President, Executive Staff, NSA Intermediaries Affirmatively Linked To War Crimes Against American Citizens

The President, DoJ Staff, NSA, and NSA contractors have been linked (again) with war crimes against American Citizens. The timing of the President’s statement of the CIA rendition program was linked to NSA intermediary fear that they could be indicted for war crimes for their continued involvement.

The NSA continues to illegally intercept domestic communications. The information obtained from illegal torture has been used to unlawfully detain American citizens. American civilians are unlawfully transported to places far from their home districts then illegally imprisoned in a manner that violates the Geneva Conventions.

The American government is unresponsive to the rule of law. Despite the sanction of having illegal evidence suppressed, the government continues to engage in illegal activity. The only option is to prosecute the President for war crimes.

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The President stated that there were certain methods which he could not disclose. These coercive methods include simulated live burials in countries the United States government knows engage in torture. It is not lawful, and a violation of the Geneva Conventions, to transport any civilian or combatant to a region outside the combat zone for purposes of engaging in torture or abuse.

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NSA: Oregon Court Permits Discovery Into Illegal Attorney-Client Monitoring Program Ref

The United States government has an ongoing, illegal attorney-client intercept program which is outside the FISA court review, and violates the Constitution.

By inadvertently disclosing the evidence of this illegal activity, the government loses all claims to any privilege. It remains to be understood which other NSA activities are violating which other Constitutional protections and rules of evidence.

General Discussion On Privilege And Classification

The court has misapplied the law. Once information is disclosed, even inadvertently, the executive privilege is waived. [ 172 F.R.D. 384 ]

Indeed, secrecy and privilege are not the same. However, the issue isn't simply the initial disclosure. Once there are subsequent communications by others, including the government related to that initial issue, those subsequent communications are no longer privileged. Rather, they may be lawfully admitted to a war crimes tribunal, as is the case here.[172 F.R.D. 384, 676 F.2d 793]

Recall, the issue is whether the NSA can or cannot intercept communications between a defendant-counsel. However, the problem is that that monitoring is known because of the FBI release of the monitoring to the target.

The activity may be secret. The issue is whether, when government privilege is waived evidence of violations of attorney-client privilege are admissible. The answer is: Yes.

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I. Government Waived All Claim of Privilege With Inadvertent Disclosure

Whether the information is or is not needed to prove the case, the government through the disclosure has waived privilege. [16 of 33, lines 1-2]

This is not a valid legal conclusion, nor consistent with precedent that waives all privileges through inadvertent disclosures:

I accept the government’s argument that the inadvertent disclosure of the Sealed Document does not declassify it or waive the state secrets privilege.24 of 33

All subsequent government claims of privilege invoked [p. 22 of 33] are meaningless.

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II. Illegal Warrantless Surveillance Cannot Lawfully Be Classified

The analysis then shifts to whether the classification on that illegal activity has or has not violated the law.

The core problem is whether that underlying state action, regardless its objective, is illegal; but despite the illegality, secrecy is illegally invoked not to hide the activity, but to prevent discovery of other evidence of government criminal activity.

Once the activity is linked with an illegal activity, the classification of that illegal activity -- in this case illegal intercept of attorney-client communications -- that activity itself is not lawfully classified.

Rather than decide whether or not the material is or is not classified and possibly viewable by plaintiff; the correct analysis starts with reviewing whether the activity, once adjudicated illegal, trumps all classification, and creates evidence of criminal activity.

In this case, the government wavier of privilege, and the courts conclusion that there was no warrant, satisfies both tests. The illegal activity can be turned over to the State Attorney Generals for purpose of prosecuting the President for violations of the Constitution and Guarantee the US government will protect the States' right to a republican form of government.

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We turn to the issue of sensitivity. Even though activity may be classified, the illegal activity still needs to be reviewed by the FISA court. It remains to be understood whether the FISA court, through its power of suppressing illegally obtained evidence, is or is not appropriately checking the abuse of power.

Clearly, the illegal activity continues, and the President has publicly asserted as such. These are ongoing criminal acts, and despite that illegality, the FISA court has not been afforded the deference to lawfully punish the government for continuing to ignore the Constitution. It is one thing to engage in foreign surveillance; quite another, despite the Supreme Court in re Hamdan reminding the government that requirements must be followed, but those requirements are ignored.

The government continues as it has done with Guantanamo: Assert national security, all the while ignoring the requirements of the Constitution. This is no different than the muddled argument confusing power and ministerial duties in the Iran-Contra affair, on page 460 Footnote 28.

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The issue of whether FISA does or does not trump State Secret privilege, although interesting, is trumped by the initial waiver through the inadvertent disclosure. [26-7 of 33]. The court leaves open the question of whether FISA does or does not trump the state secret privilege [29 of 33]. However, the Reynolds holding that privilege be given "deference" [ 30 of 33 ] is inapposite. The inadvertent disclosure both waived the privilege, and Reynolds is no longer controlling.

The government has misstated the law in asserting the Executive has the exclusive power to classify information [31 of 33]. This is incorrect. ORCON specifically grants this classification-declassification authority to the entity that originates the information.

Confirmation of Unconstitutional Attorney-Client Intercept Program

The issue is whether that classification has more to do with an effort to hide illegal NSA surveillance of the wider attorney-client intercept program. Based on the US Attorney's convoluted reasons for mandating defendant counsel is present, we judge:

A. The attorney-client intercept activity is a widespread, illegal NSA program which is outside the FISA court review, and is wholly unconstitutional; and

B. The objective of the NSA and DoJ isn't to protect any state secret, but to thwart public knowledge of the wider attorney-client intercept and transcription program, both which violate the FISA warrant requirement, and cannot lawfully be classified.

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Links

Ref Domestic rendition, and foreign detention confirmed as real programs.

Ref Details of the domestic attorney-client intercept program, and US Attorney knowledge.

Ref The FISA conspiracy and domestic rendition activities are part of the same illegal activity: To unlawfully capture information about American citizens; use that information to illegally kidnap American citizens; and then illegally transport American citizens and detain them in locations outside their local jurisdiction. The activity is known by US government personnel and contractors to be a violation of the Geneva Conventions and US Constitution.

Ref The information of this illegal activity has not been lawfully classified, is evidence of war crimes. By inadvertently revealing the details of the illegal activity and war crimes, the Executive loses all reasonable claims to executive privilege. The assertion of Executive privilege cannot lawfully be recognized by any court.

Ref NSA intermediaries are confirmed to have engaged in multi-state communication over concerns with war crimes liabilities and links to illegal NSA activity. The confirmation of this communication is not longer protected, and has been revealed to third parties outside the alleged FISA conspiracy. The existence of this communication is no longer protected by any claim of privilege or secrecy, but a matter of criminal law.

Ref The government is committing fraud upon the court by misstating issues of the law, illegally classifying evidence of criminal activity, and deliberately confusing the issues of power and ministerial duties. This is a common practice within the NSA to stifle valid questions from legal and technical experts from the lowest levels of DoD and DoJ on the ongoing FISA conspiracy.