Constant's pations

If it's more than 30 minutes old, it's not news. It's a blog.

Tuesday, September 07, 2004

FBI I-drive: Where they hid the 9-11 information

As the buildings came tumbling down 3 years ago on 9-11, FBI agents were rolling their eyes. Not because they had a disaster on their hands. The agents had already been briefed on what was possibly going to occur.

Rather, the agents were upset that the buildings actually came crashing down. According to sources close to the NYC FBI office, "the buildings were not supposed to come tumbling down."

Brilliant. Then we found out that DoJ employees like Sibel Edmonds and Robert Wright were threatened if they spoke out about the data that was known, or should have been known in re the 9-11 attacks. Ref; Ref Sibel Edmonds was a translator given access to the data from the NSA. These data feeds showed that much more was known and discussed. Sibel was originally offered permanent status and even a promotion if she kept quiet.

Fast forward to today, 2004. FBI now reveals that they have an I-drive where information is stored, but not disclosed. Ref: Brady Violation The I-drive was used before 9-11, and as far back as 1996. Ref

In layman's terms this means "all the information that was supposed to have been collected" was sitting in an I-drive on the FBI common server. We have yet to hear the full story. Ref; The Democrats had the I-Drive as a "Judiciary Issue" in March 2004. Ref

Bluntly, the FBI has not been revealing 'all that it knows' when issued a subpoena by defense counsel when preparing for trial. In general terms, anytime the government takes someone to court, they have the right to review "all the evidence" that is going to be used, and also have access to any information the prosecutors or government has that might tend to show to the jury that the defendant [defense counsel's client] is innocent.

So you can imagine that in 2004 a few defense counsel [lawyers] are upset. Not only has the FBI not been giving their clients all the information; but the larger problem is that defense counsel has been lied to all these years about "what range of information has been stored." Ref

Again, we have yet to understand to what extent prosecutors and the courts knew or should have known of this "failure to provide all the information in the FBI I-drive." It is not uncommon for the courts to know of police misconduct, trumped up charges, testilying, and other abuses by the government but do nothing.

Yes, the "shock" by the court is merely crocodile tears. The courts fully know that information is stored in private non-public databases. How else can the court explain why people are unable to provide complaints, have no incident reports taken, but the police officers are able to "use information that is not available to the court or defendants" in order to interrogate them.

In other words, what is really going on is the court, prosecutors, and FBI-DOJ have been caught doing what they've long known they were supposed to be doing: Maintaining private databases that was material, and used as the basis for allegations and questions, but never provided to the defendants.

The FBI has this song and dance about "single source data is not used." This is non-sense. Single source data isn't required; FBI regularly relies on anonymous sources and it was the "lack of information" that was the excuse to assume the worst about protestors in NYC.

Indeed, the FBI has a real problem on its hands. It has this I-drive that has "all this information that has not been provided to defense counsel"; and at the same time FBI needs to explain "why haven't there been any apprehensions of AlQueda in the US "despite this secret database."

FBI can't argue "We have high standards of evidence" and "We aren't allowed to investigate." Baloney. There has been nothing in the FBI's way to prevent them from gathering all sorts of open information; the problem the FBI has is the FBI failed prior to 9-11, and is now looking for an excuse to expand its power.

In short, the I-drive contains the information that has not been adequately disclosed; rather than admit "the information was in the I-drive and we didn't adequately use it or forward it," the FBI is creating the ruse that "we need more power."

And then "because the FBI is incompetent," Congress is now saying, "Well, we can't rely on the FBI" [even though the information in the I-drive], so let's expand the power of the CIA to spy domestically.

Take a look at what is going on. FBI fails to act based on information in the I-drive; threatens Sibel to keep quiet; fails to act prior to 9-11 based on knowing there would be an attack; incorrectly assumes the buildings wont fall down; and then, to stonewall, demands under the Patriot Act "even more power" to gather more information to hide in the I-drive.

Questions about the FBI I-Drive

  • Why is the FBI being rewarded for silence?

  • Why wasn't the Senate and House Judiciary Committee made aware of the information on the I-drive related to 9-11? Ref

  • How many cases/convictions does the FBI expect to have overturned now that the full scope of the I-drive data is known?

  • How long will it take to organize and provide to defense counsel all records related to the I-drive?

  • To what extent was Andersen Consulting aware of the I-drive data archiving requirements when it was awarded the contract to provide feedback to DoJ management?

  • What records did DoJ management not provide in a timely manner to the GAO and/or DoJ Inspector General on the I-drive?

  • When the records-access problem was revealed during the Timothy McVeigh trial what efforts within DoJ, GAO, Senate/House Judiciary Staff, or the DoJ IG were made to determine what contribution the I-drive data had to the "inability" to timely provide the many millions of pages [thousands of files] to defense counsel? Ref; Ref

  • Why is the FBI keeping information in the I-drive and not providing this information to defense counsel and prosecutors?

  • What criteria, if any, are supervisory agents within the FBI and Special Agents in Charge using to evaluate whether information should be taken out of the I-drive and put into the case file?

  • What knowledge did agents in the DoJ Office of Professional responsibility [OPR] have of the I-drive; what efforts did OPR make to evaluate whether information in the I-drive was adequately stored, maintained, and logged per procedures in the FBI's Manual on Administrative and Operating Procedures [MAOP]?

  • There were no references to an "I-drive" in the 9-11 commission report; and the only two references to "hard drive" are on pp 221, and pp 276, yet these references have nothing to do with the FBI or DOJ and relate only to personal, non-government computers. What information within the FBI I-drive should have, or was, given to the 9-11 commission?

  • There are over 1069 references to the FBI in the 9-11 report, yet there is no mention of the FBI hard drive. Has the FBI timely provided information in the I-drive to the 9-11 commission; how has it been demonstrated to independent auditors' satisfaction that there is no information in the I-drive related to the 9-11 recommendations?

  • On page 356, Item 6 of the report, the Commission writes, "June 2001: FBI and CIA officials do not ensure that all relevant information regarding the Kuala Lumpur meeting was shared with the Cole investigators at the June 11 meeting." Indeed, FBI and CIA officials were not sharing information at the ~local, field, unit~ level, but this information was ultimately brought together at the DSP. This "information sharing problem" wasn't a problem ~across~ agencies, but ~within~ agencies. Personnel reviewing the I-drive cannot be confident that the original data submissions even got into the I-drive, much less reviewed by a supervisory agent.
    How might the comment be broadened in light of the I-drive?

  • The FBI has already demonstrated it cannot adequately manage and crossflow information within its own agency. Why would giving the FBI "more power" to gather more information [that it was not sharing in house] solve the "cross-agency communication problem" as evidenced by the "I-drive lack of disclosure, crossflow, and review problem"?

  • The only reference to an "FBI interview memo" is on page 359, second para of the report. Yet, this "interview memo" reference has nothing to do with the 9-11 commission review of the interview memos; rather the reference merely acknowledges that the source of the communication was ~not~ the FBI interview memos, but actually the open media. How were "FBI interview memos" reviewed by the 9-11 commission in light of the FBI I-drive; were commissioners denied access to information within the I-drive because there were no specific requests for that information?

  • Which findings need to be re-examined wittin the 9-11 report in re the FBI Hard drive?

  • Have all reasonable 9-11 commission requests for information been satisfied now that we know the existence of the I-drive?

  • How long will it take to re-examine the 9-11 commission recommendations in light of the I-drive?

  • Which recommendations would be changed, modified, rescinded, or expanded?

  • Were any 9-11 commission recommendations not issued, that would otherwise had been issued had the I-drive information been known?

  • What recommendations were removed from the final 9-11 commission report that might otherwise be re-added in light of the information in the FBI I-drive?

  • How many detentions in NYC at the RNC were based on information within the I=drive?

  • How much information gleaned from Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, or Afghanistan interrogations were gleaned by Counter intelligence Field Activity [CIFA] personnel, and have been stored in the I-drive?

  • To what extent was information in the FBI I-drive used as the basis to establish procedures within DoJ, CIFA, and/or the Pentagon on methods to use to put pressure on prisoners in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and/or Afghanistan?

  • What access did White House General Counsel Gonzalez have to any information on the FBI I-drive when making assessments about the Presidents liability for allowing, permitting, failing to stop, or overseeing troops engaged in torture, abuse, and harassment of prisoners?

  • Was the FBI I-drive information used as a repository for information that "showed the fruits" of Guantanamo; were I-drive entries monitored to evaluate to what extent harassment, torture, and abuse in Abu Ghraib were "achieving desired results" or "the treatment was justified"?

  • To what extent was funding provided through Columbus, Ohio Defense Finance and Accounting Service {DFAS] to fund personnel temporary duty [TDY], travel, programs, efforts, administrative efforts, information technology, or consulting fees in order to maintain, archive, store, and otherwise manage information on the FBI I-drive for purposes of supporting DoJ, DoD, and/or CIFA intelligence gathering?

  • How much information in the FBI I-drive or other CIFA databases would show that personnel at GITMO are innocent?

  • Why isn't the information that would show these people are innocent being revealed and provided in a timely manner?

  • More troubling, why isn't the "burden of proof" on the government to show why they are holding someone, as opposed to the current method of requiring the burden to rest with the accused to show why they are innocent?

  • In Hamdi, the Supreme Court stated that we have not outlawed the constitution and writ of habeous corupus has not been suspended; and that detainees are entitled to have their detentions heard in US courts. Why is a "lesser compliance standard" permitted in allowing the military to conduct this review [in the executive branch, as opposed to ~US courts~ in the Judicial Branch], and put the burden of proof on the detainee to prove innocense; how can innocense be "proven" when the "information needed to proove that innocense" is not released, not avaialable, and in many cases not known to exist within the FBI I-drive?

  • How can the government claim it is engaging in "checks and balances" when: The executive branch is conducting reviews of itself; there is no judicial branch review or oversight of the detentions; and the information reviewed may not necessarily include FBI I-drive information, nor necessarily meet the Brady Standard for ensuring that all information be provided?

  • Information in the FBI I-drive is "not deemed credible" nor of probabite value to present to the defense counsel or prosecutors to sustain a conviction. Why do we allow "accusations on innocent to justify detention" on the basis of inforation in the FBI I-drive;

  • Although this information is not deemed reliable enough to present to prosecutors or the corts and outside the Brady-reporting requirement, why is information within the FBI I-drive used as the basis to detain people in Guantanmo?