Inherent State War Powers Against A Rebellious Presidout
Using the President's definitin of "imminence," the States are within their power and rights to declare the President in rebellion; and work with other nations and powers to bring the President into compliance with Geneva.
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Do you remember the problem with the Iraq war? Without WMD, there was no “imminent” threat.
The Constitution permits states for do things when there are imminent threats, and there is insufficient time to coordinate things with Congress.
The same standard of imminence – which has or has not been applied to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq – can be applied to the States. Anything the US government did into the run-up to the war in Iraq, States may similarly do to justify an imminent threat from the President against the States.
States may legally conclude, after consultations with other states and foreign powers, that the President is in illegal rebellion, and has illegally waged war. The States, working with other states, may lawfully wage war against the President.
When the President wages illegal war, that warfare is not a precedent to prevent the States from waging war against him. Rather, the burden shifts to the President to justify why there is no ongoing threat.
As with Iraq, the States may use any basis to conclude that the President remains an imminent threat to the States guarantee to a Republican Form of government; and conclude, after consultations with other nations and states, that the US Congress is complicit with this President’s illegal rebellion.
Any argument the President may make why the States do not have an imminent, ongoing threat from the President can be turned on their head when applied to the President’s activities in Iraq. Each attack the President makes against the States – in their assertion that the President is an imminent threat – will undermine his defense at The Hague. The President cannot credibly assert one standard of imminence as it relates to Iraq; but a second standard of imminence as it relates to the States’ concerns with the President.
Things the US government did in the run up to the war in Iraq – because of their asserted connection with showing there was or was not an imminent threat – can be applied by the States to the President.
The States may, as the President did with Iraq, use disingenuous efforts to resolve problems; accelerate timelines; fabricate evidence; and make claims disconnected from what the President is doing. The States may rely on a standard of evidence which the President used against Iraq.
If the matching standard of evidence the States employ is challenged, the President will defeat himself.
The President relied on a doctrine of pre-emptive attack to satisfy the imminence requirement. States may also rely on this standard when prospectively, as was done in Iraq, speculating that the President might be doing something.
Each defense or standard the President asserts the States must meet on this imminence test applies to the President’s conduct in Iraq. Where the President’s precedent of imminence is asserted as the standard, the States may similarly apply this standard to the President.
Anything the US government did as it relates to Iraq in the run up to the war in 2003, the states may legally do. Where there were inspections to review the conduct, the States may use the President’s refusal to cooperate with State inspections as evidence he remains an imminent threat; where the President in Iraq used ignorance as the basis to assert a legal requirement had been met, the States may do the same.
Where there was speculation asserted as fact in Iraq; the States may do the same.
Where there was a prospective concern that someone might do something in the distant future as a basis to satisfy the imminence standard today; the states may do the same. Speculating in the distant future of what might happen as the basis for the States to conclude there is an imminent threat of Danger today.
All Presidential abuses the President used to compel others to cooperate, the States may similarly use to compel other people to believe the same about the President’s imminent threat to the Constitution and States. Where the US government has refused to enforce a war crime against the President, believing that fiction can satisfy the imminence requirement, the States may legally do the same.
States may use the refusal of the US government to recognize this matching principle as evidence the US government is an imminent threat, but pretends it is something else. The same argument was made with Saddam; it can be applied by the States to the President.
Just as the President has become a tyrant against We the People; each of the fifty [50] sates is a potential tyrant against the President. Anything the President does to thwart the States from holding the President to account, the States may do and use as evidence of the President’s plan to thwart the States protecting themselves.
Imagined things of what the President might do, can be the real thing which Satisfy the State concern of what is an imminent threat from this President.
The President’s signing statements are evidence of what he views of the law; and his demonstration for his contempt for the US Government guarantee to the States that they enjoy a Republican Form of Government. Republics, if they are to exist, require enforcement of the law; without enforcement there is no Republican Form of government. The States may reasonably rely on the president’s signing statement that he is an ongoing, not just an imminent threat to the States Right to Republican Form of Government.
The Second Amendment protects the States Right to a Militia. This President threatens the States’ militia, prospectively threatening to deploy them to places outside the States without the State governor. The President is prospectively ;planning to violate the rights of the State, as guaranteed in the US Constitution.
The President’s comments and statements about the states’ view of the President’s ongoing, imminent threat is admissible to The Hague for purposes of adjudicating the President’s guilt or innocence of having waged illegal war without there being an imminent threat.
IN the mind of the President – regardless the facts – prospective action is an imminent threat. IT does not matter what the laws says about imminence. If the President believes that a prospective threat is an imminent threat, the States may apply the President’s thinking and conclude, as was done with Iraq, the Same president is prospectively an imminent threat to the States. The Same President cannot credibly call one thing an imminent threat; while the same thing is a basis to deny the States to be concerned.
The President was concerned about something; yet, the States are told, not asked, not to be worried. Denial of a speculative charge is a reasonable basis, in the President’s mind, to conclude there was an imminent threat; the President must know his similar denials must be reasonably connected with the same concern of something that is imminent.
Or are we to believe that the President is concerned about imaginary things, calling them imminent; but that real things are to be dismissed as non-imminent? A real threat is when there is a double standard on imminence, but the President puts himself above the law, which he is not allowed to do.
Applying the world view of the President – however warped it might be – must mean that the President reasonably expects prospective things to be used today; and the States should reasonably conclude that prospective things of what might be abuse may or may not be an imminent threat of imminent Danger.
The States should not wait, but do as the President did: Presume the President is an imminent threat. The same things this President asserted were the basis for the US to be fearful of Iraq would apply to the President.
Congress is permitted to suppress an internal rebellion, but they refuse. Using the President’s standard of imminence – this refusal is the basis for the States to conclude that the President and Congress refuse to cooperate with the oath; and that their refusal is evidence of their defiance of their obligations.
As with Saddam who did not agree, the President and Congress cannot disagree; otherwise their refusal is evidence of their imminent threat. Congress made a finding and has appropriate money to this President on the basis of this standard; the States may make the reasonable conclusion the same standard will apply for the States.
Real money has been appropriated, but no wrong doing alleged. How can the States take away any other lesson than to conclude the Congressional appropriations – rightly or wrongly – for Iraq were based on a perception of imminence; Congress refuses to punish the President. Surely, the President and Congress do not hope to impose a different standard on each of the fifty [50] states.
Based on fiction, the President and Congress have asserted many things about Iraq and other nations. The States may similarly do the same, creating an alliance to day to suppress this illegal Presidential rebellion; compel Congress to enforce the law; and wage lawful war against a Rebel in the White House.
Congress alone, not the President, has called for the militia. As with Iraq which refused to respond to standards from without; the States may use the Congressional refusal to cooperate with the Constitution, and their refusal to enforce and comply with the laws, as, was the case with Saddam, evidence of their imminent threat.
Saddam supposedly refused to do something; Congress, when it refuses to cooperate, is in no better position. When Congress refuses to act on the law, as Saddam supposedly did, the States may use the refusal as evidence of the imminent threat from the Congress and President.
The States are the protector of the Rights of We the People. Where the President and Congress choose to pretend there is a threat; the States may point to this standard as the basis to conclude an equal threat exists in Congress and the Oval Office.
The President must respect the standard of imminence; otherwise, the States may legally expand their cooperation with foreign nations, create an alliance with others states, and legally wage war against the President – a rebel, a leader of the Congressional insurrection against the Constitution.
Where there is an imminent threat by this President and Congress in not protecting the Constitution, We the People through the States may conclude that the imminent threat cannot wait for Congress to agree that they are a threat.
The States, in defending their right to a Republic, may legally wage war against the President and Congress. Where the President and Congress assert this is not lawful, the States may point to Iraq and compel the President and Congress to ask why they do in Iraq what the States are not allowed to do.
The clash will be between the States and President; or between the President and the War Crimes prosecutor. The common element – the President, the eternal object of contempt.
The States must do what Congress refuses; where Congress refuses, the States may reasonably conclude the Congress is complicit with the President. The trap is for the President and Congress to argue one standard on imminence for themselves to block the States; while the War Crimes Prosecutors are told another standard of imminence exists.
The rule of law – if it real – relies on written law. There is one standard of imminence. The showdown is to compel the President to account for the standard of imminence he used. Either it is lawful and the states may legally wage war; or the standard was illegal, and the President waged illegal war.
The standard is in Article 1 Section 10 Clause 3: “Or in such imminent Danger aw will not admit of delay.”
____ Are we to believe that the UN Charter on imminent threats is different than what is in the Constitution?
___ How does the President, in asserting his oath to the Supreme Law, UN Charter, and Geneva, explain his double standard on what imminence means?
___ How does Congress justify appropriation money for something that is supposedly an imminent threat; but they argue the opposite, asking the States to believe there is no imminent threat form Congress?
Consider the long list of things done in the run-up to the war: Each of these things, despite their question, was the basis for the President and Congress to wage war and appropriate money.
___ Illusory evidence
___ Abuse
___ Tenuous, imaginary things
___ Pre-textual arguments
___ Indirect communication
___ Shifting requirements
___ Threats
___ Intimidation
___ Prospective concerns of what may happen
___ False information
___ Planted stories
___ Speculative and imaginary things
The States are the bearing the burden of the losses in Iraq. The President and Congress are saying, despite no sanction on the President for his absurd maladministration of the finite resources only Congress provides, would have us believe that the above conduct is not permissible.
___ What standard is the Congress saying that the above conduct is permissible when engaged by the President to wage illegal war; but not acceptable when the States protect the Constitution?
States may use the same standard when imposing duties on tonnage, keeping troops, engaging war, create an alliance with other states or powers.
Where there might be a speculative concern, as with Iraq, the States may conclude there is an imminent threat.
When the President infringes on the militia and states right to a regulated militia, the States may conclude the President is not protecting the Constitution; but in active rebellion.
___ Why does the supposed refusal of the President of Saddam invite armed conflict; yet the States are required to assent to the refusal of the President to enforce the law or protect the rights of the States?
The President may not illegally infringe upon the militia needed to put down his illegal rebellion.
___ How will the militia, if not properly equipped and regulated, but deployed overseas, or subject to removal from the state without Governor approval, possibly satisfy the Second Amendment requirement?
As with Iraq where the President and Congress shifted the burden to Saddam to solve a problem; it is the reciprocal role and right of the States to apply the same standards of evidence to the President: Shift the burden. If he refuses to cooperate, his refusal to defend himself against speculative accusations satisfies the imminence threat the States need to wage lawful war against the President, as a Rebel, leader of the Insurrection, and blocking the Congress from doing what it shall do: Protect, preserve, and defend the Constitution against the rebels in the Executive Branch.
What You Can Do
Review the events prior to the invasion of Iraq not as things that were done to manipulate America; but in the opposite light – as things the States may legally do to the President.
___ Plan without regard to reality
___ Use false information to really the nation for action
___ Make accusations without regard to real evidence
___ Shift the burden of proof to the President
___ Wage war on the basis of accusations about what may happen, not what might have happened
___ Make phony efforts to resolve the issue
___ Use the President’s refusal to respond as evidence of his illegal rebellion, imminent threat, and legal foundation for the States to wage lawful war.
War by this President has not been checked; the States cannot credibly be asked to be held to a different standard. The President has not been delegated any power to make one standard, then another. He has no power to make law; his illegal activity is not a precedent. If the States are not permitted to do these things, there is no Excuse for the Congress not punishing the President for having done what the States are not allowed to emulate.
If the States cannot do these things, then Congress has a bigger problem: It cannot explain why it permits the President to do the same things denied to the states; but only promises to threaten the states, not the President.
A republic means balanced enforcement of the law; not making excuses to assert one standard for some; and do nothing about other things.
There is one standard: Regardless what Congress does or does not do by way of charging the President with having done what the States might like to do, the States may conclude the Congress is complicit, unwilling to hold the President to account.
That remains an imminent threat, to which the States may legally mobilize, and wage war.
___ Is the Congress saying that the Constitution permits only the President to do things he has not been delegated; but the States are not allowed to exercise the express powers and rights they have been delegated?
___ Is the Congress pretending that some express rights and powers do not exist; but that imaginary powers and rights to exist?
___ How can something that is written not exist; but something that does not exist appear in the Constitution as a delegated power from We the People?
This leadership, if it is real, relying on this thinking remains an imminent threat to the Republic. Congress has no plan but to pretend there are double standards, yet that we have a single law. Written law is one thing, not two. If there are two, there is no Republic, but an illegitimate government, which must be lawfully removed, and restored with something that is legitimate.
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