Constant's pations

If it's more than 30 minutes old, it's not news. It's a blog.

Tuesday, August 31, 2004

TWA 800: The government cover-up helped contribute to 9-11 and the bogus WMD claims

Noticing the patterns in ineffectual government. Knowing what continues to go wrong, and what you can do to mitigate the risks. TWA 800:

The failure to find and publicize the real problems contributed to 9-11 and the unlawful war in Iraq

Fighting gravity doesn't make it go away, nor cause miraculous levitation.

The legacy of TWA 800 friendly-fire incident was "no consequences on DoD."

The government pressure on the media during the TWA 800 shoot-down proved the media could be manipulated to accept the malfeasance in re 9-11 and the unlawful war in Iraq

A house of cards is not made more sturdy by outlawing the wind.

What broke down during TWA800 and how those systemic problems got us into 9-11 and facilitated a war based on illusory evidence

That which is not understood or repaired shall simply require an ever grater disaster to focus the needed attention. That which is not fixed will simply continue to fester and spread like a cancer.
  • No consequences for the following types of misconduct: Lying, providing false information, reporting conclusions not supported by facts
  • Integrity issues
  • Fear of consequences for speaking out
  • Systemic rewards for silence
  • Able to harass the public and other investigators into silence
  • No effective outside mechanism to arrive with credible information at odds with the official story
  • Govt failure to ensure lessons learned cross-flowed

  • Policy-driven fact finding

  • Government perceived advantages to inaction
  • Force management
  • No visible consequences for failure

  • Inadequate provisions to ensure that disastrous results and conditions were effectively identified and mitigated well before the risks occurred

  • Operational procedures were reviewed only in light of the isolated problem; broader approach and review did not occur due to lack of visibility, ineffective cross-flow, and no visible sign or signal to the public that the system was effectively responding
  • Challenging government propaganda
  • Inadequate systems in place to get straight answers to questions raised related to issues contrary to the US government position

  • Ineffective forces within the Judicial branch to compel Congress and the Executive to arrive at conclusions based on facts, not fiction

  • No effective fact-finding mechanism that adequately brought forth opposing opinions in a public forum and required a disinterested body to independently deliberate over the merits of the theories, facts, evidence, and systemic problems.

  • There was no rigorous approach, nor effective counterweight to the executive to arrive at a different result. If we recall back to the days of the Magna Carta, the King essentially had no choice; today's executive has the choice of suppressing information. This is not related to national security, but to ensuring that the executive has continued ineffective oversight, lack of accountability, and no meaningful problem-resolution.

  • Botched investigations
  • Investigators were more concerned with their jobs, than finding the truth

  • Fact finding failed to identify, address the problem related to command and control, interoperability, adequately flight control, adequacy of the range officials in ensuring that potential civilian targets were out of range

  • They may have been able to fix the interoperability problems within the TWA800 shoot down; but there was no broader look at "what problems with oversight" are we failing to address by not knowing what really happened. It is likely that the abysmal problems with Congress' ineffectual ability to adequately oversee the Executive Branch would have come to light and been addressed far earlier had TWA800 and other disasters had adequate public vetting.

  • Fact finders were convinced that there would be rewards

  • We saw during Sibel Edmonds, that the "fact finders" would not be bought, and that they would speak out about DoJ abuses

  • Fact finders could be convinced to be quiet; if they did not keep quiet they were smeared. We saw Scott Ritter speak out about the WMD errors; despite the smears, his concerns have borne out.

  • Credibility of fact finding
  • Policy-driven fact finding

  • Fact finders were not independent. US government believed later that it could control the fact finders in Iraq and prior to 9-11. Rather than deal with problems prior to 9-11, the repeated audit reports were simply ignored.
  • In re WMD, the government learned the incorrect lesson from TWA800 that if the "right" policy were pursued, the public would continue to support the objectives, regardless the facts. We see that the plummeting public support for the war in Iraq shows that even flawed policies cannot sustain themselves when there are serious questions about the legacy of the action, the results, and how effective the leadership was in taking us in the "right direction."

  • Translating physical evidence into facts
  • Failure to understand that focusing on the story, without regard to the physical evidence does not solve the problem

  • Physical evidence does not lie; and the failure to find the true story ensured that the underlying problems creating that physical evidence went unremedied

  • Physical evidence contrary to the official story was buried, hidden, removed without adequate tracking, comparison, or tabulation by independent or impartial observers

  • Conclusions discredited when contrary to government position

  • Eye-witness testimony discredited when contrary to the preferred explanation

  • Government agents actively harassed, intimidated and dissuaded witnesses from discussing observations contrary to the official story.
    We saw this in the American Airlines shoot down over NYC after 9-11; and also the FBI harassment of the witnesses who saw Arabs getting flight training at Pensacola Florida. [Ref: MadCow Productions]

  • Where physical evidence identified an inconvenient theory or conclusion, that information and conclusions [not the evidence] was discredited

  • Failure to understand that focusing on the story, without regard to the physical evidence does not solve the problem

  • Physical evidence does not lie; and the failure to find the true story ensured that the underlying problems creating that physical evidence went unremedied

  • Government was able to control access to the TWA800 site; the government learned the wrong lesson that it could explain itself out of fiction by simply asserting a truth. This wishful thinking could not be sustained in re the Iraq "WMD". The US government could not control who got was in Iraq, nor could the US government credibly create something that did not exist. It was far too difficult to import prohibited material back into Iraq to create a ruse-WMD "find" that it was for the government to make inconvenient TWA evidence disappear; or provide false evidence in re TWA.

  • Premium placed on conclusions supporting sponsored-theory, regardless physical evidence; insufficient forces capable of physically proving the truth. The government got into trouble when there was no physical evidence to be obtained; it is impossible to create something that is not there in an area where the US cannot control.
  • Failure to have independent investigations
  • Conclusions and facts not palatable

  • Lack of control of independent investigators

  • No provision made to allow for an outside investigator

  • Once the truth was known, the demand for change and accountability would be far higher and greater than tolerable; too many people would lose their jobs

  • Damage control: Greater government interest in controlling the message than finding the truth

  • Mistaken belief that the agreed-to story could be justified, that the naysayers could be discredited

  • Mistaken belief that the underlying problems need not be understood

  • Mistaken belief that it was easier not to discuss the real problem

  • Mistaken belief that the issue would pass with time and would be overshadowed by other issues

  • Mistaken belief that the contrary evidence could be controlled

  • Mistaken belief that it was easier to discredit messengers and rewrite history than actually solve the real problem

  • Mistaken belief that it was easier not to discuss the real problem

  • Media independence
  • Government pressure on corporate managers

  • Advertisers pressure on media to avoid mentioning friendly-fire

  • Media more concerned with access to unreliable government in the future than in finding facts and being willing to fire their source today

  • Media more concerned with access to sources and advertising revenue than obtaining immediate and accurate information

  • Mistaken belief there existed no alternative media outlets

  • Short-term focus on ratings without long-term consideration to public confidence in American media
  • Information access
  • Valid outside conclusions at odds with government story rebuffed with outlandish claims

  • Independent analysts had their conclusions ignored, while their personal reputations were called into question based on information unrelated to the falsified data

  • The systemic government flaws and culture [of covering-up malfesance in government which surfaced during the TWA 800 shoot down] continued during 9-11 and the preparation for war in Iraq

    9-11 was an excuse to divert needed public outrage on malfeasance in government to external excuses

    Covering up TWA 800 meant the population did not have the information needed to advocate for change.

    Confidence based on deception is a house of cards.