Abraxas Corp. Assumptions
This information is intended to assist the war crimes prosecutors.
The information below is not intended to be accurate. It is for discussion purposes only.
[Information may be substantially revised without notice.]
As you read the information below keep one thing in mind: Abraxas Corp. and its personnel have not yet been convicted of any wrong doing, nor are they necessarily complicit in war crimes. These are only allegations, not assertions of fact.
Ref Questions for Abraxas in re alleged war crimes.
Ref War Crimes Plan allegedly supported by Abraxas.
Ref Alleged Abraxas pipline to support war crimes.
Ref Alleged bribes by Republicans to silence Abraxas employees about war crimes.
The war crimes prosecutor when planning discovery will need to identify the organizational parameters, range of documents, communications, and other likely evidence. This information will help couch the scope of the Abraxas Corporation, and assist with scoping the prosecutor's budget and discovery team.
Note carefully the definition of Abraxas, which gives insight into how Abraxas personnel are placed in other firms around the globe.
Abraxas allegedly acts as a pipeline. Personnel assigned to Abraxas are around the globe, likely in undercover capacities working in other firms with no obvious, outward linkage to Abraxas. Once CIA agents are assigned to overseas locations, the Abraxas overseas network becomes the means by which CIA employees are transferred, given credentials, and assigned.
It remains to be understood which Abraxas personnel knew, or should have known, about the CIA illegal Geneva violations. One requirement for Abraxas to place someone in the CIA is knowing the agent's actual duties, and then ensuring their cover does not give any indication or hint of their real activities.
Abraxas Corporation is an international firm. A simple review of the maximum capacity of the Abraxas headquarters in McLean reveals there is insufficient space for all 300 Abraxas Employees.
Abraxas openly admits that its employees are assigned to other countries. The issue because to what extent Abraxas, because of its relationship with the CIA, is entitled to protection under the State Secrets or Executive Privilege. Abraxas is a commercial entity. As with Verizon before Vermont and New Jersey bodies, commercial entities do not have the power to invoke Executive Privilege.
Do not narrow your review of the alleged war crimes planning support to Abraxas. There is insufficient capacity to accommodate all employees. There are other entities around the globe unrelated to Abraxas which support the alleged illegal activities.
Please contact the US Attorney's office to determine whether the FBI or other agencies have placed audio-visual monitoring equipment on the north-east side of the Post Office adjacent to the McLean facility.
It is an error to narrow the focus of the alleged war crimes planning to what CIA funds have or have not flowed to Abraxas. Funds are transferred to non-Abraxas entities to accomplish like and intermediate support. Prosecutors and investigators should review funds from CIA to Abraxas and be open to discovering other US government efforts paying for the same activity, but from other programs, agencies, and program elements.
Abraxas and CIA need to provide a straight story on the dollar-man month figures, vs. the number of personnel assigned to the McLean facilities, vs. the workload assigned. If the dollar figures are consistent with the workload of planning agents, other Abraxas-related employees are assigned at intermediate locations outside McLean. If the dollar figures are not consistent, the funds must be flowing thorough other entities outside Abraxas direct control.
It is likely that DoD-related entities are involved in multiple regions. Abraxas could be a ruse. The lack of world interest in Abraxas suggests there are non-Abraxas entities involved. Observers appear to have insufficient concern. It is a security problem if all agent-support activities were located in a single location outside the main CIA facility. The fact that the CIA suggests it has lost contact with various CIA-related contractors indicates the placement program is not centrally coordinated, managed, or confined to a single entity.
There is insufficient capacity within the two  Abraxas McLean public facilities for Abraxas facilities to support all personnel assigned. There appear to be other facilities indirectly connected with Abraxas which support agent placement.
Common Stock documents are filed with NY State Regulators.
Patents are coordinated with counsel formerly associated with Wisconsin, and integrate with intelligence related equipment in the CIA, DoD intelligence community, and NSA. Primarily hardware interface devises with report signal capture.
Personnel appear have ongoing interactions with DoD, DHS, CIA, NSA organization including Lockheed Martin, SAIC, and Sandia Labs. Familiar with IPT and SETA. Capable of providing use preference, and interface design for human factors engineering, and providing program management consulting for CIA contractors including SAIC and Lockheed Martin.
It is likely employees keep documents in their personal vehicles. With about 300 personnel on the payroll, most of the employees spend time on the road, coordinating efforts, and do not necessarily make regular visits to either office. The building is just west of the Post Office, 175 parking spots. Parking around the second location is much smaller, with fewer parking lots. The distance 0.3 miles between facilities, and about 3 miles to Main CIA HQ.
To access CIA, Abraxas personnel would acquire security badges for the Abraxas shuttles.
Skill set is light on PhDs and mechanical engineering.
A fully burdened rate of $7K/employee/month.
Revenue growth (+700%) is attributed to small initial size, about 12-20 employees, then growing to over 300. In absolute numbers the revenues grew from about $1M to $8.5
Indirect labor rates are low relative to industrial production, higher-end acquisition programs due to small size, limited land, and very low overall energy consumptions. Marginal material costs. Cost of money is not an issue. Assuming no direct production operations or quality control division for materials processing.
Personnel are generally former military and government employees, many who are married, have retirement income, and are not necessarily full time Abraxas Employees, providing only part-time assistance. Personnel are assigned to other organizations.
Land is likely owned outright, property is a share of personnel investment. Salaries have been adjusted with common stock shares, awaiting IPO.
Corporate board, human relations, training oversight, program office support, budgeting, sensitive briefing area, STU-III and Top Secret messages, computers, and off site secure storage areas.
Ratio of PhDs to bachelor-degree is less than a silicon valley firm.
Assuming an IPT integration concept, well able to support the DoD planning cells. On a daily basis works with the CIA director of support, Stephanie Danes Smith.
Advanced concepts team integrates with the DHS program office and Sandia-LANL and indirectly with 1300 industry organizations.
Despite claims of 12 foreign languages, country expertise is not associated with language expertise. For example personnel may have a language experience in Europe, but be assigned to central Asia. Prominent central Asia experts do not necessarily claim Arabic or Hindi within their language expertise.
Abraxas does not appear to have sufficient revenues to conduct exclusive in-house training. Appears to occur through contracts at offsite facilities, and the internet.
Since 2001, formerly-assigned Abraxas employees are available for interviews. Formerly assigned Abraxas-personnel understand the confidentiality agreements are not enforceable when they relate to matters of war crimes and other alleged criminal activity and fraud.
Abraxas is openly reported to provide assistance to the CIA in providing background stories and placing agents undercover.
Alleged Abraxas Pipeline
Abraxas personnel have openly admitted their existence since Sept 2001. The Abraxas Corporation is allegedly the means by which Abraxas-related personnel, formerly assigned to the CIA, were then repositioned in other business capacities and entities around the globe.
To carry develop this pipeline, Abraxas had to methodically place civilians in overseas locations; then ensure that assigned CIA personnel were not in any way openly doing something related to their hidden activities. The CIA would have had to, at some point, provide information to Abraxas about the specific duties that a given CIA employee would engage; Abraxas would then use this information to place the CIA agent within the Abraxas-created personnel pipeline.
The Abraxas pipeline would theoretically require a first wave of Abraxas employee placements; then a second wave of promotions, contracts, and other business relationships to remove overt connections between the Abraxas and the overseas entities; then continue to ensure that the newly-Assigned Abraxas personnel remained in positions of influence.
During wave 1, the Abraxas-placed personnel would likely have been placed in personnel position, technical writing, human relations, shipping, storage, and other management positions.
During wave 2, when Abraxas-placed personnel supported CIA agents, Abraxas-connected entities would engage in five general classes of discoverable activity:
(1) Information technology -- follow-on communications, e-mail, and electronic messaging through Itel Link, secure e-mail, and other NSA-compatible communication systems associated with the embassy;
(2) Information transfer -- content of messages and contracts related to these business relationships;
(3) Legal documents -- these are the subsequent legal opinions which Abraxas-connected personnel know, or should know, are not protected under the rules of evidence, Geneva conventions, or claims of secrecy -- these are matters of alleged fraud and war crimes.
(4) Funds transfers -- These are the financial flows between the Abraxas-related entities and subsidiaries, and can be traced with contracts, memoranda, and other agreements;
(5) Personnel flows -- This line of evidence relate to the technical conferences, trips, and other business conferences Abraxas-related personnel used to move through the pipeline, establish their presence. These conferences related to Academic, military, and technical interchange meetings.
Abraxas personnel appear to have an understanding of NSA cryptography, and are familiar with the algorithms used to encrypt and intercept sensitive information.
The data Abraxas-placed CIA agents handle can be anything.
Scheduling, presentation tools
Remote data access
Data storage, transfer
Photo transfer, storage
Data analysis tools
Complex SIGINT scanners
CIA Directorate of Support memoranda approving the Abraxas-pipeline concept
Demonstration that the Abraxas-pipeline concept can successfully place and protect CIA agents
Inputs to State Department communication-integration systems
Intel Link access times
Updates to secure communications
Equipment test plans, results
Foreign technology analysis
Tools and equipment are readily movable by auditors, inspectors, and construction crews during installation and site visits.
Personnel are adept at process analysis and providing point and time estimates with multi-variables.
Technical expertise includes weapons procurement, testing, and remote biological-chemical weapons detection.