Rendition War Crimes FOIA

This is a Freedom of Information Act Request [FOIA]. The information below is shared for your reference. The material below relates to war crimes information.

Feel free to use or modify this FOIA-related information as appropriate.

Note: Government personnel, contractors and intermediaries have been advised and eccouraged to use non-government computers and non-offiial equipment to hide official business, and thereby thwart oversight and war crimes discovery.

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This is an outline for FOIA requests to the CIA, NSA, DoJ, DHS, and DOD related to Rendition War Crimes Evidence.

Precedents

Auschwitz

Guantanamo

Bybee Memo

Preliminary Comments

The key problem for the Attorney General is that he has a statutory obligation to report deviations from procedures. The Attorney General, regardless his explanation, is a bonafide alleged war criminal. The Attorney General either:

A. Failed to comply with these reporting requirements, and discuss how the United States planned to abrogate Geneva; or

B. Reported the illegal conduct, and Members of Congress did nothing to stop the war crimes.

The United States can either prove that it did comply with Geneva; or the failure to produce this evidence shall be adversely inferred as evidence that the Conventions have been ignored.

The Geneva requirements have been en force since 1949. It is the obligation of detaining powers to comply with the Geneva requirements. After the Secretary of State visited Eastern Europe to publicly deny the Rendition claims, the President contradicted her and admitted the existence of the CIA detention centers.

Subsequent to Sept 2001, NSA legal counsel rejected Vice President Cheney’s direction to conduct warrantless domestic surveillance. Legal counsel in CIA and NSA were in a position to know the legal requirements and in a position to prevent violations of the Law.

The DoD 5100.77 laws of war program is a SECDEF training requirement. There are similar Human Resource requirements within CIA to ensure the laws are followed and that all treaty obligations are adhered. CIA personnel who have committed war crimes while out of uniform and not wearing any distinctive marking are not lawful combatants.

DoJ has a requirement to report deviations from established policies, procedures, statutes, and legal requirements. Either the attorney general made these exception reports and Congress knew about the planned illegal violations of Geneva; or the Attorney General has violated the reporting requirements and his statutory obligation. The conduct and misreporting permitting war crimes against prisoners of war.

Giglio requirements apply to all Federal employees. DoJ Staff have testified to Congress on DoJ Programs. Either the DOJ Staff have demonstrated there are no impeachment-related concerns per Giglio; or this requirement has not been fulfilled and not documented.

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Burden of Proof

The United States government has the burden to prove that it complied with the Geneva Requirements. The FOIA requests, if not fulfilled, shall be presumed evidence of war crimes.

Evidence, Discovery: No lawful protections

These issues are not protected by claims of state secrets, executive privilege or immunity. The matters are related to fraud, war crimes, and have been publicly disclosed deliberately or inadvertently. Once the information has been disclosed the Executive loses all claims to executive privilege. The evidence is related to post-2001 decisions, and is not protected by attorney-client privilege.

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Post-Decision Discussions

There is no lawful claim to immunity or privilege of documents related to post-2001 decisions to engage in rendition or detention at the CIA facilities. The 2006 revelations are in the wake of the Secretary of State’s trip to the European Union. All planning, memoranda, and conversations in support of the Secretary of State’s visit to the European Union is discoverable.

Once the revelations of the CIA detention centers was revealed, there were internal discussions within DoJ, the White House, CIA, NSA, and the National Security Council how to respond. Involved in these discussions were security conversations related to cover stories with CIA personnel, logistics personnel located in the United States and Europe. Involved also were CIA intermediaries responsible for the physical transport, acquisition, and transshipment of prisoners of war.

The State Department, DoD General Counsel, National Security Council, and CIA General Counsel were also involved in the media messaging cell groups. This allegedly involved SAIC and the media messaging company Fleishman-Hilliard under specific contract numbers. The Fleishman-Hilliard Contracts have already been disclosed as they related to DoD contracts. However, it remains unclear how the AT&T-affiliated entity was involved with the Rendition-related media messaging.

It is also known prior to the President’s disclosure of the Rendition activity, there was substantial communication and concern with the CIA and affiliated contractors over concerns related to liability. The only reasonable basis for this concern was knowledge by the personnel that the Geneva requirements were known, real, and applicable.

Instrumental in the post-decision conversations were ongoing messages, conversations, and plans with former DoJ personnel who were involved in the original decisions. These issues related to rendition are not protected. IT remains to be understood which specific messages were instrumental in reminding formerly-assigned DoJ personnel of their agreement to remain silent, not report, and not comment publicly on information they knew, or should have known was related to DoJ-CIA war crimes planning.

Also, key to the targeting was information illegally acquired through unlawful methods including illegal surveillance, and abuse. It remains to be understood which specific NSA personnel, contractors, and others were involved and knew, or should have known, that the acquired information was being used for an unlawful purpose: Targeting individuals for rendition, abuse, and unlawful punishment without trial.

The Geneva Conventions clearly impose requirement on detaining powers to ensure that prisoners of war are adequately housed and protected. When the German concentration camps were freed, the German documentation was important in determining how many prisoners were processed, their condition, and other details. The evidence which the Germans freely documented was evidence of their war crimes. Similarly, the United States has evidence of what was going on at the secret prisoner of war centers. Either the United States complied with these detention requirements, or they did not; either the US has evidence to demonstrate it did comply with the requirements, or the lack of evidence can be attributed to reckless disregard for their Geneva obligations.

Once the European Union began its investigations, the United States through diplomatic channels provided to third parties copies of the memoranda, concerns, and other EU concerns. These EU documents are available for public review, and the American responses rightly or wrongly respond to the EU questions. The United States responses to the EU were incorrect, misleading, and designed to be relied upon. The United States public and private communications are fraudulent and cannot lawfully be protected by the attorney-client privilege. More broadly, once the United States made the decision to engage in illegal detention, that detention-decision is affirmatively linked with fraudulent conduct, and cannot lawfully be protected by any claim of executive privilege, state secrets, or any classification authority. ORCON, as part of the Executive Orders explicitly prohibits classification of any data, record, or evidence related to illegal activity. All events after the original decision to engage in war crimes are post-decisional, and all communications after the original decision are similarly not protected.

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Key to the war crimes cover-up by Secretary of State and her staff in the State Department, and her coordination with the National Security counsel were the discussions of precedent. Whether Vietnam exceptions were or were not reviewed remains a matter of discovery and evidence.

Implicitly in the Article 82 requirements on the legal community was the obligation to ensure that the laws of war, and specific Conventions related to prisoner detention, were to be implemented and enforced. It was also known within DoJ, the National Security Council, Joint Staff, and CIA General Counsel’s office that the activity was illegal, did not comply with Geneva, and was otherwise a problem. Once the Hamdan ruling was issued and the Supreme Court reminded the government that the Geneva conventions were requirements, the internal deliberations within the CIA did not start, but increased. The increase in communication is evidence that the CIA knew they had a problem; and that the liability was real. These communications are not protected, but evidence related to the continuing knowledge that despite Geneva violations, the CIA and NSC personnel were not concerned with ending the violations, but in protecting themselves against legal consequences. The Tokyo War Crimes tribunal imposed legal consequences on the Tokyo Cabinet for their failure to stop what they had the power to stop. Arguably, anyone who took insurance to cover the risk of suit had one objective: Not to remove themselves from the illegal activity, but to immunize themselves against war crimes. Also, the post-rendition-decisions to include language within the Military Commissions Act – which would provide illegal assistance and support to alleged American war criminals -- is evidence that the concern with war crimes tribunals was real, but there has bee no effort to stop the illegal activity.

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There are certain reasonable questions related to Rendition, the CIA detention centers, and how the conduct did or did not violate the Geneva Conventions. The evidence from Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib is substantial. Similarly, it can be presumed that the same standards of evidence which ultimately released this information through a FOIA also apply to the CIA detention centers. These are not matters of state secrets or privilege, but matters of international criminal law and war crimes. The time to have worried about the potential impact on public relations or public support or non-support are long over. One of the natural consequences of war crimes, and the implicit deterrent to war crimes is the loss of public support. That the public may not support the result is not reason to keep that illegal activity secret; rather, the risk of loss of support should have, but was not, a sufficient deterrent to thwart any ongoing war crimes activity.

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Post Decision State Coordination

Once the Secretary of State knew that the EU was aware of the illegal activity, there was a flurry of planning for her visit. Included in that post-rendition-decision discussion was a practice session, dry run, and a practice question and answer session between various State Department SETA contractors, media messaging firms, and personnel inside the State Department. Before this planning meeting, DoD contractors monitored public information, and otherwise crafted a number of responses for the Secretary of State to review, practice, and the final talking points were agreed, then part of the diplomatic messages. This information has been intercepted by non-NSA resources.

It would be helpful to consider the following questions:

How was it determined that the media messages included in this pre-trip briefing were or were not sufficient?

Which CIA-DoD contractors were part of the public monitoring, and how were these entities financed through which contract vehicles?

How were the state departments claims in the 1960s against North Vietnam – that American military personnel should be treated according to the Conventions – considered, not reviewed, or otherwise part of the planning prior to Secretary of State’s visit to the European Union?

What reservations were voiced about how the prisoners were being treated?

How were the procedures and treatment, which did not comply with Geneva, justified?

When it was known that the prisoners had not been tried, how did the jailers justify the treatment, shipment, and detention of those who had not been lawfully convicted of any crime?

What mental process did the CIA personnel and contractors use to justify treatment of those who had only been accused of crimes, but not subject to any judicial review or proceeding?

What process was used to determine that a civilian or prisoner of war was or was not entitled to Geneva Protections?

FOIA Requested Documents

Exercise equipment purchases for prisoners and jailers: Where the equipment was purchased; what condition it was in; who inspected the equipment; how was it transferred from the origin point to the prisoner detention; what was the method to pay for the fuel to transfer the exercise equipment; and which fund cited did the equipment, fuel, and personnel costs associated with its installation get charges.

Issues of Camp Management

Which privileges were denied.

Dimensions of the punishment cells

Records of length of stay in punishment

Mail procedures

Types of data collected

Management indicators monitored

Success factors: How chosen, reported, monitored

Meeting Minutes from the briefings

Copies of the history, promotion, and awards given to civilians, agents, contractors, and military personnel assigned. Which award fees were provided, and how was this award fee deviation reported to Congress.

Photo, video, sound logs.

Sample award templates used to issue awards. Which regulations were included in the award packages for CIA officers assigned.

What was the rotation cycle for the CIA officers, personnel, and contractors assigned.

How were the camp policies documented?

How was the camp referred to: Camp, detention center, facility, prison, jail, or by what name – how was this name assigned?

Did each camp have a camp mascot, symbol, or name that was not a code name, but something the contractors assigned to the facility to differentiate the name, and provide some sort of levity?

How was the camp name chosen?

What input did the camp prisoners have on the material in the briefings provided to the Camp commanders?

Did the camp letter head have any relationship to any CIA offices mascots?

Are the public examples of the mascots available for sale?

Did the CIA issue contracts, rights, or other intellectual property rights to anyone to permit third parties to distribute badges, insignia, and other memorabilia related to these camps?

How were going away parties organized?

Who bought the cake?

Were there freezers to hold ice cream?

How was the refrigeration?

Was there ice, cookies, chips, and soda?

How were regional cooking treats prepared?

Did the Attorney General enjoy his Frito Pie?

Or did the camp commander prefer to designate this as “special party time” and “the good news is out” time?

How much alcohol did the camp commander drink on a regular basis?

Did the camp commander have satellite, cable, or was it a DSL line?

Who paid for the video downloads through Intel Link?

Copies of camp policies

Personnel flow schedules: Arrival, overlap, scheduling issues

Method by which scheduling conflicts resolved

Options when insufficient contractors in place

Fund citation and budget authority of the overtime

How was overtime tracked, monitored, and reviewed

Came names, designations, and distinguishing symbols, letterhead, and identifying methods

Insignia: Where purchased

Uniforms, clothing, and prisoner/jailer furnishings, bed linen: Contract number, source, and age of material, clothing, and average time used before discarded.

Promotion flyers

Favorite location to attend going away parties

Cash reimbursements for food, parties, and soft drinks. Was there a riot over whether to call this freshen up syrup, cola, soda, soft drink, bubbly sizzler, Perrier, or just plain bubbly water?

Dates the ice machines were installed

Maintenance contracts on ice machines

Method to purify the water for the ice machine

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Geneva imposes an obligation on the detaining power various requirements. The prisoners are not to be abused, and cannot be punished for more than 30 days using administrative reviews. In order to ensure that the prisoners were not held more than 30 days, there has to be a time-clock or some sort of monitoring system that accounts for when the prisoners are first punished; when they were first placed in solitary confinement; then some sort of signaling system that they were approaching, the 30 day time limit.

What kind of signal system was used?

How was it determined that the prisoners were or were not within or outside this 30 day confinement window?

What process did the jailers use to confirm in their own mind that the prisoners were lawfully entitled to the punishments imposed?

Were there any records of the time that the prisoners were first detained, regularly checked, and then released so as to comply with the 30 day time limits?

How were recurring problems with prisoners documented?

What kind of punishment system was approved?

For those prisoners that cooperated, how was it determined which type of privileges they were entitled?

How was the effectiveness of this reward system used, monitored, and reviewed by medial doctors, psychiatrists, or psychologists?

FOIA Requirements

Inspections

Site visits

Audit results

IG visits

Responses to press questions

Templates placed on communication lines: “Consent to monitoring” – Ho were the duties assigned to camp staff?

Where were the checklists created?

Were laptops provided, or did personnel have to provide their own equipment?

Who was discussing the images of the prisoners?

How were the video discs discussed and shared?

Did the video phones get confiscated on regular basis or was this only an isolated problem?

What prohibited uploads to Intel Link?

Was the CIA logistics support always available?

Were the CIA officers at the emergency command center always responsive, or were they dismissive of things?

Was the time on hold unacceptable?

What internal concerns were raised?

Planning agendas for rice trips to EU and briefings.

Responses to EU questions

Internal memos to respond to external inquiries

Medical concerns with prisoners

How were medical reports used to interrogate

Responses, memos, and information related to Red Cross inquiries

Copies of videos from interrogations

Summary supervisor training

Ft Huachuca Lessons learned: Status reporting memoranda showing that the lessons learned had been applied

Method AT&T and NARUS STA system was used to identify, target, transport, and interrogation prisoners.

Did the optical fibers integrate well with Gaussian multi-channels, or was this something that was no problem with the Intel-Link system?

Contracts used to transfer

Training manuals

Legal memoranda provided policy options on legality of action

Types of medication provided

How Geneva conventions were explained away

Facility construction, maintenance, and budget requirements.

Was this part of the normal CIA black ops funding, or was this financed through a CIA entity operating as a public business somewhere on the planet earth, above ground, in a satellite, or under ground or on the water, or under the water?

Which DoD entities, facilities, and business were used as cover to support the CIA detention center?

Where is a copy of the letter the AG sent to the Congressional leadership to explain reasons for ignoring Geneva?

Was the deviation letter satisfactory?

Where are the copies of the post-decision communication with Congress?

Copies of Congressional staff visit trip planning.

Reports to media questions to facility, state department, CIA.

CIA phone logs related to rendition questions: Are they complete; which phone calls were not logged; how did the CIA meet with outside personnel to review issues which did not want to get logged?

Copies of prisoner menus

Receipts of food purchased, grocery lists

Copies of religious hymns, devotionals, sermons, or other religious-related documents

Funding codes/citations for CIA facility support, operations, maintenance and security

Recreational activities, flyers, promotional items

Who provided the maintenance for the pool

Travel dates for CIA staff to attend recreational events in the nearby community

Where did they go

Where are copies of the photographs from these government-funded trips

Mileage, Temporary Duty payments, and orders

Which budget officer or contracting personnel reimbursed expenses

Where is this person located in physical space, and how can they be contacted?

Budgets for airline travel

Non-military airline support

Did the bank get instructions on how to respond to questions from the public and media?

What security concerns did the banks provide once the CIA leased aircraft were linked to the war crimes?

What was the move out order?

Where was the office supposed to re-open once the bank was targeted by the Bank of International Settlements [BIS], EU, or other SWIFT-connected entity?

Documentation system for prisoner hold times

Backup papers copies when primary electronic system failed

Scale of punishments for various offenses

Copies of meeting minutes, notes, and memoranda on prisoner discipline problems

Criteria to appoint prisoner primary focal point for camp commandant

Any references made to Colonel Hogan or Sergeant Schultz?


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Prisoner Management

Under the laws of war, prisoners are to be cared for, guards are trained on the Geneva Conventions, and there are in place procedures how to handle the prisoners.

After the decision was made to render the prisoners how did the Guards Handle POW objections to the illegal abuse, lack of trials, and non-access to the red cross?

What were guards instructed to say, do, or not say in the presence of prisoners?

How were the prisoners treated?

What reviews did the camp jailers make?

How were the guards supervised?

How were the lessons of the Teguba Report, Abu Ghraib, Afghan Box Car deaths, and treatment at Guantanamo considered, reviewed, rejected, or otherwise explained as not applicable?

What were the inspection times, routines, and schedules of the guards, prisoner quarters?

How was it communicated to the jailers which prisoners had been tried for crimes?

What explanation was provided to Guards as to why the Red Cross was not being given access to the facilities?

Where were the guards trained how was this training contracted or conducted, and who paid for this training?

Which specific lesson plans, guides, management fielders, or summary reading material were provided to guards and interrogators?

How were the results of the interrogations logged, recorded, stored?

How was the training material related to the CIA rendition program updated, reviewed, or reviewed on the basis of progress, results, and feedback from the detention centers?

How were the lessons learned from these detention centers funneled back to the NSA, CIA, and Fort Huachuca?

Which security training at Ft. Huachuca included lessons learned from the CIA detention centers?

Which military personnel at Ft. Huachuca attended this training session how was the information received, and what reports and concerns were raised to the Army JAG officer related to the treatment of the prisoners?

How were the prisoners rewarded or punished if they cooperated or refused to cooperate with the illegal abuse?

What review, consideration, or consultation was made with documents related to Geneva, Tokyo War crimes, or Nuremburg?

How were the lessons of the Holocaust distinguished from the prisoner treatment?

What consideration, if any, did the White House give to the Tokyo War Crimes and liability on the cabinet for failing to stop war crimes?

FOIA Requested Data

Guard training packages, workshops

Certifications of training

Training records of Guars

Contractor-certified training certificates

Funding citations and documents for Temporary Duty Travel for contractor training

Decision memoranda related to source of training for camp jailers, guards, and other personnel

Ft. Huachuca documents on trainee attendance

Guard instructions

Standard statements guards were to use when asked questions

Supervisor lists

Basis for promotion, retention, and increased guard supervisors

Summary lessons learned logs in Intel Link

Copies of BAE software system reviews of the Intel Link System

Records of BAE review of rendition related information

SAIC contracts to manage data from interrogations

Fleishman Hilliard Contract supervisors

Cross flow of information through NARUS STA 6400, fiber optics, to AT&T, Verizon, then to Fleishman Hilliard for interrogations.

Lessons learned matrix

Inspection checklists, initialed, signed, reviewed, summarized, briefed, final reports

Red Cross interaction checklist

Policy Memo related to the attempted entry and security incidents.

Training plans

Training milestones for camp guards

Simulations used to train interrogators, CIA camp guards

Firm on contract to conduct role playing exercise

Basis for training contract award to CIA logistics firms in Virginia as opposed to Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, or North Carolina.

Message traffic from DC to Rendition Centers: Training progress, status of information, whether prisoners were or were not meeting CIA and National Security Council goals.

Problems with Ft. Huachuca training.

Adequacy of jailers from the Contracted training.

Discipline problems.

Discussion of how SAS99 indicators handled by CIA IG [Turnover, allegations of treaty violations, problems with documentation, training]

Summary checklists used by DoJ Staff Counsel, CIA IG, and NSA legal teams when reviewing legality of cross flow of information related to [a] domestic surveillance; [b] illegal rendition; and [c] illegal abuse while in detention; and [d] gaps in Geneva requirements-compliance.

How problems with compliance were or were not addressed by complaints to CIA IG.

Copies of training videos, role playing, case studies used by CIA during workshops, Intel Link training, or internet based training.


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After Disclosure

There was quite a shock in the CIA once the information about Rendition was disclosed. At first, there were efforts to find who was providing the information.

Rather than address the illegal violations, there were conflicting messages issued to the media to confuse the public. This was a deliberate strategy. The aim was not to ensure compliance with Geneva, but to suppress disclosure illegal activity in this and other unlawful programs.

Once the Rendition efforts were known, there was also a problem with explaining why US personnel were or were not being tried in their Home District. US persons were transshipped out of their district, in violation of the 6th Amendment. There were also concerns the public would discover the domestic warrantless interrogation program, and the domestic rendition program. These programs are multi-agency, and rely on SWIFT information and other illegally gathered financial data. Rather than rely on a warrant, the DHS and other US government personnel have detained, questioned, and embarked on fishing trips demanding explanations for fairly benign business transactions. These warrantless detentions lasted for many hours.

Once the illegal rendition was disclosed, what consideration if any was given to civilian reactions in the US, Europe, and worldwide?

Was there a plan to explain how the illegal violations of the Constitution were justified; or was the hope to stifle public knowledge of the illegal activity?

What was the explanation for leaving civilians cars still running after forcibly removing them from their vehicles?

Was there any provision for reimbursing the civilians for the costs to recover their vehicles from the impound lot after their private vehicles were towed?

Once their groceries in their trunk spoiled, was there any consideration how they would be reimbursed for the spoiled food?

FOIA Requested Documents

Provide copies of the mapping system DHS and DOJ personnel used to travel in vehicles to and from their targeted.

Provide copies of the periodic reports and inspects of the interrogation centers.

OSHA compliance reports for the interrogation facility.

Contracts issued to detain, interrogate, and hold American citizens detained for interrogation.

Copies of Intel Link guidelines, memoranda, and other DoD-CIA-National Security Council propaganda cell messages for domestic consumption in response to initial NYT revelations.

Review dates of Constitution.

Review dates of oath of office.

Reimbursements to civilians for damages prior to, during, and after domestic rendition.

Methods to resolve public complaints related to vehicle impounds, lost wages, or letters from counsel.

How were procedures reviewed by the Attorney General.

Once AG knew of the violations, how was this dilatation reported as required to the Congress.

Copies of DHS interrogation checklists used against American civilians.

Basis for not securing warrants.

Reasons DHS and DOJ supervisors were told the warrants were not required during the domestic renditions, or the warrantless interrogations.

Copies of the briefing notes, and other contemporaneous comments from DOJ and DHS personnel on why specific warrants were or were not required.

Memoranda personnel made related to their reservations.

Evidence personnel removed themselves from the illegal activity.

Records personnel involved have of contacting US Attorney or appropriate authority to report war crimes.

US Attorney responses to reports of war crimes committed by CIA contractors, or other personnel acting as agents for the United States in the DHS, DOJ, and CIA domestic rendition activities.


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Detention

Prisoners held during a combat are entitled to Geneva Convention protections. These include various procedural and legal provisions including being advised of charges, and afforded fair treatment.

How were the prisoners notified of the charges related to their detention?

What was the mail policy?

How did the government jailers rationalize the punishment without judicial trial?

Was there a concern that he public would find out about the warrantless interrogations?

Once the public shared notes of the illegal renditions, warrantless NSA surveillance, and domestic interrogations, was there no thought that the public would realize that the activity was part of the same activity?

What was the strategy to suppress public knowledge of the European detention centers?

How were questions related to domestic rendition of American citizens handled?

Was there a briefing to government personnel instructing agents and front-officer reception to respond in a specific way to these questions?

What action did the jailers take to prevent prisoners from organizing?

How as the facility marked as a Prisoner of War site?

Who was hired to erect the barricades, fences, and other security equipment?

Which contractor or CIA-related entity provided the signs marking which direction to take to the facility, where various offices were?

Where were the phones installed?

Who created the phone lists including office symbols, organization name, phone number, and other identifying information?

Where were the radios procured?

Were there every any concerns that the CIA detention center would be attacked?

What provisions were made to protect the prisoners against attack from outside?

Where are the logs of the prisoners’ personal property?

Once the prisoners were detained, how was their personal property handled?

What provision was made to reimburse the prisoners for lost wages, rents not paid, or other fines because of being unable to resolve contractual disputes?

Which religious services did the prisoners attend?

FOIA Request Requirements

Checklists used to ensure compliance with Geneva.

Prisoner notification methods.

Copies of written message provided to prisoners.

Affidavits from prisoners at Guantanamo, after transfer from CIA, confirming or denying the evidence White House and CIA have presented.

Reasons prisoners were told no mail was allowed.

Evidence of judicial proceedings.

Documents related to the evidence presented.

Location of witnesses.

Identity and training of the judicial officers located at the CIA detention facilities who presided over the judicial proceedings.

Statements from transferred prisoners whether these procedures ever occurred.

Reasons Camp personnel cannot explain why, despite the supposed judicial procedures, the prisoners were never informed of the results, and were still detained despite the supposed resolution of the legal matters.

Copies of Public Affairs memoranda related to media questions on Rendition. Standard templates. Basis for deciding these answers were or were not appropriate. How the CIA Public Affairs office updated, changed, or made inconsistent out of court statements after the President made public admissions contrary to his legal defense.

Briefings on training for CIA public affairs.

Basis to determine CIA public affairs, after working for Addington, was or was not suitable for the job.

What reviews were conducted of CIA public affairs.

Connections CIA public affairs has with the Army Secretary of Defense. Please discuss the Katrina coordination and response, and the reason CIA Public Affairs name is on the KBR documentation. [Yes, the memos you thought we didn’t know about.]

Markings on POW site: Copy of camp markings.

Confirmation, affidavit by prisoners whether the painting, markings or other POW camp designation were ever seen while in confinement.

Satellite imagery of the camps: Showing whether the camps were or were not marked, as reported. Whether the visual image of the camp as seen from space matches the reported POW markings White House and CIA staff said was provided.

Pictures of barricades, fences, and security equipment.

Affidavit from prisoners whether cameras were still, motionless video, or whether the camera moved and followed the prisoner while in detention.

Affidavit whether the lights were bright during interrogation.

Affidavit whether prisoners were told to hold things, read things, or face specific directions.

Copy of phone installation contract, numbers assigned, maintenance records, confirmation CIA contractor assigned were competent at the job. Records of phone installation problems; problems with incorrect lines; reworked problems; repeat requirements to request documentation, maintenance, or other activity.

Whether phone and facility maintenance documentation met requirements. Whether memos and other CIA phone maintenance actions did or did not meet contract specifications.

Phone books, phone lists.

Radio frequencies assigned.

Facility defense procedures.

Location of POW-safe area to protect prisoners during attack.

Affidavit from POWs whether there were any drills what to do if there was an attack. Where were they supposed to do, do, or not do during an attack. How were they informed of an attack, what audio or visual method of communication was there.

Lists of POW property.

Index and final summary list of property: When returned, how protected, where the keys were made, who was on the key-access list; where new keys were made.

Post-confinement assistance to prisoners: Did the prisoner get the opportunity to recover damages for lost wages, other fines imposed on prisoner while unable to update credit report.

Copies of religious hymn book, religious items, or other religious material provided.


Post Disclosure Planning Response

Once the United States formally admitted to the illegal violations of Geneva, there was a major problem: How to handle the questions. Under the laws of war, those who are illegally detained may lawfully be rescued using any military means.

How did the participants justify the treatment despite Geneva required to the contrary?

How were the CIA facilities marked?

What plans were there to stop the humanitarian interventions of the CIA facilities?

How did the White House plan to handle foreign nation opposition to the detention centers?

What protections were in place to ensure the prisoners had a safe area in the event of enemy attack on the CIA detention center?

Which White House memoranda discussed reprisals against American civilians and government jailers?

What training was reviewed after the President made the announcement?

What provisions were made to handle similar abuse allegations in other locations on the high seas, and in US NAVY contracted vessels located in the Indian Ocean, Black Sea, and off the coast of Thailand?

When were issues of criminal liability documented?

Despite concerns before the decision to render, why was nothing done to stop the rendition and detention?

How was DoD 5100.77 incorporated into the CIA planning, training, or other communications between DoD, NSA, and CIA?

How were questions, concerns, and other problems with the procedures addressed?

FOIA Requirements

Post decision discussions and memoranda in Intel Link related to prisoner treatment.

Access of specific websites and Intel Link guidelines related to Geneva, war crimes.

Facility safety procedures.

Copies of diplomatic cables from allied nations: Diplomatic instructions provided by State Department to worldwide embassy staff. How provided, disseminated within internal State Department internet.

Strategy to respond to world questions. Copies of planning memos to address international questions. List of attendees, who provided in puts after the 2001-decision made to illegally commit war crimes.

Memoranda related to National Security Counsel White House, DoJ Staff, CIA, and other government entities or intermediaries raising possibility that Americans could be targeted lawfully for reprisals.

Time, date, and form President reviewed progress at the CIA detention fatalities.

Methods President informed of status of prisoners located on maritime vessels, either on, above, or under the water; or located on, above, or under the earth/soil.

Reasons specific CIA detention centers were chosen.

List of original sites considered.

Reasons for announcing the existence after previous denials.

What was the input, concern, or war crimes risk suddenly communicated.

Which specific contractor communicated open source information to the White House and CIA indicating there was admissible evidence of war crimes a real risk that US government personnel could be indicted for war crimes?

Means by which insurance companies made services available to CIA employees.

Reasons for providing in Military Commission Act of 2006 public funds for matters that should be a private insurance issue.

Methods by which Intel Link used to disseminate Geneva, 5100.77, or other training material to CIA officers, agents, contractors, or intermediaries.

Confirmation messages that the training plans had been loaded, were ready, and that they met government requirements. Contract approval, contracting officer, and contracting officers certificate and identifying name and date oath of office taken. Date Contracting officer attended Ft. Belvoir Federal acquisition training or other training location and acquisition level status. Need copy of training plan, training record, and date CIA contracting officer demonstrated compliance with FAR and other CIA Federal Procurement Guidelines and requirements.

Copies of the media message company Cost Performance Report, Cost Schedule Status Report, and Reports demonstrating the contractors system met government requirements: Subsequent Application Review, list of personnel who conducted review, and periodic reviews time made through Defense Plant Representative Office [DPRO] and Defense Contract Management Command and dates of CIA Audits of these contractors. [Ex: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, SAIC]

Copies of memoranda from the procurement office to Senior CIA and White House staff on status of activities related to the media messages, and compliance/non-compliance issues under the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

Training times and successful completion dates.

Method to review appropriateness of hires, firing, and transfers.

How were records reviewed. Need names of Human Resources personnel who reviewed position requirements, and reported whether assigned personnel did or did not meet the education, training, and experience requirements.

Copies of training plans, lessons, and status reports provided to CIA managers.

Where did this training occur?

* * *

Prisoner Treatment

Once the prisoners were moved, how did they get access to counsel?

How were the Supreme Courts opinions in Hamdan incorporated into how the prisoners would be treated after their transfer to Guantanamo?

Did the transferred-prisoners who had access to counsel in Guantanamo discuss where the other facilities were located?

Where are the copies of the CIA manger handbooks, and management guides?

Who in the White House knew of the activity?

Which US Attorneys, DOJ Staff counsel, and outside counsel for the United States knew of the activity?

How were the labor issues raised and resolved?

What were the dates of the meetings between the trainers, the jailers, and the personnel who were attending the oversight meetings?

How were senior managers informed of progress?

What were the dates that these reports were consolidated?

Which contractors were hired to review the reports, and provide legal or technical commentary on the procedures, instructions, or other Geneva-related treaty obligations?

Where are copies of the agendas?

Which legal options did the White House discuss after the public well knew that the rendition was ongoing, illegal, and had violated Geneva?

How were the reservations handled?

How were the lessons of Guantanamo provided to Eastern Europe?

What was the physical means by which the lessons, plans, and other memoranda from Guantanmo were provided to Guantanamo?

Which dates were these lessons reviewed?

Who had sovereignty over the CIA detention centers?

Who made the decision not to investigate the detention centers?

When did the Attorney General decide not to provide answers or explanations for the deviations from statutory requirements?

Did Members of Congress get a copy of this memoranda?

What subsequent communications were there after the Attorney General realized he had not lawfully informed Congress as he was required; what provisions were made to backdate, explain away, or prevent that the statutory reporting requirement did not apply; how was this “non-application”-decision arrived in 2006, five years after the requirement to provide that report?

How did the White House, DoJ, CIA, and NSA personnel communicate their concerns related to the detention centers to the Inspector General of their various departments?

Did Congress, upon learning of the illegal war crimes make any effort to shut down funding?

What were the dates that CIA officers purchased private insurance?

If the issue of CIA officer insurance coverage is a private matter, why is the US government in the Military Commission Act of 2006 [Page 84-86] proposing to use public funds for the defense of CIA and other government personnel at international tribunals?

FOIA Requirements

Certified affidavits from counsel when they first spoke to, met, and interacted with prisoner. Summary comments as to whether prisoner reported access to counsel at any time prior to this affidavit.

Methods DoJ Staff Counsel, CIA Counsel, and White House Counsel did or did not review Hamdan.

Basis for providing information to Congress which did not comply with Geneva in the Military Commission Act of 2006.

Affidavits from prisoners on when they were detained, transferred, and the details of their detention. Approximate date of their capture, transfer times, and times afforded for meals, interrogation lengths, and frequency of interrogations.

Prisoner conclusions, inferences, and suspicions about what they were being told, reasons they were being held. Discussions they had with other prisoners on their likely location, reason for capture, and possible release date. Comments from guards on what they were told would be the basis for their release.

Copies of prisoner signed statements.

Criteria whether statements were or were not signed under duress; copies of DOJ Staff counsel guidance on whether DOJ Staff can or cannot be impeached for statements made in writing in letters to Verizon, AT&T, or others about how data was used after NSA intercepted information.

CIA management guides.

White House staff meetings on Rendition.

White House staff access to Intel link.

Copies of National Security Council briefings on rendition progress, milestones, and success criteria.

Award fees, promotions, or other moneys paid related to rendition program: Through OPM, DoD, CIA, DOJ, or Defense Finance Accounting or other contracting mechanisms.

Records of threats of strikes by contractors, prisoner guards.

Meeting minutes.

Signed policy memos.

Budget documents.

Regulations.

Audit reports.

Copies of schedules, transfer orders, or other documents related to management cycles, transfer, or changes.

Date camp commanders changed, basis for change.

Reports provided by Camp commanders to other entities.

Cross flow reports, peer reviews, or cross-transfer observations when CIA contractors or others with access compared and contrasted the various facilities: Basis for assessments, experience in the community, how treatment compared with Israeli detention centers.

Names of Israeli offers who provided training, guidance, suggestions, advice, in puts. Basis for choosing the specific Israeli military or intelligence personnel Method they were identified and provided access to the facility. Copies of signed statements to keep details secret.

CIA System Engineering and Technical Assistance.

Copy of MITRE review, software analysis, and methods MITRE gave to organize, inspect, and analyze the data gleaned from interrogations.

Meeting Agendas.

How NSA and CIA data was consolidated by MITRE or other contractors and used for media messaging by Fleischman Hilliard or other entitles related to AT&T, NARUS, Verizon, or other telecoms.

Reviews done on Vietnam-era reservations directed at North Vietnamese. Vice President Cheney’s recollections on how Vietnamese negotiations handled. Reasons Vice President said protections demanded be applied to Americans by Vietnamese were not applicable with respect to US detention of similar prisoners of war: Undeclared war against people who had a different view.

Basis Cheney gave to determine prisoners could be punished without judicial review.

Explanation from Cheney as to why procedures, methods, and detention methods applied to prisoners would or should not apply to him by other nations conducting war crimes prosecutions.

Message traffic showing Guantanamo lessons were or were not ignored.

Reasons White House, SECDEF, CIA, or NSA senior managers did or did not plan for what to do after the prisoners’ existence was known.

Agreements between US and host nation.

Methods US used to thwart investigation. Copies of threats provided. Which specific trade agreements, WTO retaliation, or other action at the United Nations or international bodies did the US plan to use, manipulate, or otherwise direct at nations which did not cooperate with the illegal war crimes.

Cost arrangements, fee sharing, technology transfers or other valuable consideration provided, related, or contingent upon US-allied nation agreement to remain silent on the illegal activity.

Copies of memoranda AG Gonzalez had notifying him of problems: Detection, awareness, knowledge outside White House and US Government that US violating Geneva.

Congressional notifications made by AG Gonzalez per title 2; Deviations. Reasons for not timely providing this after 2001. Explanation why the year is 2006, and still not deviation report from Gonzalez on statute violations, deviations, or noncompliance.

Message traffic to CIA, NSA, DoD, and DOJ IG related to illegal detention centers. How handled. What was blocked. What was shut down. What threats were made.

Documents Congress received related to war crimes. Dates Congress shut down funding and issued memoranda denying Executive power to spend funds on illegal things.

Private purchases of insurance: Need records of the outside firm showing the times, who CIA personnel spoke to, and the nature of the discussions. Need copies of the transcripts between CIA officers and the insurance companies. Phone recordings and audio made for quality control purposes. Samples of transcripts and random audio needed: Show the transcripts are valid and have not been tampered with. Document were not available as required under the insurance industry requirements, and other reporting requirements to the SEC and state regulators.

Date the Virginia and Maryland Insurance Oversight authorities notified, and called to conduct investigation of apparent insurance fraud: Retroactive coverage for events that had already occurred. Need state licensing information on the CIA insurance companies; where the funds are investigated; and how these SEC-regulated entities are or are not complying with their 8K and 10K reporting requirements to the Exchange, NYSE, CBOT, or other exchange regulators.