law, formerly a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps, says the new Military Commissions Act reflects a clear and much-needed Congressional commitment to the war on terror, which to this point has been largely conducted in legal terms by the executive branch with occasional interjections from the judiciary...
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), Congress has firmly committed itself to the view that the nation is at war and that the legislative branch of government has a significant role to play in a variety of legal issues associated with the “enemy combatants” – both legal and illegal - that seek to do great physical harm to the United States and its allies. While the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provided an advanced signal that Congress was at last willing to get involved in a limited manner in some of the thorny legal aspects of the War on Terror, the MCA represents a major Congressional shift in scope. In short, the MCA is a resounding statutory broadside that impacts forcefully and with great effect across the entire legal landscape.
Above all, the MCA has certainly washed away all doubt regarding Congress’ willingness to characterize the War on Terror as a real global war against real enemies who desire to murder and terrorize. Accordingly, Congress has demonstrated that it is more than willing to employ the full weight of the rule of law pertaining to armed conflict against our enemies. Prompted by the Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, an energized Congress understood that they could no longer remain on the sidelines in the War on Terror. Congress established the creation of military commissions, affirming quite satisfactorily that the MCA is consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions – the military commissions so established constitute a “regularly constituted court,” affording all the necessary “judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”
Not only does the MCA provide crystal clear guidance in the context of the establishment and operation of military commissions to try “any alien unlawful enemy combatant” (al-Qa’eda and al-Qa’eda-styled Islamic terrorists) it provides concrete statutory definitions concerning a wide variety of terms that have been previously hotly debated. The MCA also clearly places a large legal “seal of approval” on many of the initiatives taken by the Bush Administration in the War on Terror. For instance, the MCA defines “unlawful enemy combatants” in precise language while recognizing in the same breath the lawful functioning of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal for enemy combatant determination set up by the Department of Defense in response to the 2004 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ruling:
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.
The MCA also lists in detail the criminal offenses that fall within the jurisdiction of the military commission. Apart from the traditional list of war crimes the MCA appropriately includes “conspiracy” and “providing material support for terrorism,” drawing definitional language from the Material Support provisions at Section 2339A for the later offense. In addition, reaffirming the fact that the United States is in a state of hostilities, the MCA addresses the matter of streamlining the process for dealing with the large number of petitions filed by lawyers on behalf enemy combatants in the federal court system. Again, if one recognizes the government’s premise that the nation is at war and the laws of war apply, then the MCA properly deals with restricting habeas corpus and providing for other limitations on the jurisdiction of civilian courts.
In the sphere of authorizing trial by military commission, the Congress wisely allows for the military commission to operate in the traditional manner of all previous military commissions (hundreds were tried by military commissions in World War II, some were even U.S. citizens) and consider, for example, hearsay evidence and information gathered without a search warrant. The MCA holds that “[e]vidence shall be admissible if the military judge determines that the evidence would have probative value to a reasonable person” and “[e]vidence shall not be excluded from trial by military commission on the grounds that the evidence was not seized pursuant to a search warrant or other authorization.” While the MCA correctly excludes all statements obtained by use of torture, the MCA also tackles the hard question of statements taken from an illegal enemy combatant where a “degree of coercion is disputed.” Such statements may be admissible under strict guidelines depending on when they were obtained. Statements obtained before the enactment of Detainee Treatment Act “in which the degree of coercion is disputed may be admitted only if the military judge finds that (1) the totality of the circumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value; and (2) the interests of justice would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.” Statements obtained after enactment of Detainee Treatment Act in which the degree of coercion is disputed may be admitted only if the military judge finds that in addition to (1) and (2) above, “(3) the interrogation methods used to obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”
Ironically, some view the common sense evidentiary provisions in the MCA as a violation of Common Article 3’s requirement that the accused be afforded all the necessary “guarantees … recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.” Such ethnocentric views are quickly dispelled when one considers the day-to-day activity of most modern European criminal courts where hearsay is regularly considered and far different legal avenues regarding the introduction of evidence are regularly employed. Even the International Criminal Court allows hearsay. In fact, earlier calls by some (uniformed judge advocates who should have known better) that a military commission should include the same due process standards that American soldiers enjoy at a military courts martial under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice were wisely disregarded by Congress. Obviously, these “relaxed” provisions in the MCA are necessary due to the exigencies of war – witnesses and victims may be dead, investigators are not able to get to the crime scene, etc.
As various legal challenges to portions of the MCA make their way through the lower courts, e.g., the MCA revokes all U.S. court’s jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions by alien enemy combatants in U.S. custody, it is highly doubtful that the Supreme Court will strike down very much of the MCA as unconstitutional. Indeed, in time of war the Court has traditionally been most reluctant to intervene in matters of national security, particularly when the executive and legislative branches have joined together in such a seamless fashion.
In summary, Congress has sat on the sidelines in the War on Terror for far too long. While rational people understand that the unique threat of al-Qa’eda-styled terrorism can only be addressed by employing the laws established for armed conflict, it is equally true that said laws of war need to be updated to encompass the new paradigm. For over five years, Congress has simply watched as the executive branch, with occasional mandates from the judicial branch, crafted and implemented an emerging rule of law. It is extremely supportive of the rule of law and vital to the issue of legitimacy that the legislative branch of our government has finally joined the process.
Jeffrey Addicott is Associate Dean for Administration, Director, Center for Terrorism Law and Professor of Law at St. Mary's University School of Law. An active duty Army officer in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps for twenty years, he spent a quarter of his military career as a senior legal advisor to the United States Army’s Special Forces. He retired in 2000 at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. His latest book is Terrorism Law: Cases and Materials, 3rd Edition (2006).
October 9, 2006
Editorial Response
Professor Jeffrey Addicott is not correct in his characterization of Congress’s recent passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 as a demonstration of its commitment to the war on terror. Rather, passage of this bill is evidence of Congress’ ratification of an ongoing conspiracy to violate the War Crimes Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371. I use the term “ongoing” because at the time Professor Addicott posted his Op-ed piece on October 9, 2006, news reports had not announced President Bush’s signature on Military Commissions Act of 2006. As is well known to careful readers of the final version of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the Act purports to retroactively amend the War Crimes Act and legalize violations of the Geneva Convention from the time George W. Bush has been leading the war on terror.
The fact of the conspiracy itself is undeniable to even first year law students, let alone law professors specializing in international law, criminal law and the law of war. It is well known that a conspiracy is an agreement of two or more people to commit a crime, or to accomplish a legal end through illegal actions. The elements of a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 are: (1) an illegal agreement, (2) criminal intent, and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
During the early months of 2002 the U.S. Justice Department’s Attorney General, the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, and White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales generated a flurry of memos amply demonstrating an intention to violate the Geneva Conventions under international law and the War Crimes Act under U.S. domestic law. There also are memos from the Secretary of State and his Legal Counsel that tried to dissuade President Bush from taking the advice of the foregoing legal advisors. On February 7, 2002 President Bush wrote a memo acknowledging the controversial nature of the decision he was obliged to make and agreed to ignore the Geneva Conventions for al Qaeda and Taliban detainees “consistent with military necessity.” Many overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to violate the War Crimes Act followed to join with President Bush’s own overt act of issuing his February 7, 2002 Order.
Throughout history we sometimes record abominable behavior by people in authority, whether it be the notorious Dred Scott decision by Roger B. Taney, the crimes against humanity by Word War 2 Nazi Hans Frank, or the ethnic cleansing of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. All were lawyers.
Lawyers in the United States commonly take an oath that begins with, “I do solemnly swear:. I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of …” The Military Commissions Act of 2006 is in-your-face unconstitutional and any lawyer worth his or her oath is obligated to condemn it. In case anyone doesn’t have a long enough memory, Professor Addicott posted a column on the Jurist on March 26, 2002 entitled, “Military Tribunals are Constitutional.” The U.S. Supreme Court did not agree.
Nicholas Miller Jackson, J.D., LL.M.
Florida Bar Member No. 167983
October 10, 2006
posted by Constant @ 8:01 PM
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