NSA: Honest Answers to House Judiciary Questions
Finally! Some honest answers about the NSA illegal activities.
These are the "credible responses" to the House Judiciary DNC-questions.
This information below has been reconstructed. The purpose is to do three things:
All of the questions are from a public memo. They are entitled, “ RESPONSES TO JOINT QUESTIONS FROM HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE MINORITY MEMBERS”
The responses below are not real responses from the Department of Justice or Whtie House. Rather, the purpose of these responses is to outline what is best known, and provide a forum for discussion:
Targets of Surveillance
1. Approximately how many persons located in the US have been targets of government intelligence activity under the warrantless surveillance program?
Credible Response: We’re not sure. We’ll find out and let you know within 48 hours.
DoJ response:
The National Security Agency (“NSA”) electronic surveillance activities confirmed by the President involve targeting for interception by the NSA of communications where one party is outside the United States and there is probable cause (“reasonable grounds”) to believe that at least one party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization (hereinafter, the “Terrorist Surveillance Program” or the “Program”). Operational details about the scope of the Terrorist Surveillance Program are classified and sensitive, and therefore cannot be discussed in this setting. Revealing information about the scope of the Program could compromise its value by facilitating terrorists’ attempts to evade it. We note, however, that consistent with the notification provisions of the National Security Act, certain Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have been briefed on the operational details of the Program.
2. What criteria is used by NSA staff to determine whether one party to the communication is a person working in support of al Qaeda?
Credible Response: We’re not clear that the criteria are consistent. The issue is the technology used to “target AlQueda” had already been in place prior to Sept 2001. This technology was already targeting people inside the Untied States.
As to the specific issue of criteria, it is not within NSA exclusive control to decide whether the target does or does not reside in the United States our outside; nor that they do or do not work with specific groups. Rather, this criterion is adjusted by the Joint Staff, White House, and various inputs from political appointments in the State Department. It is our view that Bolton’s open request for NSA intercepts is sufficient basis to conclude that NSA staff can be inducted to adjust legal criteria and expand targeting to include targets exclusively inside America and unrelated to any criminal activity.
DoJ Response
Under the Terrorist Surveillance Program, decisions about what communications to intercept are made by professional intelligence officers at the NSA who are experts on al Qaeda and its tactics, including its use of communications systems. Relying on the best available intelligence and subject to appropriate and rigorous oversight by the NSA Inspector General and General Counsel, among others, the NSA determines whether one party is outside of the United States and whether there is probable cause to believe that at least one of the parties to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
3. Is the internal standard used to decide whether to monitor the communications of a person in the United States under the Program identical to the FlSA standard? In other words, before someone’s communications are targeted for interception, does someone determine that there is probable cause to believe the target is knowingly conspiring with a foreign terrorist?
Credible Response:
The internal standard to guide monitoring does not match the FISA. The technology developed to target the NSA SIGINT was developed outside FISA; and changes to FISA in 2004 have not been fully incorporated. For example, despite changes to FISA on the warrant exceptions, the existing technology does not flag personnel when illegal, warrantless surveillance occurs.
To answer your question, there is no probable cause incorporated into the NSA technology that acts as a screen on whether someone is targeted. All information is captured, and what the NSA has done is assigned the “bad things the NYT knows” into a fictional “President Program.” There are other NSA activities that violate the law.
In short, before someone’s communications are targeted for interception, nobody someone determine that there is probable cause to believe the target is knowingly conspiring with a foreign terrorist. Rather the opposite occurs: All communications are captured, and those who may be doing something, we forward for special relationship analysis. This is done under a special SETA-designed system which looks at the relationships and clusters. We look for frequency, recurrence, and unusual patterns. If someone exercises their rights – and is unique in America – they are more likely to be given special attention.
Once the NSA forms a relationship cluster, then two things happen: DoJ and DHS are notified to do a background check, and any information that we cannot explain--- or do not have the time t research – we use as the basis to self-assign a search warrant. This is done without court oversight.
Once we conclude that the cluster is unusual, we then without notice appear in their homes, review their personal information in violation of the 4th Amendment, and assess whether they may be doing something we could arrest them for. If we find nothing, we will expand our search to include personal records and bank accounts. If needed, we will appear at financial intuitions with a self-assigned warrant without court oversight and dig through personal business records.
Banking institutions are given points on the basis of whether they do or do not timely report tips to the DoJ. Those firms which provide tips are given favorable reviews; those banking institution which are not cooperative to our illegal, warrantless searches are subject to increased audit scope by the internal revenue service.
Once we determine that we have no evidence – but “really know” that someone is doing something wrong – as was done in Guantanamo – we use our ignorance as the excuse to kidnap people, hold them for detention for hours, deny them the right to consult with an attorney.
At any time we may pick up American civilians. We may or may not tell them where we are taking them. Sometimes it is by car; sometimes it is by aircraft.
We will require people to answer our questions. We are too lazy to find facts to present to a court; rather, we will use the excuse of “limited resources” to ignore the law. However, if you check our Wiki-updates, you’ll see that we in the DHS and DoJ have plenty of time to surf the internet.
DoJ Response:
The Terrorist Surveillance Program targets communications only where one party is outside the United States and where there are reasonable grounds to believe that at least one party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. The “reasonable grounds to believe” standard is a “probable cause” standard of proof. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“We have stated
. . . that ‘[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’”). FISA also employs a probable cause standard (specifically, whether there is “probable cause to believe” that the target of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign power). See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3).
4. Once the NSA decides to monitor the communications of a person in the United States, do they also target and monitor the communications of any person in the United States who communicates with the original target? If so, does someone first determine whether the second target is knowingly conspiring with a foreign terrorist?
Credible Response
Yes, NSA targets everyone. NSA needs to be thought of in terms of illegal treaties with the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. NSA is actually a larger network that hides in other countries. Each nation relies on “other nations” to conduct illegal surveillance.
There is no formal decision to “monitor” a specific communication. Rather, we simply increase efforts to direct more energy to examine what we collect on everyone. There is no requirement that the “original target” be what we have publicly asserted. Rather, the target can be anyone, anywhere, and at anytime.
To answer your last question, nobody specifically determines that a second person is or is not doing anything. Rather, we simply let the computers analyze the patterns, then we look at the summary patterns and forward that to DoJ and DHS for warrantless interrogations and kidnapping.
What should be happening: The FISA court should actually be able to know that the NSA technology is harmonized with FISA changes. At this juncture, given we know the NSA was monitoring before 9-11, we know the technology changes required after 9-11 were too complicated, and FISA changes and the NSA were out of psych, as they have always been.
There should be someone determine whether this is probable cause before targeting them for monitoring. This is our error. We have violated the law. Our military personnel should be punished under the UCMJ. Please do not do what we did at Guantanamo: Beat us. We’re just stupid military, defense contractors who cannot get real jobs. We will violate the law, and feign stupidity. Yes, we really are stupid, but we get paid a lot of money to be quiet about that as well.
DoJ response
As set forth above, communications are targeted for interception under the Terrorist Surveillance Program only if one party is outside the United States and there is probable cause to believe that at least one party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.
Scope of NSA Program
5. How many hours and dollars have been spent searching or seizing the phone calls or emails of people in the US, and how much of this has been spent on people who have never been charged with any crime?
Credible Response
Not to be flippant, but this has been going on since NSA was first created. So that would be about 60 years – times 365 days – times 24 = 525 600 hours. Then if you multiply that by the number of personnel assigned to NSA, approximately 30,000 including contractors, that’s 15 768 000 000. or 15.768 Billion man-hours, and possibly piles of manure.
If we assume for the sake of argument that our fully burdened man-hour rate – including overhead, material, and all contact costs is $ 200/hour, then the total amount of money is 3 153 600 000 000, or 3Trillion dollars.
To answer your question: How many hours and dollars have been spent searching or seizing the phone calls or emails of people in the US: 15.8 Billion man hours, and $3.2Trillion.
How much of this has been spent on people who have never been charged with any crime? All of it. There is no AlQueda, the list is controlled by the NSA and CIA.
All that time spent, and we screwed up just like we did at Pearl Harbor. We fooled you. We actually knew what was going on, and who placed the explosives in the world trade center. Yes, and we know where the money was transferred after the US contractors crated the aerospace vehicles. We have friends in the Russian laundry business. Would you like some starch? We have a very nice sale going on.
DoJ response:
Operational information about the Terrorist Surveillance Program is classified and sensitive, and therefore cannot be discussed in this setting. Revealing information about the operational details of the Program could compromise its value by facilitating terrorists’ attempts to evade it. As noted above, consistent with the notification provisions of the National Security Act, certain Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have been briefed on the operational details of the Program.
6. How many people in the US have been referred to the FBI for further inquiry or investigation? How many people whose emails or phone calls have been monitored have never been referred to the FBI?
Credible Response: It is our view that the referrals are in the order of magnitude of several million. The total man-hours the FBI agents have available is well above the total man-hours DoJ says they have. Rather, the DoJ conservative numbers are in the tens of thousands; this doesn’t match what is reasonable. Rather, if you look at the total number of agent-man hours, and delete all hours for training and actual work, you’ll see that there are too many agents sitting around, doing nothing. This makes no sense. Rather, the real answer is that the total workload that is contracted out to non-government employees is very high. This is something we haven’t mentioned:: That non-government workers as poorly screened as those who were working prior to 2001 are reviewing this data. There’s no telling how many of them use this personal information for their fun and amusement.
As to your specific question: How many people have been referred to the FBI for further inquiry, and those whose e-mails and phone calls have never been referred: We don’t have the exact number, but will let you know in 48 hours.
But we can tell you: All Americans – all 300 million of them have their e-mal and phone calls monitored; all of them are regularly watched for patterns. This is not something we have really shared with the FISA court. It is part of the “really secret stuff” that we do outside the “official non-official super secret double mirror” thing we do. It’s simply that we pretend to follow the law, but assign “all the really nasty stuff” to “someone else” and then change back after the reviews are over. It’s all transparent, just like our Constitution.
DoJ Response
As we have explained above, operational information about the Terrorist Surveillance Program is classified and sensitive, and therefore cannot be discussed in this setting. Revealing information about the operational details of the Program could compromise its value by facilitating terrorists’ attempts to evade it. Consistent with the notification provisions of the National Security Act, certain Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have been briefed on the operational details of the Program.
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7. Are the names, phone numbers, or email addresses of persons in the United States who have had their communications monitored as part of the Program been included on any watch lists?
Credible Response
Yes. If you would like to know how many watch lists we have, that is a separate question. The DHS and DoJ work with banking institutions to find large financial transfers. In most cases DoJ and DHS agents do not have enough interest to find facts on their own; we will kidnap people, interrogate them without a warrant and deny them information on what they are being asked bout.
Just as we did in Guantanamo, we do that in America. If there are any bruises, we tell people they will be hunted down if they talk about what happened. We threaten them with arrest if they discuss what happened. We make it a condition of their release from our illegal kidnapping for them to be silent. We tell them we are mentoring their phone calls and will know if they go to a lawyer. This has been working rather well, until we made a few errors. Actually, we made many errors: We didn’t realize that GCHQ was mentoring what we were doing, or that the American civilians were actually undercover informants of Congress. Well, aren’t we stupid. What are you going to do -- lock us up and send us to a torture chamber? Too late, we already did that. Ha!
DoJ response
As we have explained above, operational information about the Terrorist Surveillance Program is classified and sensitive, and therefore cannot be discussed in this setting. Revealing information about the operational details of the Program could compromise its value by facilitating terrorists’ attempts to evade it. Consistent with the notification provisions of the National Security Act, certain Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have been briefed on the operational details of the Program.
Telecommunications Companies
8. Telecommunications companies and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) are protected from criminal and civil liability if they are provided a court order from the FlSA court or criminal court or if a high-ranking DOJ official has certified in writing that “No warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have been met, and that the specified assistance is required.” Has anyone at the Justice Department provided any telephone companies or ISPs with these certifications in the course of implementing the NSA’s program?
Credible Response
Yes, the DoJ has closely worked with the phone companies to ensure the program is not detected, and that we are not caught violating the constitution. We make them sign confidentiality agreements, threaten them with loss of many things, and then show them what we can do. That usually keeps them quiet. They like the money we pay them to be silent about the crimes we commit. Kind of like paid guns, but we do this in order to make ourselves feel like we’re really honorable. We’re criminals.
The phone companies are the ones who helped us design the system. Prior to 9-11, they were actively involved in illegal activities. You can find copies of their discussions with DoJ in the GCHQ files. Their general counsel was concerned that there was some talk of lawsuits; we got a lot of campaign contributions and decided to say nothing. Isn’t that funny?
The current waivers to liability are not legally enforceable. They were created on the basis of fraud. We knew that when we create them. Rather, because the NSA is using this technology for combat support against Americans – in violation of the laws or far – US phone companies could be liable for war crimes. There is no statute of limitations.
DoJ response
As we have explained above, operational information about the Terrorist Surveillance Program is classified and sensitive, and therefore we cannot confirm or deny operational details of the program in this setting. Revealing information about the operational details of the Program could compromise its value by facilitating terrorists’ attempts to evade it. Consistent with the notification provisions of the National Security Act, certain Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have been briefed on the operational details of the Program.
9. Which telecommunications firms have opened American communications arteries to the NSA without a warrant?
Credible response: All of them. The phone companies are on special access lists which the Joint Staff works with for the emergency communications. There are special JCS priority systems used to transmit information very quickly. We regularly run tests of this system, and can confirm that within six minutes the President and Joint Staff can establish two way communications, with confirmation, and issue illegal orders. As you can see, we can also do the opposite very well: Shut it down, and block it or cause confusion as we did on 9-11.
Within the Continental United states there are the various combatant commander alternate operating location and support facilities. These are actually part of the CIA domestic cover service. We also use overseas companies as front companies for our operations. Bolton was well positioned to use the NSA because of his familiarity through the Honduran Embassy.
As to the specific issue: “Which telecommunications firms have opened American communications arteries to the NSA without a warrant” – you are missing the point. The issue isn’t whether the arteries are or are not opened – they are always open. The issue of warrants is merely a formality. We collect information on everyone.
Once we think we can find a high profile target – or person of sufficient statute that we can blackmail. Intimidate, or other wise target, we’ll do that. We regularly intercept the private communications of personnel who have absolutely no significant objective other than to “show what we can do.” For example, suppose you are having a private conversation with your friends and you let something slip. Within a few short minutes we can have a copy of that transcript and the audio file presented to your leadership and say, “You have to fire this person, or we will fire you.” We do it all the time. What’s more fun is when we can get someone with some really juicy details, and actually enforce the law.
But don’t tell us about Brady, we don’t want to hear it. The way we get around this is that we’ll use the NSA to target people – and increase attention. Usually, if you spend enough time around someone they’ll make a mistake. The next thing we do is then use the NSA intercepted information to then “just happen” to target someone. We call this the investigative lead program. This is the regular transmission of NSA data to local law enforcement. Law enforcement will use the NSA intercepts – and they’re told they are “anonymous tips” and “investigative leads”. Then they use this to increase their attention, and look for these things. This is the way we get around the warrant requirement.
The problem we run into is when some rat bastard goodie two-shoes is honest. Well, we’ll just accuse them of “trying to be innocent” and get them anyway.
DoJ Response
As we have explained above, operational information about the Terrorist Surveillance Program is classified and sensitive, and therefore we cannot confirm or deny operational details of the program in this setting. Revealing information about the operational details of the Program could compromise its value by facilitating terrorists’ attempts to evade it. Consistent with the notification provisions of the National Security Act, certain Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have been briefed on the operational details of the Program.
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Use of Information
10. To what extent has information collected included details of the targets’ personal lives or political views, and has such information been immediately destroyed? Have intelligence agencies taken any actions beyond surveillance with regard to such individuals?
Credible response
As to your send question, answer 9 appears to be a response. But let’s expand our discussion. The intelligence agencies themselves may not necessary have a direct hand in what happens. We regularly contract out to private firms and encourage businesses to take retaliatory action against whistleblowers or those who are getting close to figuring things out: That this is a dictatorship, but with really neat media relations.
A better way to respond to your question is to ask whether the US Government – not just intelligence agencies – have taken action beyond surveillance with respect to political activities. The answer is: Yes. We regularly plant under cover informants, assign agents, and direct monitoring of anyone we do not understand, or have no basis to detain. Rather, we use our ignorance as the basis to abuse.
As to what we have actually done, the answer is simple: CIA rendition. This is called the domestic rendition program. We move personnel outside the US on CIA charter aircraft and make them disappear. Sometimes they are alive, sometimes they’re lost.
As to your first question, the information we collect is about everyone. The information includes anything: Not just their personal information but their views.
As to your second question the information is retained. We work with our Echelon allies to transport the data out of the US, and we “destroy” the US files. So we comply with the statutes. The data is ‘regularly stolen” so we do not report this “breach of security”. Rather, we classify this as a “maintenance issue” or another name as soon as congress figures out how we are actually spending the money: Not for the things they thought we were doing. DO not look at Article 1 Section 9, we might get into trouble.
DoJ response
The purpose of the Terrorist Surveillance Program is to protect the Nation from foreign attack by detecting and preventing plots by a declared enemy of the United States that has already killed thousands of innocent civilians in the single deadliest foreign attack on U.S. soil in the Nation’s history. In order to advance that end while simultaneously protecting civil liberties, procedures are in place under the Program to protect U.S. privacy rights, including applicable procedures required by Executive Order 12333 and approved by the Attorney General, that govern acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons.
11. Was evidence obtained from the NSA classified surveillance program subsequently used to obtain a warrant from the FlSA court? If so, how many times has this occurred?
Credible response
Yes, a lot. We regularly use NSA intercepts to channel information to both government and non-government entities for purposes of intimidation, management, and public perception management. The evidence itself is used to form the basis for additional inquiry. We get around the warrant requirement by providing this information as an “investigative lead” and then officers can “stumble upon” the evidence. The courts get fooled all the time.
As to the evidence form the NSA we use to get a FISA warrant: It happens all the time. The way we get around this is by “stumbling upon” evidence using non-NSA resources. Then we can present this t the court. However, given that we’ve been stumbling alot lately, we decided not to bother going to the FISA court, but simply pick people up, question them, and take the FISA court out of the loop.
Yes, this explains why you are suddenly picked up outside your child’s school, and spent 7 hours waiting for us to “figure out” what to do. We have teams going around picking people up. You can figure out how often this is occurring if you encourage people to report their average waiting time, and then review the number of teams. You’ll quickly see that there are many people who are getting targeted with the NSA data; they are led to believe it is for something else.
DoJ response
As we have explained above, operational information about the Terrorist Surveillance Program is classified and sensitive, and therefore cannot be discussed in this setting. Nor can we disclose the content of classified and sensitive communications and pleadings filed with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
12. What is done with the information collected from the warrantless surveillance program that ends up not being useful for law enforcement or security purposes?
Credible response
All information obtained is potentially useful. We keep paper copies of data for 25 years. Just as there are self-crated exceptions to FISA, so too are there self-crated exceptions to the Privacy Act. Oops, didn’t we tell you?
The information collected from the illegal activity is stored. It is not necessary destroyed. Rather, we do hide it in offsite locations, overseas, and it is used for many things. The information could very well be sitting in a warehouse north west of London in a building that looks like a small factory, but it’s actually an underground facility. But you didn’t hear that from.
DoJ response
As indicated above, procedures are in place under the Program to protect U.S. privacy rights, including applicable procedures required by Executive Order 12333 and approved by the Attorney General, that govern acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons. Those guidelines are designed to ensure that the Terrorist Surveillance Program is conducted in a manner consistent with preserving civil liberties.
13. Other than the President, what individuals at the White House are briefed on the program, and how often are they briefed?
Credible response: We’re not sure who we’ve told. We’ll have to get back on that.
What we can tell you is Attorney Fitzgerald has been looking at the data incorrectly. He should ask for all the files, not simply the e-mail links. Within those “unrelated emails” you’ll see how much personal information is passed around. We don’t necessarily tell them exactly what we are doing; we just show up with our “really neat plans” and then they do what we say.
As to the specifics of “the program” – that’s a misnomer. The activity is actually much larger and far more sinister than you’ve been led to believe. All the things the NYT discussed is dumped into “the program.” The other things – the really awful, horrendous things, which you would simply scream over – those are in “other programs.”
Q2 is the internal NSA security service. They’ve got most people convinced that if they talk they’ll be in trouble. There’s one small problem. The NSA employees have figured oat that the Modernization programs are related to new encryption devices – not just theoretical technology – that allows other countries to communicate outside the NSA ability to intercept or decipher.
Curiously, the NSA employees have been able to figure out how to acquire and use this technology and the NSA is unable to intercept this. The NSC and NSA senior management have not been able to figure out which personnel do or do not have access to this non-decipherable technology. We will find an evil way to learn more. We have SETA contractors who will brilliantly devise a scheme. That’s who gave us the idea of the . . . [ooops, we won’t talk about that; far too scary ].
DoJ response
The Terrorist Surveillance Program remains classified and highly sensitive. In general, the identity of individuals who have been briefed into the Program is also classified. We have previously explained, however, that the President sought legal advice prior to authorizing the Terrorist Surveillance Program and was advised that it is lawful, and that the Program has been reviewed by lawyers at the Department of Justice (including the Attorney General), by lawyers at the NSA, and by the Counsel to the President. Since 2001, the Program has been reviewed multiple times by different
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counsel. Although the President is responsible for reauthorizing the Program, his determination to do so is based on reviews undertaken by the Intelligence Community and Department of Justice, a strategic assessment of the continuing importance of the Program to the national security of the United States, and assurances that safeguards continue to protect civil liberties. That process requires certain individuals to be cleared to receive classified and sensitive information about the Program.
14. When was James Baker read into the Program?
Credible Response: Not sure, we’ll let you know in 48 hours.
DoJ: Please refer to the answer to question 13.
15. Who at the Department of Justice was informed of the Program? When?
Credible Response: By name, not sure, we’ll let you know in 48 hours. But you can be sure that everyone who is in trouble over the illegal activity has talked to their lawyers. If you want to know who’s involved, all you have to do is find out which DoJ employees have retained private counsel. Not all that hard: The same system which can target American civilians can also find and transcribe attorney-client conversations. Worldwide. That’s why our law enforcement has a great record when it comes to convictions. Guess who feeds the information to the law enforcement on who has an attorney? We get into a real problem when we don’t know that someone is an undercover Congressional spy fully trained in the law, has changed their name, and has undergone plastic surgery with a sex change in Thailand.
DoJ response : Please refer to the answer to question 13.
16. When was the Solicitor General’s office and the Deputy Attorney General’s office informed of the program?
Credible Response: Not sure, we’ll find out. You can be sure they knew about it before 9-11. That’s why the phone companies were screaming.
DoJ: Please refer to the answer to question 13.
17. Does the Attorney General personally approve or authorize each interception of a United States person’s communication? If not, who approves each interception?
Credible Response: No, he doesn’t do his job. He’s a criminal, liar, and should be disbarred. Senator Feingold knows that he’s a weasel.
The FISA includes several warrant exceptions. The Attorney General knows that the exceptions as applied are much larger than what is permissible. Because we have illegally asserted that the exceptions are broader – to include whatever we want – Gonzalez doesn’t actually prove or authorize very much. We found him wandering in the basement mumbling something about “basketballs”. That’s our secret NSA program. Everyone thinks he’s crazy, but he’s just practicing for his war crimes trial. It doesn’t look like it’s working: Feingold won’t let go of his underwear.
DoJ response
As explained above, under the Terrorist Surveillance Program, professional intelligence officers at NSA, who are experts on al Qaeda and its tactics (including its use of communications systems), make the decisions about which international communications should be intercepted. Relying on the best available intelligence and subject to appropriate and rigorous oversight, those officers determine whether there is probable cause to believe that at least one of the parties to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. In addition, the NSA, the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence conduct oversight of the Terrorist Surveillance Program through, for example, the reauthorization process.
18. Does anyone independent of the NSA check persons in the US whose phone calls or emails are searched or seized to make sure that they are not being targeted based on their political opinions?
Credible response
Yes and no. The NSA has contractors who do a lot of work. For purpose of real legal laity, they are essentially government agents and war criminals. For purpose of deniability, we tell them that they have immunity and threaten them to keep them silent.
As to your specific question: There is no credible system in place to monitor the NSA activities, nor prevent people like John Bolton from getting information base solely on their opposition to violations of the laws of war.
So, in so-so many words -- so, so, so --- Yes, there are people who are targeted base on their political opinions; and no there are not adequate oversight programs – contrary to what the NSA IG has said – over the NSA activity. Nor is the Independent Oversight Board told enough about Echelon or the investigative leads to put this all together. Rather, we simply wave the flag and say, “America,” expect them to grovel. It worked in Iraq, well on paper. Turn the paper upside down, and hold it up to the mirror. Well, we tried. Sort of. It hasn’t worked all that well lately.
As to the allegations that NSA employees are overseeing it – ha! Look at he mess they made on the Port Deal: If they were really doing their job, they would’ve caught that. And the same NSA employees are the ones who are silent about the 9-11 and the Iraq WMD issues: We know what was or wasn’t done.
Don’t believe that non-sense about “what we do or do not review.” We don’t follow the law or go to court as required; so why would we follow procedures that we made up and aren’t consistent with the law? No reason.
DoJ response
General Hayden has stated that the Terrorist Surveillance Program is “overseen by the most intense oversight regime in the history of the National Security Agency,” see Remarks by General Michael V. Hayden to the National Press Club, available at http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_012306.html, and is subject to extensive review in other departments as well. The oversight program includes review at the National Security Agency (by both the Office of General Counsel and Office of Inspector General) and the Department of Justice. In addition, with the participation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice, the Program is reviewed
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every 45 days, and the President decides whether to reauthorize it. This review includes an evaluation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program’s effectiveness, a thorough assessment of the current threat to the United States posed by al Qaeda, and assurances that safeguards continue to protect civil liberties.
Minimization Procedure
19. Executive Order 12,333[] provides that intelligence agencies are only authorized to collect information on US persons consistent with the provisions of that Executive Order and procedures established by the head of the agency and approved the Attorney General. (Sec. 2.3). What minimization procedures are in effect concerning information gathered by the NSA concerning persons in the US?
Credible Response
The procedures are not the same as what we do. Notice also other executive orders violate the law. So whether an executive order does or doesn’t say something has little relationship to what actually happens.
“Minimization” to the NSA means, “Minimize knowledge that Congress knows about our 100% coverage of all political dissent.
DoJ response
Procedures are in place to protect U.S. privacy rights, including applicable procedures required by Executive Order 12333 and approved by the Attorney General, that govern acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons. NSA applies minimization procedures that are appropriate and approved for the activity at issue. For example, special minimization procedures, approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, govern NSA handling of U.S. person information acquired pursuant to FISA-authorization surveillance. Department of Defense Regulation 5240.1-R (and its classified annex) are the guidelines approved by the Attorney General that are referred to in Executive Order 12333. Those guidelines govern NSA’s handling of U.S. person information. United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 provides more detailed guidance on the latter.
20. Has United States Signals Intelligence Directive [USSID] 18, “Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures,” July 27, 1993, applicable to the NSA, been changed since January 2001? Is it still in effect? Does that Directive, as amended or not, apply to all surveillance being undertaken by the NSA of persons inside the US outside of the procedures set forth in FISA?
Credible Response
The laws of 1993 are outdated. The world changed after Sept 2001. We have a dictator. Anything in writing – including the constitution – that is leader does not like we ignore. Even if we do or do not change the laws, we still ignore them.
Yes, there have been changes in our conduct; so the laws and procedures – although violated before Sept 2001 – are of little interest.
Yes, the directive as written applies. But why follow them? Congress isn’t going to do anything. The American people will never vote to protect their Constitution. We’ve trained them to see big scary things, smoke, and then pull the RNC button. Besides all the voting boxes are under RNC contract.
Who’s going to believe there’s this much fraud? Have you ever seen anyone get upset at the President? Of course, not that’s because 145% of Americans blindly support America – we have so much support, even future generations – future voters – all 45% on top of the 100% already voting for him -- even when they sleeping. Can democracy get any better than this?
DoJ Response
United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 has not been changed since January 2001 and is still in effect. As indicated above, procedures are in place under the Terrorist Surveillance Program to protect U.S. privacy rights, including applicable procedures required by Executive Order 12333 and approved by the Attorney General, that govern acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons.
21. When were the minimization procedures last changed? Did the Attorney General approve those changes? When?
Credible Response: Not sure, we’ll find out in 48 hours. Gonzalez may have a copy of the review form. They may be in the basement near the basket balls.
Even if we change the procedures. We’re not going to follow them. Besides, there’s a difference between procedures, what we do, and what the law says. If you focus on procedures, you are ignoring our violation of the laws. That’s a good thing: We distract you and you get upset that we’re not answering questions of no value.
DoJ response
Executive Order 12333 calls for Attorney General-approved procedures for the collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons. The Secretary of Defense issued the current version of these procedures in December 1981
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applicable to all Department of Defense (“DoD”) intelligence agencies. The Attorney General signed those procedures in October 1982. A classified annex to those procedures dealing specifically with signals intelligence was promulgated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in April 1988 and approved by the Attorney General in May 1988. NSA has internal procedures derivative of those authorities that were last updated in 1993. The annex that specifically governs FISA procedures was modified, with Attorney General Reno’s approval, in 1997.
22. When was the last time you supplied any Member of the House Judiciary Committee or any Committee of the Congress a copy of such minimization procedures?
Credible Response: Congress, what’s that? This is the Post Sept 2001 world. We don’t need any Congress. We need more secrecy, and 250% voting support. 1000% support. 10,000% support.
As to your question, we presume – based on your question that you feel like you’ve been left out of the loop and not provided any information in a timely manner. We’re sorry. We’ll send you a copy in 48 hours
Even if we provide you a copy of the procedures, will you believe we’re following them? We won’t follow them, so does it matter?
OK. We’ll admit it: We ignore the law, we don’t follow it, and we did not make sure that the NSA technology is consistent with the statues. We’re lazy. It’s far simpler to point to ‘big scary things.” Do you have some WebPages we can surf? That is more fun. This is really tiring.
Just get this over with: We admit it, we’re guilty – big violations of the law, no excuse, and a lot people know. Fitzgerald knows. Everyone knows. Can we just get over this and get to the impeachment?
As for the briefings we’ve provided – not sure what’s stopped the ranking members to order the NSA to look at things and provide an open version.
DoJ Response
NSA has briefed intelligence committees of both Houses extensively on minimization procedures over the past several years. NSA can determine from available records only that NSA provided Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff DoD Regulation 5240.1-R and its classified annex in January 2006 and both USSID 18 and DoD Regulation 5420.1-R and its annex in July 2005. NSA’s records do not indicate when a copy of those materials was last provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. However, it is important to note that much of this material is freely available. USSID 18, July 27, 1993, has been made publicly available in redacted form (see, e.g., www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/07-01.htm). In addition, DoD Regulation 5240.1-R, December 1982 (but not its annex) has been declassified and made publicly available (see, e.g., http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1r.htm).
Concerns About the NSA Program from Within the Administration
23. How many federal employees have expressed concerns about or objections to this program and what has been done regarding those employees of the NSA or other federal agencies or in response?
Credible response: A lot, but we brainwash them to make them think, “it’s just over there” or “isolated.” It’s actually everywhere. If they only knew. To those who peep, we send them to the Q2 for shock treatment. There’s a special toy we use. Can’t say what it looks like. It’s very scary.
DoJ response
It would be inappropriate for us to disclose any confidential internal deliberations of the Executive Branch. The long-recognized confidentiality protections afforded Executive Branch communications are designed to encourage candid advice from Executive Branch lawyers and officers, and subjecting such advice to disclosure would chill those deliberations. The General Counsel and Inspector General of the NSA oversee the NSA’s implementation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. We note that there are procedures in place under the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 that permit employees concerned about the legality of intelligence programs to report their concerns to the inspectors general of intelligence agencies and thence to Congress.
24. Why was the NSA program suspended in 2004?
Credible Response: It didn’t stop. We said it stopped because we wanted you to believe a false thing. We lied. Told Fibs. Like the White House Press corps does when they repeat what we say.
We wanted you to believe that “something happened” in 2004; actually what happened was the Phone companies really put their foot down, and sent some really nasty messaged. Then we told them, “OK, we’ll stop.” Then we transferred that workload over to some other phone companies who got paid a lot of money, and had to sign some more convincing waivers. The waivers had some really confusing things in them, and we had some really interesting friends at he phone company who greased the wheels for us.
The Terrorist Surveillance Program described by the President has never been suspended; it has been in operation since its inception in October 2001. Indeed, the President explained that he intends to reauthorize that Program as long as the threat posed
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by al Qaeda and its allies justifies it. Beyond this, we cannot discuss the operational details or history of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Nor can we divulge the internal deliberations of the Executive Branch.
Presidential Claim of Inherent Authority
25. What is the limiting principle of the President’s claimed inherent authority as commander-in-chief? For example, does this interpretation of the law authorize the opening of first-class mail of U.S. citizens under the DOJ’s interpretation, and if not, why not?
Credible Response
The President has no inherent authority. He cannot violate the law. The principle that limits him is his oath. He ignores this.
No, the President does not authorize opening mail -- he ordered it, but we were doing it anyway. He was happy. Yes, the green tape is from DHS.
The issue is whether the US citizens should reasonably expect to have mail opened. There are two answers: Yes, they should expect it since we live in a dictatorship; and no, they should not expect it since we have a Constitution. Pick: Do you want to face reality, or do you want to do the right thing. Don’t ask us which is which – we can’t decide.
We regularly intercept mail inside the US. It doesn’t matter who we say they are or are not associated with. If we don’t know something, we’ll find out. Yes, we violate the law. It is a lie to say we don’t open mail ;rather we put “that activity” in another program. We’ll change the name and find a new PO Box to hide that.
You can speculate all you want – you’re more likely to stumble on the truth that what we might otherwise tell you. If we scream, “Commander in Chief” louder, will you listen, or just change the channel?
DoJ response
The Terrorist Surveillance Program intercepts only communications where one party is outside the United States and there is probable cause to believe that at least one party is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. The Program does not include the opening of first-class United States mail. There is a long history of Presidents, including Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, authorizing the interception of international electronic communications during times of armed conflict as an exercise of the President’s inherent authority under the Constitution and pursuant to general force authorization resolutions. Whether the President’s authority under the Constitution would permit the interception of mail would require a different legal analysis. In light of the strictly limited nature of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, we do not think it a useful or a practical exercise to engage in speculation about the limits of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.”).
26. Under the Administration’s legal interpretation, does the President have the authority to wiretap Americans’ domestic calls and emails under his inherent constitutional power and the AUMF, if he feels it involves al Qaeda activity?
Credible Response: You’re really making this shard.
First, the President may without warrant intercept information. This is part of FISA. There are exceptions to the warrant requirement. However, our Dictator Bush made new exceptions which Congress didn’t approve.
As to your question about interpretation: We interpret the law to our interests – the power to do evil things against our enemies in the political arena.
The President does not have the lawful authority to do what he is doing.
No, we do not have the inherent power to do anything – he only has specifically delegated powers. Nothing is implied. The AUMF is not relevant, it is a red herring
The issue is whether it is lawful to do what we are doing: No. The President will interpret eth law as he wants, and Congress does nothing.
IT doesn’t matte whether the law does or does not involve ALQueda. We target everyone.
DoJ Response
The Force Resolution’s authorization of “all necessary and appropriate force,” which the Supreme Court in Hamdi interpreted to include the fundamental and accepted incidents of the use of military force, clearly encompasses the narrowly focused Terrorist Surveillance Program. There is a long history of Presidents authorizing the interception of international electronic communications during a time of armed conflict. President Wilson, for example, relying only on his constitutional powers and a general congressional authorization for use of force, authorized the interception of all telephone, telegraph, and cable communications into and out of the United States during World War I. See Exec. Order 2604 (Apr. 28, 1917). Similarly, President Roosevelt authorized the interception of “all . . . telecommunications traffic in and out of the United States.” As explained in the Justice Department’s paper of January 19, 2006, that historical foundation lends significant support to the President’s authority to undertake the Terrorist Surveillance Program under the AUMF and the Constitution; indeed, the Program is much narrower than the interceptions authorized by either President Wilson or President
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Roosevelt. Interception of the content of domestic communications would present a different legal question.
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
27. When did the Administration and DOJ decide that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) granted the Administration the power to create the NSA program?
Credible Response: We decided the UAMF granted the power to do this after we got caught doing what was not legal. WE invented this argument without thinking it through very well. Implicit in this argument is the nexus of using NSA in combat support against Americans. This is a war crime, and have only just realized how stupid we have been to admit what we are doing: Waging war illegally against American using illegal military force in an illegal way. Ooops. We really made an error on that.
The Department has reviewed the legality of the Terrorist Surveillance Program on multiple occasions. We cannot discuss the operational details or history of the Terrorist Surveillance Program.
28. Are there any other actions under the AUMF that, without the President’s inherent constitutional power, would not be permitted because of the FlSA statute? Are there any programs currently being used like that?
Credible Response: There are many actions would are illegal. There are many self-asserted exceptions to many laws. We have already discussed the warrantless interrogation program; the investigative leads, and the use of “stumbling” theory of evidence: All are outside the statute and exceptions.
Yes, because the conduct does fall outside what is permissible – read, “Illegal” – we have violated other laws: namely, the failure to report the illegal activity as we have failed to do.
Yes, there are programs that are illegal, and have been selectively worded to make them appear t be legal; the problem we had is when we could not convince the NYT to be silent about our evil.
DoJ Response
We are not in a position to provide information here concerning any other intelligence activities beyond the Terrorist Surveillance Program, though our inability to respond should not be taken to suggest that there are such activities. Consistent with long-standing practice, the Executive Branch notifies Congress concerning the classified intelligence activities of the United States through appropriate briefings of the oversight committees and, in certain circumstances, congressional leadership.
29. Under the Administration’s interpretation of AUMF, has the President ever invoked his authority as commander-in-chief through either secret order or directive other than NSA surveillance?
Credible Response: The Execute has ordered illegal NSA activity before the AUMF was created. This is not a sign of his vision, but his commitment to lawlessness. The AUMF is not relevant. We were already violating the law prior to Sept 2001.
As to whether the interpretation of the AUMF does or does not justify anything –that is pure non-sense. We invented the AUMF argument after we got caught.
There are many secret orders that violate the law. We are criminals. The President has relied on non-AUMF arguments to invoke illegal authority, using memos to direct illegal violations of the law.
DoJ response
As stated above, we are not in a position to provide information here concerning any other intelligence activities beyond the Terrorist Surveillance Program, though our inability to respond should not be taken to suggest that there are such activities. Consistent with long-standing practice, the Executive Branch notifies Congress concerning the classified intelligence activities of the United States through appropriate briefings of the oversight committees and, in certain circumstances, congressional leadership.
30. How do you reconcile the Attorney General’s statement that Congress would not have granted the Executive such authority and at the same time, contend that this authority is something that Congress intended to give under the AUMF?
Credible Response
The only thing we can offer is: Gonzalez has lost his marbles. It is non-sense to say that the Congress granted authority or power above and beyond the Constitution. Congress cannot delegate power nor create it, that is outside the Constitution. It is non-sense to say that congress did or did not intend to so something that they have no power to do: Create power out of waste paper. Can’t be done, but if you scream loud enough and cry, “Big scary things” people will cower. That means you. Hay, get under your desk. Please?
We cannot reconcile it. Gonzalez really slipped on this one. We’re not sure what to do: He’s got too many secrets, and we’re not sure if we can trust him.
You have asked a good question. It is a way of trapping us. No fair.
OK, here goes. The entire AUMF argument is fiction. Congress did not grant him any authority to violate the law. There is no basis to content that Congress intended to violate h law, or create new exceptions to FISA.
Rather, the AUMF is generalized language. It is only relevant in Hamdi because Hamdii’s detention was not specifically addressed; we appealed to ignorance to justify violations of Habeas corpus.
In order to distract Congress form our crimes, we involved Hamdi --- a generalized plea to ignorance – as the basis to say that we could use the AUMF to trump FISA. The reverse is true; We used the FISA self-created exceptions as the basis to trump the Constitution.
DoJ response
We understand your question to be a reference to a statement the Attorney General made on December 19, 2005. As the Attorney General clarified both later in the same December 19th briefing and on December 21, 2005, it is not the case that the Administration declined to seek a specific authorization of the Terrorist Surveillance Program because we believed Congress would not authorize it. See Remarks by
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Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff and Attorney General Gonzales on the USA PATRIOT Act, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=5285. Rather, as the Attorney General testified before the Senate on February 6, 2006, the consensus view in discussions with Members of Congress was that it was unlikely, if not impossible, that more specific legislation could be enacted without compromising the Terrorist Surveillance Program by disclosing operational details, limitations, and capabilities to our enemies. Such disclosures would necessarily have compromised our national security.
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
31. When did the Administration reach the conclusion that FISA did not have to be followed to use the NSA program?
Credible Response: Many years ago, on a ranch in Texas. There was a little man who had a little oil field. He lost a lot of money. He thought, “What if I could be king, and make the rules.” After that, he knew he did not have to follow the law to do what he wanted: Brats are not allowed to be accountable, they just scream louder in their cheer leading mega phone. If you’re really powerful, you can pay someone to lie for you.
Actually, the President before Sept 2001 ignored FISA and did what he want with NSA.
DoJ Response
Before answering this question, we note that the Department’s legal analysis assumes, solely for purposes of that analysis, that the targeted interception of international communications authorized under the President’s Terrorist Surveillance Program would constitute “electronic surveillance” as defined in FISA. As noted in our January 19th paper, we cannot confirm whether that is actually the case without disclosing sensitive classified information.
As explained at length in the Justice Department’s paper of January 19, 2006, the Terrorist Surveillance Program is completely consistent with FISA. FISA itself includes an exception for surveillance “authorized by statute,” 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a). In light of the decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that the AUMF authorizes the President to undertake fundamental and accepted incidents of war and the long history demonstrating that signals intelligence against the enemy is such a fundamental incident of war, the AUMF is a statute that authorizes intelligence surveillance against members and agents of al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations and thereby satisfies FISA.
The President was advised that the Terrorist Surveillance Program was lawful before he first authorized it in October 2001.
32. Did the increasing number of modified and rejected requests for FISA warrants since 2001 implicate the Administration’s determination to bypass FISA?
Credible Response: We were already bypassing FISA before Sept 2001. We were already determined -- before we had a roadblock – to bypass FISA, the law, Congress, the Courts, and the Constitution. IT was part of our evil PNAC plan, drafted in the early 1990s, when the idea of “big scary things” was put into play. It was alot more than 19 people. Someone wrote their thesis on this, and the rest is re-written history.
DoJ response
As explained above, the Terrorist Surveillance Program does not “bypass FISA.”
The determination to implement the Terrorist Surveillance Program was made based on the advice of intelligence experts that the Nation needed an early warning system, one that could help detect and prevent another catastrophic al Qaeda attack. The President authorized the Terrorist Surveillance Program because it offers the speed and agility required to defend the United States against further terrorist attacks by al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations. Among the advantages offered by the Terrorist Surveillance Program compared to FISA is who makes the probable cause determination
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and how many layers of review will occur before surveillance begins. Under the Terrorist Surveillance Program, professional intelligence officers, who are experts on al Qaeda and its tactics (including its use of communications systems), with appropriate and rigorous oversight, make the decisions about which international communications should be intercepted. By contrast, because FISA requires the Attorney General to “reasonably determine[]” that “the factual basis for issuance of” a FISA order exists at the time he approves an emergency authorization, see 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)(2), as a practical matter, it is necessary for NSA intelligence officers, NSA lawyers, Justice Department lawyers, and the Attorney General to review a matter before even emergency surveillance would begin. Great care must be exercised in reviewing requests for emergency surveillance because of the risks involved. Among other things, if the Attorney General authorizes emergency surveillance and the FISA court later declines to permit surveillance, there is a risk that the court would disclose the surveillance to U.S. persons whose communications were intercepted, see 50 U.S.C. § 1806(j), potentially compromising ongoing intelligence efforts. In the narrow context of defending the Nation in this congressionally authorized armed conflict with al Qaeda, we must allow these highly trained intelligence professionals to use their skills and knowledge to protect us.
33. Do you know of any other President who has authorized warrantless wiretaps outside of FlSA since FlSA was passed in 1978? If so, please explain.
Credible Response: Not sure, we’ll find out. Probably none of them authorized it; rather, we were doing it on our own.
DoJ Response
The laws of the United States, both before and after FISA’s enactment, have long permitted various forms of foreign intelligence surveillance, including the use of wiretaps, outside the procedures of FISA. If the question is limited to “electronic surveillance” as defined by FISA, however, we are unaware of such authorizations.
34. In a press briefing on December 19, 2005, General Hayden stated that the NSA was using a subtly softer trigger which precluded going to the FISA court. What exactly constitutes this softer trigger?
Credible Response: A “softer trigger” means we step more softly to not awaken Congress to this dictatorship.
Hayden’s softer trigger comment is non-sense. We don’t use triggers. We use punching bags, with gloves off. Everyone gets targeted. If your dog has a cell phone, we know what kind of dog food you’re dog is regurgitating.
DoJ Response
As noted above, the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard is a “probable cause” standard of proof. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“We have stated . . . that ‘[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’”). FISA also employs a probable cause standard (specifically, whether there is “probable cause to believe” that the target of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign power). See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3). The relevant distinction between the two methods—and the critical advantage offered by the Terrorist Surveillance Program compared to FISA—is the greater speed and agility it offers.
35. How many FISA judges were informed of the warrantless surveillance program?
Credible Response: What FISA court? We didn’t tell them, we just did it. We made up new exceptions and then went crazy. Toga, toga, toga!
DoJ response
The Terrorist Surveillance Program remains classified and sensitive. In general, the identity of individuals who have been briefed into the Program is also classified. In addition, we cannot disclose the content of our discussions with the Foreign Intelligence
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Surveillance Court. We assure you, however, that the Department keeps the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court fully informed regarding information that is relevant to the FISA process.
36. Was any judge on the FISA court of review informed of the NSA program as part of the briefing of the 2002 appellate case, In re Sealed Case? Were any of the lawyers on that case read into the program? How many?
Credible response: Crap, now you’re asking legal questions. This is really hard, Can we take a break?
Probably, but we’re not sure. Maybe the Judges at the Senate Judiciary committee can comment on this. We didn’t tell them what we were doing. The lawyers haven’t been given full access to hat the NSA is doing: “Big scary things.”
As to how many lawyers have or have not been told: You can pretty much assume that we have a bad answer: The wrong people know and didn’t do their jobs; and the people who know failed to report the illegal activity as required. Do you want them to lose their jobs? Wow, this has some attorney discipline implications. Are you sure you really want to know that the US lawyers were well aware of this illegal program, but acted like nothing was going on?
DoJ response:
As we noted above, the identity of individuals who have been briefed into the Terrorist Surveillance Program is generally classified. We note, however, that In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (For. Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002), involved whether the FISA Court had statutory or constitutional authority to place restrictions on interaction of criminal prosecutors and foreign intelligence investigators as a condition for granting surveillance orders. The Terrorist Surveillance Program would not have been relevant to the question before the court in that case.
37. Are there currently any plans to take the entire NSA program to the FISA Court within the broad parameters of what is reasonable and constitutional and ask the FlSA Court to approve it or disapprove it? If not, why not?
Credible Response: If we told the truth now, we’d have a lot of explaining to do. We might lose the lection for eternity, and have to disband the RNC.
No, we have no plans to do anything that might result in the American population realizing the scope of our evilness.
To answer your question: There is no plan – that we follow -- to ensure the NSA is reasonable or constitutional; rather, we’re simply going to hide the reality overseas, and reclassify the “really bad things” in other places.
The FISA court would never approve of our actual activities.
DoJ Response
It would be inappropriate to discuss here future plans for seeking any particular order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which could involve both privileged internal Executive Branch communications and deliberations and classified and sensitive court filings. The Department has, however, sought to use the FISA process wherever possible, and we will continue to consider all lawful options.
38. What aspects of FISA are too burdensome for the Administration to comply with? Why did the Administration fail to utilize the emergency provision of FISA?
Credible Response:
The burdensome aspects – too burdensome to comply with -- are the Constitution. We have DoJ employees who like to update Wikis, so we’re not as busy as you might believe. Rather, we’re busy because of all the work we create for ourselves: Inventing new lies to explain away the ones that have fallen apart. There’s too much time between now and the lection, and we are running out of glue. Help!
The aspects of FISA that we do not want to follow: The parts that say what we’re supposed to do. We don’t like that. We want to tell you what to do. We want to write laws, enforce them, and then lock Congress away.
We did not use the emergency provision of FISA because we didn’t think it was an emergency: We thought it was normal to violate the law and not comply with what we promised.
DoJ response
As noted above, the determination was made, based on the advice of intelligence experts, that the Nation needed an early warning system to help detect and prevent another catastrophic al Qaeda attack. Speed and agility are critical in this context. It would be an unjustifiable lapse if al Qaeda electronic communications were used to coordinate another deadly attack on America, but the communications were not intercepted in time because of the delay that traditional FISA procedures require.
The emergency authorization provision in FISA, which allows 72 hours of surveillance without obtaining a court order, does not—as many believe—allow the Government to undertake surveillance immediately. Rather, in order to authorize emergency surveillance under FISA, the Attorney General first must personally “determine[] that . . . the factual basis for issuance of an order under [FISA] to approve such surveillance exists.” 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f). FISA requires the Attorney General to determine that this condition is satisfied in advance of authorizing the surveillance to begin. The process needed to make that determination, in turn, can take time. Section 106(j) of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1806(j), provides that if a court later declines to authorize an
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interception that previously was authorized by the Attorney General under the so-called “emergency” exception to FISA, it may order disclosures about the surveillance to U.S. persons whose communications were intercepted. Thus, using the “emergency” exception poses a risk that surveillance activities will be subject to public disclosure. To reduce that risk, the Attorney General follows a multi-layered procedure before authorizing interception under the “emergency” exception to help to ensure that any eventual application will be approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. That process ordinarily entails review by intelligence officers at the NSA, NSA attorneys, and Department of Justice attorneys, each of whom must be satisfied that the standards have been met before the matter proceeds to the next group for review. Compared to that multilayered process, the Terrorist Surveillance Program affords a critical advantage in terms of speed and agility.
Miscellaneous
39. According to the Administration, a line NSA analyst rather than an independent judge determines whether or not an intrusion into a[] citizen’s privacy is reasonable. Do you think that there are appropriate checks and balances under this framework?
Credible response No, it is not appropriate to rely on NSA analysts. Judges are the judges; analysts are the analysts. Checks and balances don’t work when you don’t check and you don’t balance. So we don’t check or balance. That solves that problem.
DoJ's Mystery Fairy: Depends on whether the analyst is paid enough to be quiet. NSA analysts aren’t really all that intelligent. Some of these people we find in dumpsters, digging through trash. Some of them know what a computer looks like.
NSA analysts are given the power to be Federal Judges. NSA lackeys are more competent that poorly trained judges to know the law. What do Judges know? They’re judges: They don’t know facts, they just judge. That’s not smart.
Actually , by ignoring the law we are protecting the law: We are protecting America from bad judicial decisions that do not match what we want.
DoJ response
Yes. As noted earlier, General Hayden has stated that the Terrorist Surveillance Program is “overseen by the most intense oversight regime in the history of the National Security Agency,” see Remarks by General Michael V. Hayden to the National Press Club, available at http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_012306.html, and is subject to extensive review in other departments as well. Please refer to the answer to question 18 for further information about the considerable privacy protections that are built into the Program.
40. Have any purely domestic calls intercepted through the NSA program? What happens if such calls are intercepted, to the information and the responsible employee?
Credible Response. Yes, domestic alls have been intercepted. If domestic calls are intercepted, we do what we always do: Our jobs.
There is no requirement that NSA and Echelon narrow their field. Rather, we will simply call the “things we don’t want to admit are crimes” as a “classified program.”
The information is retained and may be used to do what we want: Humiliate you, get you to grovel, and make you believe that we are all powerful. Actually, we do this because your reasons are devoid of logic, and the NSA management is really stupid.
If we do intercept calls, the responsible employee should be disciplined. But we actually reward them with more visits to Q2: “Would you like to meet Mr. Mind Probe again?”
DoJ Response
The Terrorist Surveillance Program targets for interception only those communications where one party is outside of the United States and there is probable cause to believe that at least one party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. The Program does not target for interception wholly domestic communications (i.e., communications which both originate and terminate within the United States). There are procedures in place to avoid the interception of domestic calls. In addition, as mentioned above, procedures are in place to protect U.S. privacy rights, including applicable procedures required by Executive Order 12333 and approved by the Attorney General, that govern acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons.
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41. Is the NSA engaged in keyword analysis or pattern analysis of purely domestic communications?
Credible response: That’s only the beginning. We have all kinds of other interesting pattern recognitions. We can swim through this data like you can’t imagine. Even if there’s no pattern, we can create one, forecast one, even make one appear where there’s nothing. If you need an excuse to interrogate someone, we can find an algorithm that will get you your punching bag.
The domestic surveillance monitoring uses all methods imaginable, and then scary things. They violate the law. Talk to Bolton. He knows about that.
DoJ response
The Terrorist Surveillance Program targets communications for interception only when one party is outside the United States and there is probable cause to believe that at least one party is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. It would be inappropriate to discuss in this setting the existence (or non-existence) of specific intelligence activities or the operations of any such activities other than the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Consistent with long-standing practice, the Executive Branch notifies Congress concerning the classified intelligence activities of the United States through appropriate briefings of the oversight committees and, in certain circumstances, congressional leadership.
42. Is the NSA engaged in keyword analysis or pattern analysis of the communications of people in the United States who call or email overseas?
Credible response: Yes, we do more things. If there’s a National Geographic mammal with a run down battery in its tracking device, we can tell you when the battery will fail, the type of material the battery will needs, the replacement costs, and the approximate weight of the mammal to the nearest ounce. You never know when mammals might turn into “really big, scary things and try to take over.” We’re ready.
DoJ response
As noted above, the Terrorist Surveillance Program targets communications for interception only when one party is outside the United States and there is probable cause to believe that at least one party is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. It would be inappropriate to discuss in this setting the existence (or non-existence) of specific intelligence activities or the operations of any such activities other than the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Consistent with long-standing practice, the Executive Branch notifies Congress concerning the classified intelligence activities of the United States through appropriate briefings of the oversight committees and, in certain circumstances, congressional leadership.
43. Has information obtained through warrantless NSA interceptions been used in any criminal prosecutions?
Credible response: Yes, all the time. We use NSA intercepts to provide investigative leads. The information is used to “stumble on” evidence. We do this to violate the Constitution. So much for Pearl Harbor and 9-11: We got distracted. By design.
DoJ Response
The purpose of the Terrorist Surveillance Program is not to bring criminals to justice. Instead, the Program is directed at protecting the Nation from foreign attack by detecting and preventing plots by a declared enemy of the United States. Because the Program is directed at a “special need, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). Because collecting foreign intelligence information without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and because the Terrorist Surveillance Program is lawful, there appears to be no legal barrier against introducing this evidence in a criminal prosecution. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f), (g). Past experience outside the context of the Terrorist Surveillance Program indicates, however, that operational considerations, such as the potential for disclosing classified information, must be considered in using intelligence information in criminal trials.
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44. Are their any plans by the Bush administration to inform those US individuals whose phone calls or emails were searched or seized but they have been cleared of any wrongdoing?
Credible Response: We have plans to inform citizens their rights have been violated. They should know that, living in the greatest country hear, they consent to having their rights violated without their consent or knowledge. American citizens have no right to know how their rights are being abused: That’s too scary, they might vote us out of office and make us irrelevant like the Roman Empire, the Whigs, or That 70s Show.
Unless we have to – which we do not do – if someone is searched, we will forever use that search as an excuse to do more searching. We use our accusations as an excuse to make more accusations. No one is ever free and clear in America, this is America: You have to give up your rights in order to be free. Didn’t anyone tell you that? George Orwell’s 1984 is our Bible. Our Rosetta Stone. Our Cooking Recipe Book.
As explained above, the Terrorist Surveillance Program is subject to rigorous oversight to protect privacy interests. In addition, procedures are in place to protect U.S. privacy rights, including applicable procedures required by Executive Order 12333 and approved by the Attorney General, that govern acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons.
45. Are any communications between attorneys and their clients or doctors and patients being captured?
Credible Response: Yes. We have your X-rays on file, we know what you’ve been eating, and have no comment on why your attorney is surfing the internet looking at what they’re looking at. They are on our side, so we’re going t have a “little chat” like we always do. What to come along?
DoJ response
The Terrorist Surveillance Program targets communications for interception only when one party is outside the United States and there is probable cause to believe that at least one party is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization. Although the Program does not specifically target the communications of attorneys or physicians, calls involving such persons would not be categorically excluded from interception if they met these criteria. As mentioned above, however, procedures are in place to protect U.S. privacy rights, including applicable procedures required by Executive Order 12333 and approved by the Attorney General, that govern acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. persons.
posted by Constant @ 12:41 PM
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