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Wednesday, September 27, 2006

Alleged War Criminal Viet D. Dinh Fatal Admissions, Errors

Viet D. Dinh has allegedly supported unlawful warfare, and FISA violations.

In a 26 Sept 2006 Wall Street Journal editorial [A look behind the curtain at the Hewlett-Packard theater page A14], Viet D. Dinh makes a number of fatal admissions, useful to a war crimes prosecutor.

[ For other coverage: Ref ]

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1. Viet D. Dinh reports he is counsel for Tom Perkins, allegedly under investigation for illegal activity and Hewlett-Packard. The editorial does not include references to Viet D. Dinh's involvement in turning back the clock on the PSLRA, and other rules of governance.

2. Viet D. Dinh reports he is aware of an e-mail dated Jul 18 from Tom Perkins. Because of the disclosure, this e-mail and its contents are no longer attorney-client privileged communication. It remains to be understood which portion of that e-mail, if any, Viet Dinh has not disclosed.

3. Viet D. Dinh reports he was Asst. Attorney General for legal policy, from 2001-2003, when the US NSA and DOJ were allegedly engaged in illegal surveillance, and failures to report unlawful conduct.

4. It is unreasonable to assert that a public reporting by CNET "burnished" the image of Hewlett-Packard. Rather it is the conduct of the alleged co-conspirators that is the issue. Contrary to counsel's assertions, the trigger for the activity, investigation, and review was in no way linked with an editorial, but alleged unlawful activity which the FBI and other law enforcement officials reviewed. Viet D. Dinh well knows that law enforcement does rely on anonymous tips, and may or may not use the open media for ideas. If there was no substance to the CNET report, the FBI and SEC would not be moving beyond a preliminary inquiry; the H-P officers would not have resigned, and Perkins would not have sought outside assistance after the alleged illegal conspiracy unfolded.

5. As to what Hurd has or has not done, notice that Viet D. Dinh did not assert any fact, but said, "I believe that his knowledge was tangential," and "I think he should get the benefit of any doubt." I may believe that the moon is made of cheese, but why give anyone any doubt? No answer from Viet D. Dinh.

6. Dinh is making legal arguments and arguably excuses for why Hurd did or did not resign. It makes no difference whether the CEO did or did not have the power to control anything. If there was a serious effort to enforce or abide by the law, but the Board was or was not in the way of achieving that outcome, then Dinh has yet to explain why Hurd did or did not consider resigning. Whether Hurd did or did not have the power to do anything relative to Dunn is meaningless.

7. It is disingenuous for Viet D. Dinh to argue that the CEO should or should not take action to "increase shareholder value." This is a slogan from the 1990s, and is meaningless. Rather, Viet D. Dinh "idea" of value is to partially immunize companies of the PSLRA requirements and water down the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, hardly valuable.

8. "Hopefully those distractions are now over." Hardly. The Geneva conventions and war crimes prosecutors reviewing the alleged illegal detentions in Eastern Europe know well Viet D. Dinh's alleged involvement in the legal opinions used to allegedly convince senior Members of Congress to do nothing about the inhumane treatment in Guantanamo. Viet D. Dinh has yet to be called as a witness to explain is knowledge of the Abraxas request for information, and to what extent the DoJ has sought his assistance in 2006 to deal with the 2001-2003 issues of the CIA activities in Italy to allegedly kidnap Italian nations and transport them for alleged torture in Egypt.

9. Viet D. Dinh asserts that personnel involved in reporting Hurd have resigned. Under the PSLRA, State of Accounting Standard 99 would have increased audit scope based on these resignations. Under Viet D. Dinh's construct, the PSLRA would strip the oversight authorities of the power to sanction the accounting and auditing industry of failing to cooperate with the investigations, and otherwise take us back to the Enron Cowboy days: "Whatever you want, just don't get caught."

10. Viet D. Dinh asserts that Bart Schwartz will review processes. How is this credibly going to be enforced if the PSRLA/Sarbox, as Viet D. Dinh wants, is gutted? Even if Schwartz does a review, failing to have a credible civil enforcement mechanism, as otherwise required under PSLRA/Sarbox, would hardly justify any public confidence the review may be subject to meaningful consequences if done in an allegedly reckless, negligent, or cursory manner; or there was subsequent revelations that the security sampling methods used were not reliable, nor consistent with SAS 70. Recall, it was Spike Bowman, former NAVY man who worked for the DoJ Counsel's office that was brought into Guantanamo to do an "independent investigation." Hamdan should remind Viet D. Dinh that the legal requirements, not merely someone's reputation, are the standard of comparison.

11. Viet D. Dinh absurdly asserts that the standard or line to whether someone is or is not reviewed is from this day forth. This is an incorrect reading of the Rule of Law. The law is as it is; the law, as it applies, relates to the facts under that law. It is meaningless to assert, "Henceforth, no one, at least of all corporate America, should be able to claim that they didn’t' know that obtaining telephone records without consent is improper and illegal." This was never a credible excuse before the H-P, so whether H-P events did or did not occur has no bearing on whether this defense remains meaningless.

12. Viet D. Dinh asserts that Hurd has made disclosures and comments related to Hurd interactions with the H-P-Dunn investigation. This remains to be understood. Whether the disclosures are or are not factual, incorrect, misleading, or designed to mislead the Grand Jury is a matter of evidence, not for Viet D. Dinh to assert with any credibility that the disclosures have or have not been "frankly acknowledged."

13. "I am really sorry I didn't deliver on this." [Alleged e-mail from Tom Perkins to Hurd, which Viet D. Dinh disclosed to third parties, destroying claims of atty-client/executive privilege related to this and all communications related to this matter.] That's a fatal admission that the performance was well below what the board expected, or should have expected. What prevented Perkins from asserting his "legal obligations" earlier when the CNET reports were surfacing, and the board discussed the leaks? No explanation from Perkins or Viet D. Dinh. Whether that is or is not protected by the business judgment rule remains to be seen.

14. Here's a fatal admission about a leak investigation. The war crimes prosecutors would like to get more information about this, who DoJ suspected was disclosing information about illegal Geneva violations, abuse, inhumane acts, and other unlawful warfare. "Having participated in and observed a number of leak investigations as a Justice Department official, I also thought it nearly impossible to uncover a confidential source without using government subpoenas. . . or resorting to illegal methods, which at the time was unthinkable." Given the NSA was illegally monitoring before Sept 2001, why should anyone believe your comments are anything but incredible? In your DC Bar presentation, you publicly commented on the compliance DOJ had with the Constitution, but revelations now indicate the opposite. Viet D. Dinh, please discuss your knowledge of the NSA-DoJ efforts to obtain access to Verizon facilities without securing warrants as required under FISA; the reasons your office did or did not know about Title 28 and Title 50 requirements on the AG and President to report violations of Statutes; and your knowledge of DoJ Staff counsel concerns that the Bybee and Berenson memos would illegally permit inhumane acts, in violation of Geneva.

15. Viet D. Dinh asserts PSLRA-related defense language when he states, "There was no disclosure of material nonpublic financial information to trigger regulatory or legal issues." This is an assertion which remains dubious. PSLRA/SarBox is one tool public investors rely on to attach an enforcement mechanism to this claim: If there were problems, as it remains to be explored, with the materiality of the information that was or was not disclosed, then the only way to ensure that misconduct is sanctioned is if the PSLRA is fully enforced as it exists, not gutted. Why should we believe that there was "no disclosure" of material information; or that the information that should have been disclosed was not improperly hidden; or that the legal and regulatory issues that exist under PSLRA, would not have blossomed further had PSLRA not existed?

16. Whether Hurd was or was not engineering an "impressive" or "banal" or "fraudulent" turnaround remain matters for the SEC to review. This is a matter of auditing. It is not appropriate to credibly assert that the turnaround is or is not real until the SEC, securities litigators, and outside auditors review the details. SAS99 calls for increased audits cope with regulatory action, allegations of criminal activity, resignation. Whether the audit committee did or did not appropriately increase audit scope before these legal matters did or did not exist remains to be examined. Whether the auditors have internal auditors have or have not destroyed their working papers remains to be understood.

17. Notice the contrast between these two statements of opinion: First arguing that the CNET article did or did n do something; then changing gears and arguing the opposite that another article was not harmful:

A. "The CNET article, if anything, burnished the image of H-P and it's management."

B. "It is difficult to see how a puff piece with nuggets already publicized by H-P could be viewed as harmful."

Yet, the internal conversations suggest the opposite: That the CNET disclosures were causing sufficient concern, that the Board was willing to engage in discussions how to violate the law. Whether your client is or is not connected to these inconsistent statements remains to be understood.

18. Viet D. Dinh cites a memorandum which allegedly misstates corporate board requirements under the business decision rules and their fiduciary duties. Viet D. Dinh has yet to explain how his client's conduct was or was not meeting the fiduciary duties. [See memoranda which states, "Dr. Keyworth often had contracts with the press.] Viet D. Dinh fatally asserts, "And there is no general duty of confidentiality for directors, only a duty of loyalty." This is incorrect. Directors also have other duties of care, diligence, and fair dealing. Part of that duty may be to remain silent on a matter of sensitivity. Then again, how will these other fiduciary duties be enforced if the PSLAR is gutted? No answer from Viet D. Dinh. Whether the director's actions did or did not comply with the full fiduciary duties as they are enforced under the State Governance requirements is a matter of law.

19. Viet D. Dinh incorrectly asserts, "the whole thing boils down to Mr. Keyworth deciding to speak favorably to a reporter without permission." Hardly. The rest of the story is what precipitated the discussions outside the board. Indeed, if these conversations were benign, as Viet D. Dinh dubiously asserts, no legal scholar or attorney can explain why the FBI and SEC are reviewing the original alleged misconduct before the now-resigned-CEO was in place. It appears the internal auditors, and outside auditors have a SAS70 internal control issue, which Bart Schwartz appears to have yet to publicly comment on.

20. Whether the disclosures did or did not violate an agreement is irrelevant. The only issue is what were the requirements, rules, and policies of the board; and to what extent were the board member's fiduciary duties to each other and the firm thwarted through the unauthorized disclosures which the board apparently well discussed, prompting the effort to (allegedly illegally) find the leakier.

21. "The answer to that question of authority is not self-evident as a legal matter." If that were true, what prevented the board from discussing this "big confusing legal matter" with both the general counsel, and the internal auditors? No answer, but this conversation should be documented, or an explanation why counsel and the board were not on the same page as to what was or was not going on with the internal SAS70 audit review, apparently never done. The issue isn't simply whether the conversations did or did not occur; but what did the General counsel, board members, and internal auditors have a duty to do once the issues, which should have been documented in the board minutes, were or were not resolved.

22. "But each board member individually owes a legal duty to act in the best interests of a cooperation, a personal duty that cannot and should not be delegated or transferred to anyone else." Brilliant, so if this duty was to each other, why is Perkins providing an e-mail to counsel (Viet D. Dinh), which counsel has made public? We can only conclude that the loyalty the board members, as practiced is subordinate to the individual's legal interests only when the legal interests are invoked; if the legal issues are not known, hidden, or not understood, then the apparent confusion takes precedent over legal clarity. That shows signs of abysmal compliance with any credible board member screening, and a breakdown of the internal auditor's reviews of the effectiveness of the board member qualifications, oversight, and effectiveness. Even if the legal duties were asserted to have been fulfilled, the confusion hardly warrants confidence the duties have been fulfilled; this must be demonstrated, not simply asserted.

23. Notice the following statement which appears to be deliberately ambiguous: "It is true that unauthorized disclosures of board information would violate a mutual commitment of confidentiality that H-P directors made to prevent such disclosures following the ouster of Carly Fiornia as chairman and CEO." This fatally acknowledges that there was in place a system or policy that prohibited what was happening, but no effective internal control, nor an explanation from the internal auditor why this new policy was or was not effectively managed, reviewed, and monitored. Under Viet D. Dinh's PSLRA/Sarbox changes, these SAS70 failures would get a pass as an enforcement tool.

24. Internal audits require direct conversations to find facts. It remains to be seen whether the board member was or was not acting as an internal auditor, or in another capacity. Thus, any contention that Keyworth "understandably" stated something is a dubious assertion, not well supported by SAS70 internal audit requirements. The issue isn't simply a time-snap shot, but the period of reporting between the initial problems, and the subsequent SAS70 milestone. There appears to have been no milestones. We conclude that Keyworth's assertion that he would be willing to respond ["Why didn’t you just ask"] are dubious; had Keyworth had this state of mind, he would not have allegedly secretly disclosed contents to CNET, but would have issued a public news release, on his own, to disclose to all what he and CNET were discussing. We see no press release with Keyworth's name on it; rather, we have the SEC and FBI reviewing the issues. This is hardly understandable.

25. Viet D. Dinh acknowledges he is aware of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Indeed, the issue of the business judgment rule is trumped when there are specific ministerial duties and requirements imposed on the CEO and board, through SAS70 internal audit requirements or internal procedures. Business judgment cannot be given deference when there is a specific rule which mandates other conduct. Indeed, this is the heart of the alleged Geneva-FISA violations within DoJ Staff, 2001-2003 when Viet D. Dinh knew, or should have known, there was a discussion about whether the Bybee and Berenson memos were or were not sufficiently credible to defend those who allegedly failed to remove themselves from the illegal violations of Geneva and FISA. Viet D. Dinh, despite his knowledge of the business judgment rule, FISA, and Geneva, continued to provide services to DoJ well after the alleged illegal activity was well underway.

26. There is an issue of the US Attorney General training program through the Justice Law Institute. These are requirements which the US Attorneys and DoJ Staff learn related to the laws of war, Geneva Conventions. The information is available from the JAG. There are cross flows of information from the JAG community into the US Attorneys office and DoJ Staff. There are video tapes and trip training notes showing which DOJ Staff have or have not provided this JAG-related information to the US Attorney’s office. Viet D. Dinh's problem is that he's publicly commenting on governance and training issues: "Her supporters whispered that Mr. Perkins had challenged her proposal for a mandatory director education program on corporate compliance." Now that Viet D. Dinh has opened the door on senior management training, it's his job to explain what information from the JAGs from the Justice Law Institute he has received, should have looked at, or did not review that was otherwise available for him to examine on video. This information relates to admissibility of evidence that is related to fraudulent conduct, violation of statute, and the loss of executive privilege. How does Viet D. Dinh explain his company's public posting of personal information on the wiki, without adequate disclosures of his full involvement with the postings on the wiki?

27. Viet D. Dinh also disclosed, represented, and left the impression with the DC Bar that the US DoJ was following the Constitution. The FISA-Geneva violations suggest otherwise. Viet D. Dinh writes, "Left unanswered was whether the sub rase investigation was a good idea or whether the reaction was reasonable to the infraction." Indeed, is it reasonable for the public to continue to believe Viet D. Dinh's disclosures to the DC Bar, or is there another motivation of the US President to shut down the DOJ OPR investigation into which DoJ Staff counsel knew about the illegal surveillance and Geneva violations?

28. Viet D. Dinh also comments on a matter related to a personal option that an investigation, not the illegal activity under investigation, was unconscionable. ["in June, Tom Perkins (Viet D. Dinh's client) wrote to Larry Sonsini, outside counsel to the H-P board, and passed on my view that the investigation was unconscionable and likely illegal."] Stunning: When someone is represented by counsel, the duty of the other counsel is to ask whether they are represented by counsel and discuss that issue with counsel; Viet D. Dinh has yet to explain whyhis client (Perkins) was directly communicating with Larry Sonsini, and why Viet D. Dinh was not communicating. What's the reason that Perkins was communicating with Viet D. Dinh, but Viet D. Dinh was not directly communicating with Sonsini, and leaving Perkins out of the direct discussions? What Sonsini unaware that Viet D. Dinh and Perkins were discussing the issues; if there were legal concerns, as Viet D. Dinh suggests, why wasn't Perkins working exclusively with Viet D. Dinh?

29. To suggest that "Sonsini was simply a good, honest lawyer doing his best to represent his client" is inconsistent with what Sonsini was doing; nor what Viet D. Dinh should have expected. Rather, if Sonsini was doing the right thing, we have yet to have an explanation why Sonsini was not directly discussing the legal issues with Viet D. Dinh, rather than Perkins. If Perkins has legal experience that might Trump Viet D. Dinh, then the issue is the reverse: Perkins would have had the legal experience to know, compounding his legal obligations under the business judgment rule: The issue isn't judgment in business, but whether that judgment, given Perkins apparent knowledge of the law was or was not sound. We can only speculate.

30. Based on the above, the apparent lack of compliance with the attorney rules related to clients represented by outside counsel, there appears to be more to the story. Viet D. Dinh in saying, "Sonnies' candid acknowledgement of pretexting . . . prompted Mr. Perkins to contact telephone companies. . . " appears not to be a credible statement. The real reason for the communication appears to be something else, possibly a warning from a third party; this information has yet to be understood, or who inside DoJ or the SEC may have tipped someone off that there was an ongoing investigation against H-P. Overall, there appears to have been something else that prompted the allegedly untimely conversation that Perkins should have earlier made. This appears to be experience that Perkins had that would prompt Sonsini to discuss the issues with Perkins directly, rather than respect the attorney requirement that they only talk with counsel when the client is represented.

31. Viet D. Dinh provides qualifications in his WSJ editorial. Notice the assertion that DoJ said that record-access can be illegal in some circumstances. Indeed, when the Attorney General violates Statutes, he has a requirement under Title 28 to report in writing that information to Congress: What the statute was that was violated. Viet D. Dinh was present 2001-2003. We have yet to hear a straight story from Viet D. Dinh: What did Viet D. Dinh know about the Geneva violations, FISA violations, and other unconstitutional conduct. He's said to the DC bar what the standards were; but stating a standard is far different than complying with that standard. [See, emphasis added: "would impose sanctions for certain sales. . .would criminalize some conduct.. . ."]

32. There is an issue of attorney-client communications, what information Perkins had that Sonsini had that prevented him from discussing the issues with Viet D. Dinh; why Viet D. Dinh did no directly discuss the legal issues with Sonsini directly; and why Perkins, not Dinh, was discussing the legal issues with Sonsini. Either:

A. Viet D. Dinh had a private relationship with counsel, an ongoing agreement to work through a client, and agreed that Perkins and Sonsini could discuss issues. This suggests that the public accolades for Sonsini are not based on objective criteria but on a to-be-disclosed ongoing relationship between Sonsini and Viet D. Dinh. OR

B. Sonsini did not know Perkins was represented by outside counsel; but Perkins had a duty to rely on HP counsel, not his private counsel, raisin the question of when Perkins contacted Viet D. Dinh, and what capacity Viet D. Dinh was acting -- private consultant, confidential legal advisor, or a person who the board would have known Perkins was discussing legal issues with in addition to the primary H-P General counsel.

It's a problem when the General Counsel is not trusted, and outside counsel is ignored, only to find out that the back-up counsel may have not properly disclosed their ongoing relationship, or may have provided illegal, unlawful, or conflicting legal advise. Given this apparent habit of Viet D. Dinh to not disclose himself to Sonsini and the HP Outside General counsel, it appears as though Viet D. Dinh does this on a regular basis, has a reputation for providing outside legal advice, and is called when there are internal legal issues between personnel. It remains to e seen how Viet D. Dinh has been similarly contacted by the DOJ Staff counsel when they were approached on issues of FISA violations, OPR investigations, and Geneva. It is a serious matter when someone, who may have been party to the allegedly illegal activity and unlawful policy then provides outside legal advice to those DoJ Staffers who have been asked to comment on prisoners of war, Geneva, and inhumane treatment under the laws of war. Suggesting, "What happened to Tom Perkins is unique only because of the players involved" is not a credible statement. This is not the first time that someone has discussed a legal issue with two different lawyers and gotten possibly conflicting information. The issue isn't whether the lawyers agree, but what the court of justice adjudicates. The incorrect approach is to pretend the legal issues are privileged, unbelievable, or outside the Article III powers of the court to review.

33. The issue DoJ Staff counsel have is when the ongoing practices are illegal, but rather than compare the conduct to the standard, they compare it to the derivative policy and incorrectly conclude there is no violation. It's one thing to draft a legal policy that is based on a flawed legal opinion; quite another to rely on an illegal legal opinion to trump the governing law or statute or treaty. Consider this language, the pervasiveness "of the trade in illegally obtained phone records has led many buyers of illicit records to believe that they were not dealing in stolen goods." What they believed is irrelevant. The only two factors are (1) What was the controlling law or treaty; and (2) What happened. The right approach is to gather facts, not pretend that certain parties did or did not have a credible belief behind their concerns. The question is whether counsel has or has not disclosed the extent to which they have continued to interact with DoJ Staff counsel on issues related to illegal activity, are not protected by privilege, and have been disclosed to third parties outside that claim of privilege. The issue isn't one of Executive privilege or national security, but the means by which an alleged war criminal does or does not have the means to induce others to rely on allegedly defective legal opinions and memoranda issued 2001-2003 which were known, or should have been known, to violate both FISA and the Geneva conventions. It makes no difference how you define torture; the issue is whether the abuse in Italy, Guantanamo, and Eastern Europe did or did not violate the laws of war prohibiting all inhumane acts. The Attorney General and US President under Title 28 and Title 50 had a joint requirement to report illegal activity to Congress. There's one office where that memo should have been linked -- the office of Viet D. Dinh. Either the memo exists, or it does nt. Either way, the issue for Members of Congress to ask is why it took Viet D. Dinh two years, until 2003, to "get around" to removing himself from what appears to have been illegal government activity he knew, or should have known about in 2001.

34. Viet D. Dinh asserts that someone's knowledge was tangential. What is the basis for this statement? "Based on all the available information, I believe that his knowledge was tangential and his involvement indirect."

A. What information are you basing this "belief" upon?

B. Have you disclosed "all" the information you have, or are there classified DoJ documents, relationship, and ongoing interactions with DoJ Staff that encourages you to reach this conclusion?

C. Are you aware of DoJ Staff counsel concerns about Geneva, FISA violations, and possible war crimes liabilities?

D. Upon which legal memoranda did Viet D. Dinh ground his "belief," as they related to issues of Military Commissions, CIA-Abraxas relations, treatment of prisoners, or the DOJ Staff counsel discussions on when habeas corpus should be suspected?

E. Prior to the events of Sept 2001, Viet D. Dinh created much of the Patriot Act. Why didn't the Patriot Act include the cancellation of habeas corpus? Why should we believe that the discussion related to cancellation of habeas corpus, as they relate to the Military Commission bill on page 81, and Senator Leheay's comments, not be contrasted with the calendar: It is 2006, fully 5 years after the Patriot Act was passed. What was the reason the writ was not cancelled then; and why despite the debate to ignore Geneva, was there not a similar discussion to ignore the writ? How can anyone argue that the "confusion" of 9-11 trigged illegal activity, when that planning was completed prior to Sept 2001? To argue that the events of 9-11 were "unforeseeable" are at odds with the pre-9-11 planning that went into the Patriot Act. It is too late in 2006 to argue that the events of 2001 amounted to an invasion. There is no credible basis to believe that anyone working in DoJ was concerned with following the law; rather, every effort was made to ignore the Constitution, not get caught, and ignore the Courts -- on issues of prisoner abuse, laws of war, FISA, NSA. Every possible excuses has been invoked in 2006 to justify the decisions in 2001 to ignore the law. What was the thinking to, arguably, do the opposite: Pretend that DoJ was obeying the law in 2001, doing all it could to protect America, not cancelling the writ; yet in 2006 change the debate terms as to whether we were or were not invaded justifying a cancellation of the writ? Claims in 2006 that there was "fear" and "confusion" are dubious: DoJ well knew the law, ignored it, and wrote language to defy the Constitution, Supreme Law, Geneva Conventions, and FISA. There was only one office that Title 50 and Title 28 memoranda would flow through had the Attorney General and President complied with their reporting requirements. Viet D. Dinh either you're lying in 2006; or you have a problem in knowing what was or was not done in 2001-2003. Your problem is that you've publicly commented on these issues, your IP number traces the wiki with your name on it, and you have yet to correct the record with the DC Bar.

Congratulations on opening the bard door, and making the war crimes prosecutors job that much easier. You can't claim privilege on attorney-client matters when you publicly comment on issues that your client should only have routed through you. It remains to be understood how many DoJ Staff counsel continue to call you to get help on these legal issues related to Geneva, FISA, war crimes, rendition, prisoner abuse, Title 28, Title 50, and the statutory requirement of the President and Attorney General to cooperate with the DOJ OPR, and explain in writing to Congress where they opposed or did not follow the law. Nuremburg did convict attorneys when they provided illegal opinions, and failed to prevent illegal conduct and war crimes.

Arguably, there's alot Viet D. Dinh knew or should have known between 2001 and 2003 that is surfacing. He was there. Either he knew what was going on, or he had no clue. What we do know is his company is linked with the wiki that says Viet D. Dinh may be a supreme Court Justice. If that's the case, then like Chief Justice Reports, it remains a matter of law and professional ethics whether Viet D. Dinh did or did not properly remove himself. His job was not to serve the President or the Attorney general; his oath was to the US Constitution, rule of law, Geneva Conventions, and FISA. Viet D. Dinh appears to have us believe that the lawyer’s duty is to the shareholders and public. In truth, the attorney's only loyalty is to themselves and whoever is willing to pay them to keep silent on matters of criminal law. Viet D. Dinh's problem is that he's working both sides of the litigation: First as an alleged defendant for what he's done or failed to do; but then as a public advocate, while still arguing for flawed legal excuses to defend a client. His client and legal interests isn't just Perkins and the DOJ Staff, but his personal legal desire to remain free of accountability for his alleged complicity in failing to prevent war crimes and illegal violations of the Supreme law 2001-2003.


A. We judge Viet Dinh has an ongoing relationship with DoJ Staff counsel in 2006; and is aware of the 2001-2003 conversations which Brad Berenson had on the CIA detention centers; and should know about the outside counsel inputs to the DOJ Staff and White House requesting government legal defense for DoJ Staff counsel who may be prosecuted before international war crimes tribunals.

B. We judge Viet Dinh has reviewed memoranda that illegally stated Geneva did not apply, and that abusive treatment in the Bybee memo was acceptable. Viet Dinh can hardly be viewed as an objective counselor. Rather, he has a vested inertest in seeing that the Congress publicly debate legislation that would hope to immunize him and others who have allegedly failed to ensure Geneva was enforced as he has the specific 5 USC 3331 ministerial duty to have done.

C. We judge Viet Dinh knows (1) the DoJ Attorney General has not complied with Title 28 reporting requirements; and (2) there have been violations of FISA and Geneva when Viet Dinh was in a position not prevent the illegal policy from being implemented, but refused to take action to remove himself or stop the illegal activity.

D. We judge the Military Commission Act is substantially in harmony with to-be-disclosed memoranda which Viet D. Dinh and Brad Berenson knew, or should have known, were in contravention to the Geneva conventions, violated the laws of war, and were in no way consistent with the clear requirements that prisoners be treated humanely.

E. We judge the Military Commission Act’s underlying objective has nothing to do with prisoner treatment or national security, but creating a set of rules which are consistent with illegal memoranda which Viet D. Dinh, John C. Yoo, David S. Addington, Bybee, and Gonzalez know, or should know are not consistent with the Geneva Conventions and do not meet the standard of humane treatment of prisoners.

F. Regardless what Congress may or may not do in 2006 with respect to the Military Commissions Act or FISA, nothing changes the clearly promulgated requirements which existed in 2001-2003 which Viet D. Dinh allegedly knew, or should have known. These legal policies which Viet D. Dinh and Wendy J. Keifer well knew, allegedly (a) were inconsistent with the memoranda, policy, and illegal plans which abused prisoners in violation of Geneva; and (b) unconstitutionally bypassed the FISA requirements to secure a warrant.