DoD narrows Conyers FOIA request in re Downing Street Memo
Wondering what DoD is trying to hide? It's not all that hard to figure out.
There are plenty of records. And DoD doesn't want Congress to look at some things. Why?
This note explains how the "stuff DoD doesn't want included in the FOIA" can be put together to find out what Congress really wants to know: Who was involved, who is the White House linked, and who has obstructed lawful inquires.
Enjoy!
Cindy Sheehan got the Downing Street Memo and is pretty upset. The cousin of the Texas shooter, a veteran, offered Cindy his land to protest.
In the meantime, we hear that DoD has agreed to a narrow the FOIA request.
Conyers writes, "the Pentagon did contact my office and suggested modifications to narrow the request (which we did), " Ref
The question that comes to mind: How does the final version of the FOIA request compare with the original?
It would be useful to compare the [a] original request; with [b] the agreed to terms; [c] the final changes; and [d] the FOIA response from DoD to Congressman Conyers.
Here's the unanswered question: How did the "narrowing" of the FOIA request exclude certain documents?
Discussion
DoD likes to narrow down "the problem" into something that is "appropriate" so that "other things" are excluded. They tend to encourage people to "cooperate with a reasonable request" so that "their request can be more appropriately responded to."
In practice, what DoD likes to do is narrow down the list of "appropriate requests" to something that takes the important things off the table. In other words, there could be issues, terms, and important information in the FOIA that have not been publicly discussed, but should be known.
At this point I have no clear statement on "what DoD has or has not agreed to" in the subsequent agreement.
Here's what I would like to see
A final breakdown from DoD showing which types of documents would not have been provided had the original FOIA request-terms been unchanged;
A study or analysis done on the change between [a] the original request; and [b] the final request, with some discussion on the likely types of issues, terms, and questions that would not have been covered.
What can be done is a reverse-engineering on the discovery-type-terms. In other words, if you take the terminology that was removed from the original request and assume this "leads to some valid information," you can then speculate on the range of issues, management actions, and types of reports/documents/internal audits/briefings DoD did or didn't provide.
In other words, by narrowing the FOIA request, DoD does two things:
Think of this as when law enforcement gets reasonable suspicion that there's something going on. They don't have a warrant, but they believe that there's an imminent crime. Under the law, they can enter a building.
Lo and behold! If they "stumble" across something "totally unrelated" to their original suspicions, that evidence is still admissible.
What DoD is trying to do is prevent the Congressional Committees from looking at something that is not directly related to a very narrow request in the hopes of putting the blinders on.
Let's be clear what the Downing Street Memo is: It is evidence that, contrary to the White House assertions, the facts were fixed to justify a war, and many knew the intelligence was made up.
We also know that Rove is in trouble. This means the White House staff knows something.
Yes, there's alot of stuff DoD doesn't want the Congress to know about. Let's speculate what this type of information could be:
One of the fictions flying around is that CIA-FBI had a wall. That's non-sense. The NSC has something called the DSP which collates all the information from CIA and FBI.
What will be important to review is how the final DoD request excludes information that would show how DHS, CIA, CIFA, JTTF and/or FBI intelligence information was rolled into DoD briefings.
We know through the 9-11 Commission that NAVY IG interviewed Spike Bowman.
The analysis will have to compare what factors, targets, information would be excluded from the final list.
This information could relate to the message traffic, witness interview, and post-defection interrogations lists.
NSA sends over various satellites and airborne vehicles. At the same time ground units form the Army and Marine intelligence units have various Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
Units from the Marine Corps Pacific Fleet were dispatched in theater. It would be appropriate to find out which personnel would be taken off the final list of FOIA submittals.
In tern, the final DoD list could be so narrowed to hide ongoing efforts related to doing the same thing in Iran: Essentially making up more information [as was shown in the Downing Street Memo] but this time creating the "ruse for war" in Iran.
Also, satellite imagery of various Naval carrier groups, vessels, and other "commercial vessels" [CIA cover ships] in the Indian Ocean cold be the very information needed to pinpoint which ships were or are continuing to house prisoners in the "floating GITMOs." These are floating torture vessels which the US has argued "are not subject to the Geneva conventions" because they are located in international waters.
The problem with this "logic," is that the laws of war apply to personnel, regardless where they are located.
Every time there is a problem, commanders have to decide whether to look into the matter; ignore the problem; or call in outsiders.
Regardless what they do, there's always an initial notification. This can be done through message traffic, phone calls, or meetings.
Regardless how they are notified, someone initially finds something. The important thing to do is to gather the anecdotal evidence from the Whistleblowers and find if there is a common pattern of
All units have regulations, orders, and procedures. It will be important to look at which procedures were getting reviewed during the briefings.
What will be important to look for are the audit reports showing which functional areas are getting reviewed; what the findings are; and how the final audit reports compare with their baseline procedures.
What will be important to look for are holes:
Units provide status on mission accomplishment, personnel training, and combat readiness.
These are reports that are scheduled, recurring, and go out on an ongoing basis.
What will be important to look for is the incoming traffic from the various reporting units that are outside the request. This will establish a baseline.
Thus, by "taking items of the list," DoD is preventing the Congressional Committee from understanding this baseline activity.
Once Congress looks at the baseline, then compares it with the various spikes in and out of the then-future combat theater [looking forward from 2002], we can get an idea of what are spikes.
At this point, we have nothing to compare "the spikes" with: How do "the spikes" compare with other "ongoing monitoring activities" in other activities?
This will be important to look at:
Again, the point is that we may not know exactly what is or isn't going on; but we can compare "area A that has nothing to do with the area of primary interest" and then compare how the actual reporting [from DoD's perspective] to see if there are inconsistencies in the reporting.
In general, with any activity, there is a reasonable level of reporting or planning. If we find that X-event in the future was to occur, but the reported DoD response is much less than the baseline-comparison, we know we're not getting something.
At this point, DoD has taken this "comparison" off the table by narrowing the request.
Message traffic is something that is interesting to look at. It takes time to physically compose/transfer a boilerplate and then output a message for signature.
There is a discrete amount of time between the time that the message is requested; then when it is finished; and when it is finally signed/approved, then sent out via the lines.
It doesn't matter what the times are. But what we can figure out by looking at the baseline times, and comparing them with the surges, is some queuing data.
This is a way of assessing "what else was going on" and "what other priorities were there." Suppose we have a "high" priority event, and it takes 20-units of time to process that message.
Suppose we have another "high priority event," but it takes 20+5-units of time. We have to ask:
The important thing to remember is that we're looking at orders of magnitude of minutes and hours; but, if there's a hole in the timeline, and we get a consistent number of indicators from different personnel "gaps", we know that there's something going on.
These gaps can for the basis for additional inquiry. IN short, it means there's planning, delays, a decision, or some sort of problem that they're wrestling with.
Specifically, if they've got an internal battle over the Geneva Conventions, and we find various spikes above baseline, but then there's a hole . . . we know to look there.
Surprise! Guess who has the holes? The Judge Advocates [JAG] .We also know by looking at the various IG templates out of the NAVY that FBI and DOJ are involved.
Guess who DoJ uses for their VIP support? That's right: DoD Gulfstreams. Which means there is a fuel request, there's an upload time, and there's a fuel truck that has to get dispatched at a discrete time.
Yes, it takes a long time to put all these little pieces together. But that's the point: You want to get as much as you can, and then rebuild the entire timeline.
Then, the next step is to go in with specific Certified Fraud Examiner target lists to go after specific computers. This can be done by comparing the satellite intercepts, and the ground-message traffic; and then comparing it with the actual IT-usage times; and then comparing this with the original responses.
There will be gaps. Why? Because DoD personnel do not realize that NSA collects the information and this is contained in GCHQ, outside their control.
What we need is some detailed samples of "how many gaps there are" so that the public will realize that DoD has been talking out of both sides of their mouth.
On one hand they've been publicly pretending to be stupid; at the same time, their own public information confirms that there were DoJ and NAVY cross talks and message traffic in 2002. Yet, by 2005, JCS says they had no clue.
Impossible.
TDY is temporary duty. When a unit is engaged in a classified program, they have to still travel. The problem is, sometimes the personnel do not see how their "little piece" fits in with the big picture.
In other words, a TDY-travel-voucher is issued, they have to have orders; and they have to have fund cites. These are special codes that track how the funding routes through Columbus Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and then back to the paying station.
What happens in the money comes out of one account, and pays the Scheduled Airline Traffic Office for the Airline Tickets, rental cars, or other things.
There are also funds that typically come out of a service member’s private personal account; Someone going on a trip to Diego Garcia could use their personal credit cards, or make cash withdrawals from their private account. Then these travel expenses are reimbursed.
Getting back to the Downing Street Memo FOIA request: By narrowing the "list of appropriate targets," what DoD is doing is taking all the travel-related information [that could be used as a cost-baseline] and saying, "This doesn't apply."
That's non-sense. The way anyone in DoD does any planning or estimating is to look at analogies.
So where to go? There's a place called the Cost Analysis Improvement Group [CAIG] which gathers all this baseline data. If DoD has shut out the FOIA response from this group, then you know they're trying to stifle Congress from doing some cost estimates and baseline analysis.
Also, there are various travel requests that are done under cover. They are charged against one account, but they're actually supporting another event. This is what a black program is. The money is spent, but it is taken out of one program, and applied to something else.
How to find this? Well, there's something called the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary [DAES] which shows the major programs. Small problem from some of the services.
Guess who took over the DAES recently? That's right: DoD took over the subordinate commander responsibilities for monitoring the Air Force acquisition programs. What does this mean? It means that the DoD Office of Secretary of Defense for Acquisition has consolidated the "oversight" of this function.
IN other to provide status reporting on these DAES, normally what happens in the units report their status. Small problem. Those black programs that they raid have many signals of problems:
Guess what? The money was there. Then it disappears. Where does it really go? If the program is fat enough, the money gets taken out, pays some classified program, and then all of a sudden: The program has to restructure.
SO, getting back to the DAES . . .all you have to do is look at the various DAES reporting units that have had major restructures. And then trace the money that was on the original contract estimates by the CAIG, and compare: Why did we have a slip in the program?
Usually, the money is taken out after a number of meetings. So what you're looking for:
I suspect DoD is attempting to narrow down the response so that Congress is unable to do any of this analysis. It's not that hard. It takes a long time, and that is why DoD is stonewalling. They believe that they can refocus Congress’s attention/ and then when the questions come "about the real story," DoD will point back to the agreement and say, "Hay, we agreed not to . . . "
This is exactly what the Senate did when it got the "list of OK-issues to review" in the Intelligence review with both Bush in 9-11 and the WMD issues. It was done during the Clinton impeachment as well: Alot of staffers in the Senate Judiciary Committee can tell you how this give and take was done on which issues to take off the table, which funds were promised in exchange for keeping various issues quiet.
There's a little magic that goes on. If you're in a real combat unit you have something called an operational readiness inspection. This is a recurring requirement to show that units are combat ready, or what problems they have.
We know from Iraq that "highly rated units" are reporting problems with equipment.
The issue becomes: How were the original ORI readiness inspections passed?
The answer is people rated equipment as "combat ready" because they met, on paper, various requirements. Small problem: They know the equipment was worthless, and the checklists were bad.
So, the big ruse: If we can find a classified briefing we'll know the truth. That's a mirage. DoD, just because it classifies something, isn't saying that the information is correct or true. DoD will fabricate weapons performance data all the time. They'll make up bogus information.
So don't get into the trap of thinking, "because I have a classified briefing" that it's the truth. On the contrary, you may be going down the wrong path.
What to do? Remember, the goal here is to find out who in the White House knew the Downing Street Memo information was "what was real," all the while you have a huge charade going on.
The trick will be to find out:
The problem the White House has is, despite the pre-2002 decision to go to war [per the Downing street Memo], is that the classified reports show equipment status that is odds with their actual combat readiness and capabilities in Iraq.
Clearly, things don't add up: And this was known prior to 9-11. Anyone who had their head remotely connected to their brain stem knew this.
So, the next question: How did DoD through the President’s Budget incorrectly report combat unit readiness, requirements, and programs?
The answer is: This it the President's Budget. Let me say that again: Every year, the President submits something called the PB, or President's Budget to Congress in the first days/weeks of February.
Going backward in time, there are the DAES mark-up meetings that flow into this. Guess what happens in November-January? The staffers are talking back and forth about their changes.
If you go inside the Pentagon, you'll be able to see which access vaults were in use. They have various combinations on them. They're about eye-level and they're black.
Guess who keeps records of who has access to the vaults; and also keeps records of the phone calls in and out of the Pentagon related to these DAES markups?
That's right: GCHQ. So the key will be to compare what GCHQ is communicating, and then go back to see what was in the classified briefings.
You'll see that what they were talking about, doesn't match what they were telling Congress or the public.
In which areas? Look at 5100.77 in re war crimes. If you fly down to Guantanamo and go through the various TDY-visitor logs though DFAS, you'll find out which personnel actually went into GITMO, the communications, and the subsequent conversations they had.
One of the Senate Staffers from New Hampshire in November 2002 had a pre-trip package put together. This was coordinated with DoJ, DoD, and the Senate Committee. At the same, time you can go through the Senate Staffer private accounts, find out how much money they were reimbursed for travel, and then trace this dollar amount through DFAS on those funding orders.
As you wind your way through those codes, the issue isn't the dollar amount, but all the personnel codes; the office codes; and program codes related to that single visit.
This is how you'll be able to find out "what the real story" is of what was going on with GITMO:
The point is this: You have a single visit in November 2002 by a Rhode Island Senator Staffer. On its own, DoD may say, "You don't need that." But unless you get "the rest of the stuff," and "know how to swipe off the codes and info" you're never going to be able to put the whole story together:
So, to make a long story short: What DoD has done is take out the various information that Congress needs to do what DoD doesn't want: To bump up against the real stuff that would explain:
Who cares? Well, if you go back and look at the GITMO photos that are about to be released, you'll have a better idea of what was going on in JTTF, CIFA, and the various briefings the IG-interrogators were getting along the Atlantic Seaboard.
Remember, these guys living in Virgina, North Carolina, Rhode Island who are part of the NAVY were cycled through GITMO as a "great opportunity" to practice their skills.
In order to have these training and after action reports, someone had to sit down and go over this. That's where the Senior Executive Service comes in. They had meetings, voice communications on DSN [Defense Switch Network] and they also used STURON [Classified keying system to scramble voice].
The key will be to find out who had access to these STURONs; and then find out whether the investigators [who were doing the "audits"] were actually the ones trying to hide what was "really going on" in GITMO.
In other words, the very criminal investigators charged with "gathering facts" for Congress could very well be the same interrogators from the NAVY assigned to and cycled through GITMO.
Let's keep in mind what we're talking about here: War crimes. How does a Regulation update relate to this?
Pretty simple. Anytime a regulation is updated, there is a staff summary sheet [SSS] that gets applied to that update. Someone prints out the final regulation; or it gets zipped around on an adobe file for a markup.
They key is each step along this update creates in the computer system a discrete file. Even if you "erase" the record, the actual update is stuck in the computer.
Either the computer gets sold, or its still in use. You can go back and find the "old deleted records" by burrowing deep in these computers.
For a cross check, if there are land lines and electrical outlines and there are problems with their OPSEC [Operational Security] then it means that someone has set up an open-access computer for classified plans, but done so in an area where someone can still monitor the communications.
Normally, the NSA guys will catch this and say, "Change it." Small problem. If they've spent 3020 money, and had a rapid expansion, then you know that they've created some classified areas, and this requires NSA coordination.
The regulation updates will show you which units were involved, meetings that they had to update the regulation, and who was involved.
If DoD is "taking issues of the table," but this is related to a regulation that mandates a reporting requirement, but that reporting requirement wasn't fulfilled, then Congress has something else to look at.
5100.77 is the OSD regulation that says exactly how unit commanders are supposed to comply.
If DOD has "taken items off the list" that relate to plans, message traffic, and other things with 5100.77, then you have to ask yourself, "Which meetings, papers, and other documents that support these tangential programs" were actually used as cover for the original plans related to war crimes.
In other words, you can't legally engage in war crimes. But if you can bury the "funding allocation" to support that war crime in a black program, most people think you can't find it.
Well, going back to your program restructure, TDY funding, and final DFAS listing though STURON discussions, you can still trace it.
Yes, the very people charged with "ensuring criminal investigations are done" are the same people who engaged in the torture.
Let me say that another way: Those people which like to say, "We are in the inspector general's office and work for Congress" are conflicted: Those people who are your criminal investigators for NCIS and JTTF [both OSD, DOJ] are the ones who are trying to cover this up: Their buddies are the ones who engaged in the war crimes.
The various "criminal investigators" in the units have a list of "stuff we don't talk about". Small problem. People make mistakes.
Despite all the briefings, people are still stupid. They go out to the mall, and let something slip.
IN the "real world," they like to say that this is "to protect the nation from spies." Well, the real-real story: There are people in the media who have this information "that they're not supposed to have", but they've kept quiet about it.
In other words, for the media to maintain access with "those who leak," the various "background information" they get to "help explain the story," is something that they don't talk about.
But, what you want to do is look at the DoD "list of things that we don't talk about" and look it over for things that "the Media should know about if they have access to anyone with a functioning brain stem."
The media has a problem. One of their own is already in jail. And GCHQ already knows about the communications between DoD and the media.
What the media likes to do is play stupid about who they talk to, what they know. IN practice, if there's a personnel evaluation going on, and the internal auditors are finding things, the media will get a courtesy copy.
But if there's a problem, people will play stupid. "Oh, we didn't hear about that." In practice, what the DoD personnel are doing is hoping to back-channel smear other people who naively come forward.
In other words, the "higher ups," who are in charge of these war crimes, will already have ongoing relationships with the media through the DOD public affairs. But a new person will show up, not know about these relationships, and go to the media. Guess who the media calls to discuss this? The higher ups.
It's a way of enforcing discipline while appearing to be "concerned."
The issue Congress want to look into is that small gem of an item at Starbucks. Remember that meeting the OSD staffer had, and they left their notes in Starbucks? They were meeting at a location approximately 6 miles from their homes; about the same distance from Rumsfeld's house.
You want to start looking for the "various types of off-site meeting places" that they're going to. You've got people who know who DoD staffers are. You want to get some meeting minutes of something that documents where they had their going away parties, or some sort of flyer with a retirement announcement on it. If DoD on the A-ring has a problem remembering, ask them to turn over all their recycled paper boxes. We can back-channel through that.
The next step is to do a 100% survey of all people who attended these meetings, and then have a 100% survey of all civilians who may have taken photographs of the building. That would get some very nice license plates.
Then you just starting throwing up pictures, photos of people, and meeting locations and ask anyone who remembers anything about these events to share whatever they have. Remember, the smallest piece of non-sense information could be vital.
So, get you flicker photos, and start taking pictures of everything. Who know, maybe we'll even find some of the pre-9-11 meetings to explain why their non-sense stories don't make sense: Just like the London Bombing stories don't make sense.
The one thing to remember about DoD IG personnel is that they are first, and foremost, a member of DoD. They get cycled through. They may not be experts.
Remember, the "criminal investigators" that work in the NCIS, CID, and OSI are actually the ones who cross flowed through GITMO with JTTF and CIFA.
Your IGs are a good source of "big picture" things; but as far as the nuts and bolts: Your investigators are the ones to talk to.
Remember, they "classify" things; and those files are kept in vaults in DC for 25 years. This means if you ask for specific follow-up investigations but they say, "We can’t find it," you know they're lying. It's there. 25 years!
Also, each unit has a focal point for GAO, IG, and Congressional inquiries. These are staffed through DoJ and DOD legislative liaison. Guess who works there? That's right, the same attorneys who whittled down the FOIA request.
DoD has special offices in each of the commands in the Pentagon. These personnel are typically mid to senior career in the O-4 [Major, Navy LtCommander] to O-5 [LtCol, Navy Commander] level. Sometimes you'll find an O-3 [Captain; Navy Lt] there.
The point being: They're very familiar with the unit level reporting; they know their weapon systems; and their loyalty is first to their own career and Congress is last on the list.
The Legislative Liaisons people have two primary sources of information. One is the "official paperwork" route [which is the FOIA]; and the second way is how things are actually done [without a trace].
The "without a trace" route can be put together. First, take a look at their TDY travels, look at the meeting minutes and attendance rosters for those various programs they go to; and find out their access times to the STURONS. What you're trying to do is find out the "other half" of the missing puzzle:
You're going to want to look for the NCIS travel in and out of GITMO [duh]; but there's a twist. They charge the funding to NAVSEA programs. DoJ does the same thing. You're going to want to find the fuel accounts for their VIP transports which DoD has; and then go after by-name the exact funding and message traffic supporting these visits.
Remember, your criminal investigators in CID, OSI, and NCIS are not reliable. They're trying to make this go away. Your job is to find the holes.
I recommend sending word to the GCHQ people that we need specific names, travel times, and funding cite codes. What we're looking for is a matrix pattern to show the spikes; and what we're tying to do is show what should be expected by way of normal communications, message traffic, funds expenditures.
When that drops off relative to the baseline [which DoD says doesn't apply and won't give Congress], you know you’re on the right track.
A trade study is a "trade off" or "analysis" study. When someone is planning to do something, they have to look at the costs, options, and find out how much things, costs and how much time it will take.
DOD in the DAES will list all the SETA [System Engineering And Technical Analysis] contractors that provide funding inputs.
Around the Pentagon there are many buildings with people who do the real work of the Pentagon: Analysis, data collection, meetings, and putting together the plans.
These people essentially take in raw information [whatever you want, they can get it, or make it up] and then convert it into something that the DoD commanders, OSD staff, or the White House needs.
When these contractors do these studies, they're not doing anything magic. All they do is take raw date, apply statistics or some sort of algorithm [a relationship between variables] and then spitting out some sort of guess.
The firms that form this backbone have public reporting requirements:
What Congress want to look at in reviewing the DoD "list of things we don't want to talk about or respond to," is the range of data that a contractor who works on these trade studies would not have to submit.
In other words, when a contractor does a trade-study, they have to gather information. The assumptions that went into the trade-studies for your GITMO and rendition programs are all there: Gulfstream fuel times; fuel point staging points; learning curves; personnel training times; costs to acquire assets; building materials; and training expenditures.
In the end, after alot of monkeying around with the data, they come up with some sort of report, plan, or outline. This stuff gets faxed sometimes by Classified STURON into OSD. That's where GCHQ comes in: We need the copies of these classified trade studies done on the GITMO, rendition, Able Danger, Scorpion, and other programs that are related to the unlawful activities.
This information will form a baseline: What were the planning milestones; what was the lead-time for this planning; who was involved; who attended the meetings; and what types of inputs did we have from the Senior Executive Service.
This is the black program stuff. They've taken money out of a formal program in the DAES, the money has gone through DFAS, and it shows up to reimburse the people engaged in war crimes.
Program managers have briefings that they give. If they're in real trouble, they've had some personal visits with OSD. Guess where these records are maintained?
There are many places:
Each of the program managers who have had their funds raided have a general idea of where the funding was located originally; what it went to; and when it happened. They have various line item budget documents which you can trace form the DAES back to the original contractor and trade studies done; and then weave your way back and forth between the contractor estimates, the funds expenditures, and then to the final data reported in the DAES and Presidents' Budget.
What Congress needs to look at:
At this point, we can only guess: We have no idea what DoD and Conyers have agreed.
There are two options: Either DoD can provide the changes; Conyers can provide the changes; or we can get the revisions through GCHQ.
Either way, the award is going to go to the people who make a timely response.
3020 funding is one of those things they like to say, "We have to go to Congress" on this. Don't confuse this with 3040 or 3400.
When they're building a building in Oman or GITMO, this is 3020. But when they're doing it for an unlawful purpose, your guess is as good as mine.
What Congress wants to look for:
This is where we get back to the Rove-Plame stuff. Remember Rove's security clearance? He has the real risk of losing that clearance because of the terms of his clearance.
Now, here's the magic: What Congress wants to do, not the investigators, is ask the contractors who have these clearances whether they really like getting a paycheck. If they lose their clearance, they lose their paycheck.
Here's what the contractors don't know: How much information does GCHQ have that will show they are lying to Congress?
The contractors have people who are fairly knowledgeable about DoD; but they’re not all that adept on the statutes. This is another way of saying that you need to develop some additional sources [namely GCHQ] who can provide you information on the contractor names, travel times, construction background, job skills, and then get with you planners to develop pa range of possible scenarios:
Congress needs to create a general map of the world. And look at the big picture: What is DoD trying to prevent us from understanding; or what little nuggets is DOD trying to prevent us from understanding.
Again, not knowing the difference between what the original and final requests to DoD are, we have little to know about what DoD may be hiding.
They key: Is to be able to notice what DoD has taken off the table, and then work backwards 'from what is known" and put a picture together:
The key is to know the answers before you talk to the Contractors. Remember, we're talking about war crimes here. They will lie. Law enforcement, DOJ, JTTF, and the DoD criminal investigators are all in this together.
There's also something else to consider when we look at the DoD list of "things we don't want to talk about."
When someone like OSP [Office of Special Plans] puts together a program [regardless whether it is made up or not], they have to go through several stages.
First, someone comes up with an idea. Second, they flesh it out. Third, someone gets tasked to put the plan together.
Fourth, this person then runs around [or one of their deputies], and coordinates all the details. This involves phone calls [traceable, paid for], travel [paid for through DFAS], and a meeting. At least once.
They have three options on plans:
A. Modify something that already exists [this is in the file, and available on the computer, see Certified Fraud Examiner]
B. Create something from scratch
C. Delegate. [don't ask how, just get the plan]
What happens next is a bunch of people figure out:
The key is to look for the classified reports from OSD to the White House. These are generally delivered. Based on the unreliable Secret Service, we do know that sometimes people enter the White House, but there are no records.
So, here's where Congress needs to go back to their allies in the media:
They key here: You want to look at the baseline meetings [which DoD doesn't want you to now about], and then look at what had to happen:
To find this: You're going to want to find the budget people who did the CAIGs, and also find your people who had inputs to he budgets, and then the people who did the funding-coordination with the contractors, DFAS, and OSD.
The point here: When they go through their plans, there's this final document. It has to get shipped: FexEx records!
That's what DoD doesn't want you to look at: Your baseline in-out delivery times on your submittals.
There are in each contract a list of submittals that the contractors have, and also a regular review time: This tracks back to another deliverable called a schedule.
The point: You're looking for holes. You want to find when the delivery times for the FEd-Ex drop off, but the funding is still flowing.
What DoD is going to do is say, "That's not relevant." Sure it is! We have paid alot of money, they squandered it on war crimes, and now we're trying to find out what happened.
Is DoD going to cooperate? Well, DoD doesn't realize it: But they're already stuck in the middle. GCHQ has enough to tie them up.
At this point, the real goal is to get DoD to commit to something, and then compare:
To make a long story short: Even if you believe "what DoD has or hasn't agreed to" is correct, it's important that we get the final list.
That way we can do some analysis on "what they're trying to hide" and come up with some reasonable estimate of what needs to get looked at, or some other analysis that could be done to find out
This isn't a big mystery. Crimes have been committed. The job we have it to put the pieces together.
Here’s a hint. There's more on the way. If you want to join the "right side" now is the time to get busy.
If you want to play stupid, or pretend "you don't know" you're making a bad choice. Time to decide: Do you want a constitution, or do you want tyranny?
Either way, we're going to find out. We can't promise anything. But we can promise if you're hiding, we'll find you.
Did you know that they don't just give out medals? Someone has to write up an award package. That means the information gets loaded up to a computer.
Guess what? On those awards are small little codes. They don't seem important.
But the nice thing about those award orders is that there are special codes related to Units, locations, funding, and identifying information.
Most people don't know how to read them. But if you get the right person, they can convert a 4-character code into a unit; find the person's unit; and tell you exactly where they are deployed, how long they were assigned; and which combat intelligence unit and weapons system they are assigned to.
Who cares? Well, if you've got POTUS [President of the United States] saying X, Y, Z . . . but we've got personnel award records related to activities that "never could have happened, but for the requirement to feed non-sense [lies] to Congress after coming out of certain forward units in Azerbaijan after spending about $10,000 on travel costs, you can trace which commercial contractor and lobbyist most likely supported that effort.
In other words, at the very time that we were all told, "Hay, we in DoD had no clue," DoD has to explain why the State Department was getting certain message traffic from Sibel Edmonds stating there was a problem in Azerbaijan.
Obviously, someone was sent in there under diplomatic cover. That means funding came out of somewhere, was issued against either a Gulfstream for a quick trip out of Dulles into Baku, Azerbaijan; or the money came out of a commercial lobbyist firm and someone from the US came back.
Well, after all this magic, someone in OSD gets a medal. There are records.
You can trace the 4-digit code through DFAS, and work backwards and forwards to find the country; and then cross-reference those events with the message traffic coming in and out of NSA.
Again, the point is that Congress needs to have a full discussion of what was on the original OSD-DOD list; a clear understanding of what got taken off; and then we can do some independent analysis.
Can't be done? On the contrary, this is the type of analysis that's done every day in the same agencies which support the Senate and House intelligence committees. Except this time, instead of going after a foreign target like a Russian sub, we're tracking war criminals inside the United States.
Here's a hint: GCHQ has all the data. We already know the answers.
At this point, the goal is to simply remind Congress that people on the outside who are "too stupid" and "make stupid blogs" know alot more than you could imagine.
If the funding traces back to both CID, NCIS, and OSI . . . .you can bet you bottom dollar that means Congress knows.
This is not a political issue or something for the voters to decide.
These are matters of criminal law.
Here's a hint Congress: if you've agreed to something to be 'taken off the DoD list" and you don't have a good explanation or an answer: You've made a poor choice.
Time to fess up: What was on the original list, what was changed, and what's the "new list of things that DoD will accept."
Once we know that tiny answer, we can tell you which personnel within the SES and Congress knew about this, are involved, and have supported war crimes.
That's really what the Downing Street Memo FOIA request is all about.
Choose: Do you want a Constitution or do you want a tyrant?
Look to Texas. Cindy Sheehan and the swarming Downing Street Memo protestors will figure this out. Either with your help or without you.
You're going to lose.
posted by Constant @ 8:37 AM
<< Home